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The popular reception and commercial success of Mel Gibson’s The Pas-
sion brought to the fore just how forcefully Christian images and notions
of martyrdom and victimization resonate with large segments of the
American public. One might expect that at the height of US power and
military prowess a 1980s era Rambo type character, rather than a sub-
missive Aramaic speaking Jesus, would be more likely to capture the
public imagination. However, as Elliott Colla elucidates (see p. 4), The
Passion represents a powerful example of the increasing presence of
Christian evangelical themes in American popular culture; evangelical
millennial literature is growing at staggering rates. Such images may be
playing a role in perpetuating a culture of righteousness and, ultimately,
a politics of domination and violence, particularly over the Muslim
“other.” 
The paradoxical invoking of martyrdom as a justification for violence is
by no means unique to the US. A similar logic has been developing in the
Muslim East over the last decades, albeit as the result of markedly differ-
ent power dynamics. The use of self-imposed martyrdom, i.e. suicide, has
been one of the tactics used—even if intermittently—by groups in-
volved in the struggle for Palestinian national liberation such as Hamas (Damir-Geilsdorf, p.10).
The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 added another dimension to the phenomenon
of suicide martyrdom; not only were those attacks unprecedented for the enormity of their
scale, but they were not linked to a specific national liberation movement making their ra-
tionale—if one can call it that—far more nebulous. The use of suicide as a strategy in politi-
cal struggle is neither indigenous to the Middle East, nor an inherent feature of Islam, but
has its roots in radical secular modern movements, an example of which can be found in the
Tamil Tigers of Sri Lanka (Hassan, p. 8). Martyrdom has also been a central trope in Israeli na-
tional identity and politics where the historic victimization and suffering of the Jews often
gets invoked as a justification for policies of subjugation and violence against Palestinians.
The overlapping cultures of victimization and martyrdom in all cases have clearly yielded
catastrophic results and done little to advance causes, whatever they may be.
Given the current political conditions in the Arab World, it comes as little surprise that The
Passion was a hit there. In part, the movie was seen as exposing the cruelty of oppressors,
evoking parallels, for example, with the oppression of Palestinians by the
Jewish state. Very few governments in the region banned the film, and—
in a departure from Islamic doctrine—the religious establishment, in
many cases, received The Passion favourably while overlooking their
standard fatwa against the graphic portrayal of the prophets, which, in
Islam, includes Jesus. Moreover, few voices openly criticised the film’s
depiction of Jesus as being the Son of God and being crucified, both
claims being considered null and void in Islamic teaching. Visions of mar-
tyrdom, even from such unlikely sources as a US produced evangelical
themed film, can serve as potential instruments for political and cultural
mobilization.1
The valorization of martyrdom, whether through Christian and Jewish
images of victimization, or Islam inspired Hamas suicide attacks, pro-
motes not only a politics of violence, but perpetuates separation and
mistrust. In order to prevent “holy wars,” peaceful alternatives to conflict,
as Nobel Peace Prize laureate Shirin Ebadi emphasizes (see p. 30), must
be realized through non-violent, non-sectarian, and more democratic
strategies.
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Note
1. See on the reception of The Passion of the Christ in the Arab World the Middle East 
Media Research Institute (MEMRI) report, “Reactions in the Arab Media to ‘The Passion of the
Christ’” by Aluma Dankowitz (21 April 2004, http://www.memri.de/uebersetzungen_analysen/
themen/liberal_voices/ges_passion_christ_21_04_04.html).
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The Middle East is currently saturated with talk about “change.” Yet,
the resiliency of authoritarianism and patriarchy in the region coupled
with the evident failure of “democratization”-by-conquest have
plunged this part of the world into a depressing impasse. The region’s
Muslim majority is caught up between, on the one hand, authoritarian
regimes or fundamentalist inspired opposition, both of which tend to
impose severe social control in the name of nation and religion, and
on the other, flagrant foreign intervention and occupation in the
name of democratization. We witness, then, a clear abuse of faith,
freedom, and the faithful. In the midst of this, however, one thing has
become clearer. If a meaningful change is to occur in these societies it
should come from within, through the self-assertion of societal forces
in a democratic direction. But the monumental question is how? 
What options do ordinary citizens have when faced, in political, eco-
nomic or cultural domains, with constraining forces and institutions?
Some might choose complicity or “loyalty” by joining the mainstream
currents. Others, while not approving of the existing arrangements,
may well disengage, surrendering their rights to voice concerns and
thereby exiting the political stage altogether in the hope that things
will somehow change someday. Then again, others may choose to ex-
press their contention loudly and clearly even if it means remaining
on the margins of society: to be vocal but marginal, or, even worse, ir-
relevant. It is, however, extremely challenging to be heavily present at
the heart of society, to struggle for liberation, and yet maintain one’s
integrity; to be effective but also principled. More precisely, I am re-
ferring to that delicate art of presence in harsh circumstance, the abili-
ty to create social space within which those individuals who refuse to
exit, can advance the cause of human rights, equality and justice, and
do so under formidable political conditions. It is this difficult strategy,
demanding sharp vision, veracity, and above all endurance and ener-
gy, that holds the most promise. Meaningful change in the Muslim
Middle East may well benefit from such a protracted strategy. 
The public life and activism of the Iranian lawyer and Noble Peace
Prize Laureate, Shirin Ebadi, symbolizes that art of persistent pres-
ence. She gives testimony to, and exemplifies, the profound desire of
millions of women in Iran and elsewhere in the Muslim world for a
meaningful social presence. She became the first Muslim woman
judge in Iran and held the presidency of the city court of Tehran until
the Islamic Revolution, when she was forced to resign on the grounds
that women could not be judges in Islam. Yet she, along with a host of
women activists (religious and non-religious) refused to remain silent;
they waged a relentless campaign by writing, reasoning, reinterpret-
ing the Islamic texts, engaging in public debate and lobbying to re-
verse that unjust ruling until women were once more able to serve as
judges under the Islamic Republic. But such a struggle, this double
strategy of no-silence and no-violence, could not have gone very far
without the general societal support for change. The idea of Muslim
female judges, only one instance of the struggles taking place for gen-
der equality in Islam, had already gained a great deal of public legiti-
macy through grassroots campaigns of rights activists such as Ebadi,
Mehranguiz Kar, Shahla Sherkat, and many other women and men. Its
appeal was further rooted in the yearning of Iranian women, in gener-
al, to assert their public presence in society, not necessarily by under-
taking extra-ordinary activities, but through practices of everyday life
such as working outside the home, pursuing higher education, en-
gaging in sports activities, performing art and music, travelling, or ex-
ecuting banking transactions in place of their husbands. And these
very ordinary practices, once normalized among the general public,
were to undermine gender hierarchy in their society while imposing
their logic on the political, legal and economic institutions of the
state. 
Understandably, reform of authoritarian states would require dis-
tinct arduous strategies. Nevertheless, societal change remains indis-
pensable if a meaningful democratic reform of the state is to be sus-
tained. Change in a society’s sensibilities is the precondition for far-
reaching democratic transformation. While social change occurs, part-
ly as the unintended outcome of structural processes such as migra-
tion, urbanization, demographic shifts, or the rise in literacy, it is also
partly the result of global factors and flows, as well as the effect of the
exchange of ideas, information, and models. But the most crucial ele-
ment for democratic reform is an active citizenship, a sustained pres-
ence of individuals, groups and movements in every available social
space, whether institutional or informal, in which it asserts its rights
and fulfils its responsibilities. For it is precisely in such spaces that al-
ternative discourses, practices and politics are produced. 
I envision a strategy whereby every social group generates change
in society through active citizenship in all immediate domains: chil-
dren at home and schools, students in colleges, teachers in the class-
rooms, workers in shop floors, athletes in stadiums, artists through
their mediums, intellectuals in media, and women at home and in
public domains. This means that not only are they to voice their
claims, broadcast violations done unto them, and make themselves
heard, but also take the responsibility of excelling in what they do. An
authoritarian regime should not be a reason for not producing excel-
lent novels, brilliant handicrafts, math champions, world class ath-
letes, dedicated teachers, or a global film industry. Excellence is
power; it is identity. By art of presence, I imagine the way in which a
society, through the practices of daily life, may regenerate itself by af-
firming the values that deject the authoritarian personality, get ahead
of its elites, and become capable of enforcing its collective sensibili-
ties on the state and its henchmen. And in this, the role of women in
challenging gender hierarchy in and outside home is indispensible.
By art of presence, active citizenry, I do not necessarily mean perva-
sive social movements or collective mobilization for political transfor-
mation, although such imagined citizenry is likely to welcome large-
scale collective action. For authoritarian rule not only impedes con-
tentious actions, but it is unrealistic to expect society to be in a con-
stant state of vigour, vitality, and collective struggles. Society, with its
ordinary people, also gets tired, demoralized, and even repressed. Ac-
tivism, the extra-ordinary practices to produce social change, is the
stuff of activists, who may energize collective sentiments when the
opportunity allows. The point is not to reiterate the political signifi-
cance of contentious movements, nor to stress on the necessity of un-
dercutting the coercive power of the states. The point rather is to
stress how lay citizens, with their ordinary practices of everyday life,
through the art of presence or active citizenry, may recondition the
established political elites and refashion state institutions into their
habitus.
There is of course a role for outsiders to play. Instead of interfering,
they can offer courage and solidarity by recognizing those who persist
in the need for change through their active presence. Recognition en-
ergizes contenders and diminishes their despair in harsh political cir-
cumstance. The acknowledgment of Shirin Ebadi serves as a fine ex-
ample.
A S E F  B A Y A T
The Art of Presence
Asef Bayat is the Academic Director of ISIM and the ISIM Chair at Leiden University. He
wishes to thank Kaveh Ehsani for his critical comments on an earlier version of this piece. 
E-mail: a.bayat@isim.nl
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It is hard to avoid the pious denuncia-
tions of Islam in contemporary Ameri-
can popular culture. This is not a new
development, of course. Hollywood
has long libelled the Arab world and
Islam with stock characters like “the
treacherous Arab thief,” “the fanatical
Muslim,” or “the Palestinian terrorist.”
But such clichés, once confined largely
to the realm of fiction and fantasy, are
now crucial to mainstream political
analysis. Corporate broadcasting and
astute academic journals are flooded
with commentaries that single out reli-
gion, specifically Islam, to describe
what is wrong with Arab societies:
Islam is said to explain everything from misogyny to poverty, from ter-
rorism to fascism. More than anything else, Islam is now widely under-
stood to be the reason why Arab society “lacks” indigenous democrat-
ic traditions, respect for human rights and religious tolerance. It does
not matter whether the term “Islam” is ever defined, consistently de-
ployed, or even whether it actually explains the things it purports to
do. Regardless of the inconsistency or dubious simplicity of this analy-
sis, its core message is clear: the problem with Arab society is the cen-
tral role played by religion in its culture.
The above observations about mainstream US discourse on Islam are
admittedly banal. But they become quite intriguing when we view
them in the context of the prominent place of evangelical Christianity
in contemporary popular American culture. Part of what makes the
American critique of Islam’s place in Arab culture so significant is that
it often misleadingly implies that religion is not important at home.
Perhaps because of the implicitly secular cultural bent of book and film
critics, scant attention has been paid to the fact that since the mid-
1990s millenarian Christian texts—fictional and otherwise—have been
appearing on American best-seller lists. This spring, tellingly, such
texts have dominated best-seller lists from The New York Times and
Wall Street Journal to USA Today and Publishers Weekly, just as Mel Gib-
son’s The Passion of the Christ has towered over competitors at the box
office. Together the popularity of these texts suggests that many
American audiences are viewing contemporary events in the Middle
East through an extremist evangelical lens.
Left Behind 
Tim LaHaye and Jerry B. Jenkins’ twelve-part Left Behind series of
evangelical novels fictionalises eschatological accounts of the Millen-
nium, from Rapture to Armageddon to the restoration of Christ’s rule
on earth.1 The recent publication of the final instalment of the series,
Glorious Appearing, has been the most popular of all. With sales of
over sixty million copies, the Left Behind series may become the most
popular fictional series ever sold in the United States, outstripping
novels, like the popular DaVinci Code (which, significantly, also treats
core theological questions of modern Christianity), by a factor of al-
most 10 to 1. How to summarize the story told in these novels? The
opening line of the third novel, Nicolae, puts it most succinctly: “It was
the worst of times; it was the worst of times.” The authors claim to be
faithfully following the Biblical prophecies alluded to in the book of
Daniel and Revelations. In reality, they tell the story of an under-
ground, worldwide network of right-
eous believers waging holy war in the
Middle East against a Great Satan. 
In the process of telling their tale of
the rise of the anti-Christ and his de-
feat by Jesus Christ, the authors reca-
pitulate familiar pieties of the Ameri-
can evangelical right. Poverty, crime
and disease are tribulations sent to the
world by a wrathful God: only the fool-
ish or the proud would try reform.
Peace and disarmament are com-
pelling signs of approaching Ar-
mageddon: only the naïve or the god-
less would promote them. Multilin-
gualism and intellectualism are signs
of cynicism and worldliness. Secular Europe is godless and decadent.
The UN is a nefarious agency undermining the sovereignty of the USA.
When the anti-Christ takes over as UN Secretary General and changes
the balance of power in the Security Council, American militia forces
lead the struggle against him.
If the novels’ moral compass and foreign policy recommendations
seem disconcerting, consider their portrayal of gender, sexuality and
race. Female characters are insecure, overly-emotional girls in need of
strong sensitive men-leaders with names like “Buck” and “Captain
Steele.” Unmarried women are a problem in the novels—one sexual
temptress blossoms into the Harlot of Babylon. Abortion and homo-
sexuality are recurring anxieties among the core group of Crusaders
fighting Satan who are, not surprisingly, white Americans and Ashke-
nazi converts to Christianity. People of colour appear occasionally in
the background and are caricatured in ways that recall minstrel
shows. While the representation of Muslims as misguided fanatics is
certainly troubling, the novels single out Jews for special treatment. It
is not just that the series characterizes Jews as parsimonious busi-
nessmen or Pharisees more attuned to dead law than to God’s living
spirit. The novels assert that Jews might have been God’s Chosen Peo-
ple, but that they failed to recognize the true messiah. Only righteous
Jews, that is, Jews who become born-again Christians, are depicted as
heroes.
It is difficult to imagine the series attracting readers from outside
the evangelical fold, but the size of sales indicates otherwise. The se-
ries’ publisher, Tyndale House, has also developed its own Armaged-
don industry which includes CD-ROM, graphic-novel editions, and
slick live-action video and audio adaptations of Left Behind. Left Be-
hind: The Kids Series has been designed for young readers. Most alarm-
ing of all, there is the Left Behind: Military Series, novels which tell the
story of the Army Rangers and Marine Special Forces involved in the
military aspects of Armageddon. Any resemblance to current US inter-
ventions in the Middle East are not accidental. As one blurb states:
“Reading the Left Behind series has been a haunting experience, es-
pecially since September 11, with the war on terror, the struggles be-
tween the US and the United Nations, and the war in Iraq and its af-
termath. Add to that the violence in Israel over the past two [sic] years
with the current tensions over the ‘roadmap to peace’ and you get a
sense that events described in the Left Behind series seem quite plau-
sible.”2
Martyrdom
The mainstream American critique of the
centrality of Islam in Arab culture often
implies that religion is not important at home.
Yet evangelical Christianity has been
occupying an increasingly more prominent
place in contemporary popular American
culture. Just as Mel Gibson’s, The Passion of
the Christ, has towered over competitors at
the box office, so too have millenarian
Christian texts—fictional and otherwise—
been appearing in, and dominating, American
best-seller lists. The popularity of these texts
suggests that many American audiences are
viewing contemporary events in the Middle
East through an extremist evangelical lens.
A Culture of 
Righteousness and
Martyrdom
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Martyrdom
Suspension of disbelief?
The Left Behind novels are not presented as mere fantasy. While there
is no mistaking the fictional stamp of the books—they are marketed as
fiction and they pay homage to pop genres, from Harlequin bodice rip-
pers to Tom Clancy military thrillers, from 1970s disaster movies to
episodes of MacGyver—the authors claim to have faithfully rendered
Biblical prophecy literally. 
Questions of realism and literalism are crucial to any reading of the
novels, for even though American evangelicals approach the Bible in
English translation, and even though their theologians are largely untu-
tored in Hebrew, Aramaic and Greek, they hold that the events de-
scribed in such prophecy are not metaphorical, and that their interpre-
tation never strays from the letter of God’s word.
The novels explain the “Pre-millennial” theology currently popular in
evangelical churches, which states that righteous (i.e., born-again)
Christians will be “raptured” into Heaven before the Tribulations de-
scribed in Biblical prophecy come to pass. Moreover, in this rendering,
prophecies described in the book of Daniel and Revelations are said to
refer to present times. Of particular interest to this interpretation is the
establishment of the state of Israel, an event which, they assert, foretells
the imminent arrival of the End Times. Evangelicals interpret other
events and possibilities in Palestine/Israel—such as the Jewish state’s
ongoing hostilities with the Arab world or the destruction of the al-Aqsa
Mosque for the purposes of rebuilding of the Temple—as fulfilled or
looming events prophesized in the Bible. This explains part of the un-
yielding fervour that evangelical Christians have for Israel, and why they
accept the possibility of escalated conflict in the Middle East with hope
rather than trepidation. Like other evangelicals, the publishers of Left
Behind hold that Israeli settlements are a “super-sign” of prophecy, and
thus should be encouraged. Similarly, they assert that the US removal of
Saddam Hussein from power also makes possible the “rebuilding of
Babylon as a major economic centre for the Middle East” which, along
with struggles within the European Union and a possible schism within
the Episcopal Church, are welcome signs of the End Times.3
But are these novels fiction? When the theological-political basis of
such fictions proceeds with the confidence of literalism, it is difficult to
say what the standards for judging realism, let alone fictionality, would
be. Like fiction, the Left Behind novels are designed to play with belief.
But whereas fiction traditionally asks its readers to suspend disbelief in
order that their imagination is broadened, these novels engage their
readers’ imagination only in order to confirm what they already believe.
Mobilizing righteousness: 
A new American culture of martyrdom?
As suggested by the awkward “realism” of its Aramaic and Latin dia-
logue, and its excruciating recreation of Jesus’ torture and crucifixion,
Mel Gibson addressed his The Passion of the Christ to this popular de-
mand for “literalist” renditions of Biblical narrative. Gibson’s Passion has
caused a storm of debate, not just for its portrayal of Jews, but also for
its extremely graphic violence. But for all its failures, the film succeeds in
one thing: it conveys an indelible image of Jesus suffering at the hands
of sadistic tormentors. In more than one interview, Gibson has con-
firmed that his film seeks to create a sense of pathos in his audiences. 
But what kind of pathos? The discomfort effected by the film is star-
tling: we watch long scenes of torture, fore-knowing their outcome, yet
unable to stop them from happening. The structure of this experi-
ence—watching someone being brutalized without being able to pre-
vent it—is arguably one of humiliation. The film engages a rhetoric of
shame—that is to say, of shaming the viewer. As Gibson put it, the use-
fulness of such images is to make “you feel not only compassion, but
also a debt. You want to repay him for the enormity of his sacrifice.”4 
Significantly, the moral debt to which Gibson’s film aspires overlaps
with the guiding moral sentiment offered by the Left Behind series:
righteousness. The Passion of the Christ asks us not just to be ashamed
by Christ’s victimization but also outraged by it. It also asks us to accept
the scorn of the world as proof of our debt to him. Likewise, the Left Be-
hind novels present characters who know that they are right, and that
God is on their side. In doing so, they encourage readers not to fear the
scorn of a fallen world, but to invite it as confirmation of their right-
eousness. From this sense of shame-righteousness, it is perhaps only a
small step to accepting martyrdom as a normal practice of faith. Gib-
son’s film offers a super-heroic model of such martyrdom. The Left Be-
hind series offers more home-grown examples of the same. The novels
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glorify in increasingly brutal
detail the martyrdom of
“tribulation saints.”
It is indeed strange that, at
the very height of American
power, its popular culture
would be so invested in nar-
ratives and images of Christ-
ian martyrdom and victim-
ization. Such representa-
tions do not reflect an un-
derlying reality of actual
Christian suffering in the
United States. Instead, they
create an aura of spiritual
righteousness around Amer-
ican power as it moves in the
world. We might remember
that whether in post-WWI
Germany, or more recently
in Serbia, Israel, and Rwanda,
or in the US following 9-11,
the deployment of military
force has all too often been
preceded by a popular dis-
course of national victimiza-
tion. This history suggests
that since it is no longer con-
sidered acceptable to en-
gage in political violence ex-
cept in the cause of defence,
we should be wary whenever we see cultures, as in the US right now,
which invest so heavily in images of victimization. Such images—re-
gardless of their veracity or applicability—are essential for legitimising
violence and military intervention.
Popular evangelical culture offers images of suffering and millenari-
anism that bring the confidence of literalist evangelicalism to bear on
the prospect of long term American rule in the Middle East, a prospect
that is as disorienting to most Americans as it is frightening to the re-
gion’s inhabitants. Those who doubt whether Christian millenarianism
is related to US foreign policy owe it to themselves to read the Left Be-
hind novels, especially since there is much to suggest that American
evangelicals are reading these works not as fictions, but as the faithful
rendering of real-life prophecies in which Americans figure as righteous
mujahideen. While it is unclear whether President Bush is a reader of
the Left Behind series, he has often declared his appreciation for evan-
gelism. And when he speaks of “evildoers,” or warns that “you’re either
with us or against us,” he is very consciously citing the same language
that provides the vocabulary for the Left Behind novels. 
Admittedly, for the US to attempt to pursue its imperial policies in the
Middle East in the name of the millenarian ideology so widespread in its
culture would be a disaster: it would not only generate more opposition
in the region, it would alienate many in the mainstream US. Indeed, the
current administration recognizes this problem
each time it vociferously dissociates its policies
from the millenarian dogmas its policy makers
and military officers (and constituents) espouse so
publicly elsewhere. Currently, the idea of Holy War
against Islam would be abhorrent to most main-
stream Christians and secular liberals, even those
whose ideas about the use of geopolitical force
against Islam are not radically divergent from
those of the evangelicals. But if the Left Behind se-
ries is any indication, millions of Americans are
reading about, and perhaps even praying for, just
such a Holy War. 
Notes
1. Tim LaHaye has long been a prominent part
of the radical right in California. A graduate
of the evangelical Bob Jones University,
LaHaye used his position as evangelical
preacher in Southern California to help
found “Californians for Biblical Morality,”
a key player in the rise of the US religious
right during the 1980s. Before Left Behind,
author Jerry B. Jenkins was best known for
his biographies of evangelical athletes.
2. The official Left Behind series site is,
http://leftbehind.com.
3. The Left Behind series: Interpreting the
Signs, http://secure.agoramedia.com/
leftbehind/index_leftbehind15.asp?
4. The Left Behind Series: Newsletter Archive,
http://leftbehind.com/channelfree.asp?page
id=932.
Elliott Colla is Assistant Professor of Comparative Literature
at Brown University.
E-mail: Elliott_Colla@Brown.edu
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Suicide attacks—the targeted use of
self-destructing humans against a per-
ceived enemy for political ends—are a
modern method with ancient roots.
From as early as the first century AD
the Jewish sect of Zealots (sicari) in
Roman occupied Judea used suicide as
a tactic against their enemies. Suicide
attacks in the Middle East can be
traced to the early Christian Crusades
in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries;
the Islamic Order of Assassins (also
known as Ismailis-Nazari) was actively
involved in similar activities. In the late nineteenth century Russian an-
archists and nationalist groups used suicide attacks, their preferred
method, to destroy and terrorise the enemy because they regarded it
as a source of legitimacy for the cause and a rallying point for future re-
cruits.
Suicide attacks were employed by the Japanese when they used
kamikaze pilots to attack American forces in the Pacific during World
War II. In April 1945 during the Battle of Okinawa, some 2000
kamikazes rammed their fully fuelled fighter planes into more than
300 ships, killing 5000 Americans in the most costly naval battle in the
history of the United States2. In the mid-twentieth century with the
development of better explosives and means of detonating targets,
suicide attacks declined in popularity amongst terrorist groups and
were replaced by remotely detonated explosives, hostage taking and
attacks on airlines. As counter terrorism methods began to improve in
the later half of the twentieth century methods of terrorist attacks
began to evolve as well. 
Suicide attacks in the Middle East
The advent of modern era suicide terrorism arguably began with the
attacks on the Iraqi embassy in Beirut in December 1981. In October
1983 the Hezbollah or Party of God, a Lebanese Shiite militant group
that has become a major force in Lebanese politics and society, carried
out suicide attacks on a US Army base in Beirut, which killed nearly 300
American and French servicemen. This led to the withdrawal of the
American and French multinational peacekeeping force in Lebanon
making suicide attacks an effective strategic political weapon. By 1985
the use of suicide attacks had succeeded in forcing Israel to abandon
most of southern Lebanon.
In the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, suicide attacks began with attacks
by Hezbollah trained members of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad
(PIJ) aimed at derailing the Oslo Peace Accord. In 1988, PIJ founder
Fathi Shiqaqi had formulated the guidelines for “exceptional” martyr-
dom operations involving suicide attacks. Suicide attacks are now
plaguing the occupying forces in Iraq. They are becoming a weapon of
choice among the Iraqi resistance groups because of their lethality and
media impact. In general, suicide attacks constitute about three per-
cent of all terrorist incidents but account for almost half of the deaths
due to terrorism. When the US troops entered an abandoned factory
shed in Fallujah, Iraq during their siege of the city on 11 April 2004,
they found a large cache of leather belts stuffed with explosives along
with bomb making instructions. This is the first time since the thir-
teenth century that suicide attacks are being employed as a weapon of
coercion in Iraq.
The strategic logic of suicide attacks
Why are suicide attacks becoming so frequent and what motivates
the perpetrators of such attacks? A groundbreaking study by Universi-
ty of Chicago political scientist Robert Papp has shown that there is lit-
tle connection between religious fun-
damentalism (and for that matter reli-
gion) and suicide attacks. The leading
instigator of suicide attacks between
1980 and 2001 were the Tamil Tigers in
Sri Lanka, a radical nationalist group
whose members were from Hindu fam-
ilies but who were adamantly opposed
to religion. Religion is used effectively
by the Palestinian radical groups
Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and
the al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades to recruit
suicide attackers and to raise opera-
tional funds. But the leadership of these organizations has a secular
goal: to coerce the Israeli government to change its policies and to
leave Palestinian territories. Even if some suicide attackers are irra-
tional or fanatical, the leadership of the groups that recruit and direct
them are not.3
Papp’s study shows that suicide attacks follow a strategic logic
specifically designed to coerce modern liberal democracies to make
significant political and territorial concessions. According to Papp, the
reason for the rise of suicide attacks over the past two decades is be-
cause “terrorists have learned that it pays.” Suicide attacks by members
of Hezbollah and Hamas were successful in compelling American and
French troops to leave Lebanon in 1983, Israeli forces to leave Lebanon
in 1985 and to quit the Gaza Strip and the West Bank in 1994 and 1995.
The Tamil Tigers succeeded in winning major political and territorial
concessions from the Sri Lankan government from 1990 onwards using
this tactic. In the 1990’s suicide attacks by the Kurdistan Peoples Party
succeeded in winning partial cultural and political concessions from
the Turkish government. The withdrawal of the American troops from
Saudi Arabia in 1996, under pressure from terrorist attacks by al-Qaeda
supporters, also fit in with this pattern.
Psycho-social factors
Some contemporary commentators have argued that suicide attack-
ers are mentally deranged and crazed cowards who thrive in poverty
and ignorance. Such explanations about the psychological profiles
and motivations of suicide attackers unfortunately do not help us to ei-
ther explain the phenomenon or to better understand it. Traditional
studies regard suicide attacks as one of the many tactics that terrorists
use and thus do not explain the recent rise of this phenomenon. The
few studies, which have addressed suicide attacks explicitly, have
tended to focus on the suicide attackers’ individual motives such as re-
ligious indoctrination, especially Islamic fundamentalism, and on their
psychopathologies, poverty and lack of education. These explanations
have been found to be seriously flawed.
After reviewing psychological studies of suicide attackers, University
of Michigan psychologist Scott Atran has concluded that suicide at-
tackers have no appreciable psychological pathologies and are as edu-
cated and economically well-off as individuals from the surrounding
population. To understand why non-pathological individuals volun-
teer to become suicide attackers depends on the situational factors
which are largely sociological in nature. In the context of the Middle
East these include a collective sense of historical injustice, political
subservience, and a pervasive sense of social humiliations vis-à-vis
global powers and their allies. While one may have some reservations
about approaching the issue in the above way, ignoring the causes
that contribute to the tactic of suicide bombings risks failing to identi-
fy solutions to deal with and overcome it.
Martyrdom
Suicide attacks have increased dramatically in
the Middle East over the past year with the
war in Iraq and the escalation of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. This rise in suicide attacks
is remarkable given that the total number of
terrorist incidents worldwide fell from its peak
of 665 in 1986 to 190 in 2003 alone, whereas
the incidents of suicide attacks increased from
31 in the 1980s to 98 in 20031. There is
growing evidence that current American
domestic and foreign policies may be further
contributing to an acceleration of this trend.
Suicide Attacks
Life as a Weapon
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Martyrdom
Life as a weapon
If suicide attackers exhibit no psychologically and socially dysfunc-
tional attributes or suicidal symptoms then why do individuals choose
to participate in such attacks? Part of the answer to this question lies in
what drives humans to suicide. In modern psychiatry and sociology
suicide is regarded as an end, an exit from adverse social conditions in
which the individual feels hopelessly powerless. In my own study of
suicide over the past thirty years I have found that suicidal behaviour
in a variety of settings may be a means to achieve multiple ends in-
cluding self-empowerment in the face of powerlessness, redemption
in the face of damnation, and honour in the face of humiliations.4 The
achievement of these multiple ends acts as powerful motivators in
many suicides and, in my opinion, is
central to a fuller and more meaningful
understanding and explanation of con-
temporary suicide attacks in the Mid-
dle East and elsewhere.
Nasra Hassan, a United Nations relief
worker in Gaza, interviewed 250 aspir-
ing suicide bombers and their re-
cruiters. She found that none were un-
educated, desperately poor, simple-
minded, suicidal or depressed. But
their social contexts displayed the dy-
namics of their actions. The potential
suicide bombers empowered them-
selves in the face of powerlessness. Ac-
cording to her respondents, “If our wives and children are not safe from
Israeli tanks and rockets, theirs will not be safe from our human
bombs.” In an interview in his small house on an unpaved lane in a
crowded quarter of Gaza the late spiritual leader of Hamas, Sheikh
Yassin, told her that martyrdom was a way of redemption: “Love of
martyrdom is something deep inside the heart, but these rewards are
not in themselves the goal of the martyr. The only aim is to win Allah’s
satisfaction. That can be done in the simplest and speediest manner by
dying in the cause of Allah. And it is Allah who selects martyrs.” Humil-
iation acted as a powerful magnet for recruiting suicide bombers. A se-
nior recruiter told her, “After every massacre, every massive violation of
our rights and defilement of our holy places, it is easy for us to sweep
the streets for boys who want to do a martyrdom operation.”5
Since Muslims professing religious motives have perpetrated most
suicide attacks over the past two years, including those on 11 Septem-
ber 2001, it may be obvious to conclude that Islamic fundamentalism is
the root cause of this phenomenon. This assumption has fuelled the
belief that future 11 September type of attacks can only be prevented
through liberalization and democratization of Muslim societies. This
was a key rationale used by the United States government to mobilize
public support for the war in Iraq. Policies based on such an assump-
tion may be fostering the development of domestic and foreign poli-
cies in the United States which are likely to worsen the situation.
One indication that this may be happening is reflected in the results
of the March 2004 Pew Global Attitudes Survey which showed that in
several Muslim countries (Jordan, Morocco, Pakistan) a majority of re-
spondents thought that the American government was overreacting
to terrorism. The respondents also supported suicide bombings by
Palestinians against Israel and against Americans and other Westerners
in Iraq. The International Institute of Strategic Studies in London has
also reported that the war in Iraq has led to an increase in global re-
cruitment for anti-American jihad.
Stemming the tide
What strategies can be used to stem the tide of suicide attacks? The
offensive military actions such as better border defences and home-
land security and concessions to the groups sponsoring suicide attacks
are not likely to succeed. According to
sociologist Kathleen Carley of Carnegie
Mellon University, eliminating the cen-
tral actors with extensive networks and
ties with the other cell members actu-
ally spurs terrorists to adapt more
quickly and is less effective in the long
run. Thus assassinations of leaders, a
favourite Israeli tactic, may be counter-
productive besides causing public re-
vulsion. 
Suicide attacks are carried out by com-
munity based organizations. Strategies
aimed at findings ways to induce com-
munities to abandon such support
may isolate terrorist organizations and curtail their activities. But ulti-
mately those strategies addressing and lessening the grievances and
humiliations of populations that give rise to suicide attacks are re-
quired for their elimination. Support for suicide attacks is unlikely to di-
minish without tangible progress in achieving at least some of the fun-
damental goals that suicide attackers and those supporting them
share.
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Even if some suicide attackers
are irrational or fanatical,
the leadership of the groups that
recruit and direct them are not.
Notes
1. Department of State US, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003 (Washington, DC, 2004).
2. A. Axell and H. Kase, Kamikaze: Japan’s Suicide Gods (New York: Longman, 2002).
3. R. Papp, “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism,” American Political Science
Review 97 (2003): 3.
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Melbourne University Press, 1995).
5. N. Hassan, “Letter from Gaza: An Arsenal of Believers,” The New Yorker
(November 2001): 36-41.
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Suicide attacks in the Muslim World
have intensified fears of Islam in the
West. Increasingly, Islam is narrowed
down to militant Islamism and under-
stood as being rooted in a fanatical
and violent tradition. Paradoxically,
these notions of self-martyrdom within
current Shia and Sunni discourse differ
markedly from traditional sources,1
and are, to a large extent, derived from
modern secular ideologies such as na-
tionalism and anti-imperialism. 
Suicide attacks in the Middle East
first emerged in the escalating con-
flicts of Lebanon and, later, Israel/Palestine. When Hizbullah carried
out its first suicide attack in 1982, Sunni authorities condemned this
act with reference to the prohibition of suicide in Islamic law, while
Shia ulama mostly refrained from commenting. Hizbullah militants
may have found some inspiration in Iran where the concept of martyr-
dom was used to mobilize the masses for war against the Iraqi invasion
and overcome Iraqi minefields, however, the concrete example they
followed was reputedly that of Tamil resistance in Sri Lanka. Hizbullah
was not the only militia in Lebanon to adopt the method; secular mili-
tia aligned to the Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party (SSNP) and the Com-
munist Party were involved in various suicide at-
tacks, including attacks carried out by women
and Christians.2 The attacks primarily targeted Is-
raeli troops and their local allies in Southern
Lebanon. The main reason why suicide attacks
became accepted within a short span of time was
their decisive “success,” the greatest “victory”
being the withdrawal of the US Marine Corps and
French military from Lebanon after having been
seriously hit by suicide bombers. It was only in
the mid-1990s that suicide attacks were adopted
by Palestinian organizations, in particular since
the second Intifada. Over the last few years suicide bombing has be-
come part of jihad—as defence of Muslim land and people—in Chech-
nya, Afghanistan, Saudi-Arabia, and most recently, Iraq. The attacks are
not undisputed in public opinion and religious discourse, and not all
bombers are perceived as martyrs. While the great majority condemns
the attacks of 9/11 and Madrid, as being contrary to Islamic principles,
“martyrdom operations” in the context of the struggle for national lib-
eration have found a growing acceptance.
Martyrs of Palestine
In Palestine those who died in the struggle against British troops
and Jewish militia, and later the Israeli army, have always been held in
high regard. They were remembered as shuhada—whether combat-
ants or civilians—regardless of their religious or political orientations.
In the early idiom of resistance the status as victim shaped the self-
image of Palestinians to a great extent. From the early 1960s onward
secular nationalist organizations such as Fatah and PFLP undertook to
overcome this passive image and to transform it into agency. In the
course of ongoing and ever more violent conflict, national slogans
and motifs mingled with religious ones—a process that is similarly
discernible in Israeli nationalism. Islamist organizations like Hamas
and Islamic Jihad revived the term mujahid that had been commonly
used in the 1930s and 1940s, at the expense of fida’i, “freedom fight-
er”. The word fida’i predates modern times and was not uncommon in
the early decades of Palestinian resistance, but it that had been made
fashionable by the secular groups such as Fatah. More recently, the
term istishhadi acquired currency for
those combatants who willingly mar-
tyr themselves in suicide operations.
The shift from a secular discourse of
resistance to a more religiously in-
spired discourse dates from the 1980s.
This shift in rhetoric reflects a more
general trend in the region in which
the ruling elites were increasingly dis-
credited because of corruption and
the apparent bankruptcy of their
“grand” secular projects, such as pan-
Arabism and socialism. Combined
with the growing criticism of Western
double standards in their policies towards the Middle East, secular
movements lost some of their earlier appeal but also assumed less ap-
parent secular stances. Religious argumentation gained increased
popularity in the political domain, a process that can be understood
as a withdrawal into the cultural “own” in contrast to the “other.” 
The first suicide bombing carried out by Hamas, occurred on
16 April 1993 when a car bomb exploded near the Jewish settlement
of Mehola on the West bank, leaving two persons killed including the
attacker.3 On 6 April 1994, retaliating the Goldstein massacre in He-
bron, eight persons were killed and 44 injured by a car bomb at a bus
station in Afula; a week later a Hamas militant blew himself up in the
Hadera central bus station, leaving five deaths and twenty injured.
The adoption of suicide attacks as a means of resistance was to a de-
gree the result of the deportation of hundreds of Hamas members in
1992 to Marj al-Zuhur in Southern Lebanon, where they intensified
contacts with Hizbullah which trained Hamas militants in the art of
suicide attacks in their camps in the Bekaa Valley. With the second In-
tifada suicide attacks became much more frequent; and albeit that the
Islamist organizations Hamas and Islamic Jihad carried out most, more
secular groups, in particular the al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades that are af-
filiated with the Fatah movement, and the Marxist-Leninist oriented
PFLP joined the mortal efforts. 
Today, those suicide attacks are considered as “martyrdom opera-
tions.” The legitimacy of these operations is not only acknowledged
by Muslim clergy, but also finds support among a number of Christian
Palestinian leaders, as well as among the Coptic clergy in Egypt. Attal-
la Hanna, former spokesman for the Orthodox Church in Jerusalem,
praised the “martyrdom operations,” calling on Arab Christians to join
hands in carrying out martyr operations.4
The broad support for suicide attacks against Israeli targets reflects
the desperate state of the Palestinians in the occupied territories. In
the 1990s the number of Israeli settlements on the West bank dou-
bled. Further land grab took place by designing security zones, of late-
ly including the so-called security-wall. Over the last three years the
death toll among Palestinians due to Israeli attacks amounted to 3000,
with over 40,000 injured and a larger number losing their homes and
livelihood in collective punishments. Recurrent closures hamper trav-
el and gravely limit public space. Ongoing repression caused and
maintains a dramatic worsening of the local economy, figuring soar-
ing unemployment rates. Given that diplomatic endeavours failed to
deliver totally, radical options to reverse the desperate situation gain
credibility. 
Martyrdom
Suicide attacks referred to as “martyrdom-
operations” by their executors and
sympathizers, have become a weapon of
mainly Islamist groups in the Middle East.
The first suicide attacks in the early 1980s
in Lebanon met with criticism, in particular
among the Sunni religious establishment.
Though they were then regarded as violations
of Islamic principles, today suicide attacks
receive broader popular support and religious
backing—and are understood—within the
context of legitimate resistance and national
struggle for liberation.
Martyrdom & Resistance
in the Middle East
… not all bombers
are perceived
as martyrs.
Continued on p.39
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Politics
In Europe there are distinct groups in-
volved in terrorist activities: those re-
lated to European issues like ETA
Basque terrorism and those which
have non-territorial leftist centred ide-
ologies (for example, the recent threat
letters in Italy connected to leftist
cells), and radical Islamic groups. Ter-
rorist activities of the latter are often
ascribed to al-Qaeda, but, in a way, al-
Qaeda is a misnomer: a loosely con-
nected, “franchised” ensemble of ter-
rorist cells, largely autonomous to-
wards each other and having a real ca-
pacity for self-financing without refer-
ence to the “mother” institution. Their
relations are more in terms of knowing
each other through the Afghan camps
in the 1980s and 1990s (during the
fight against the Soviet Union and the
period of the Taliban regime) and in
consequence of the same antagonistic
attitudes towards the West. 
Within these groups, one can see
two types of actors: those who have
roots in the Muslim countries (mainly
North Africa and Pakistan), and those
who are converts and have joined the
organisations after their conversion.
Up to now, we know of no member of
these radical Islamist cells who had not
converted or professed Islam as his re-
ligion. On the other hand, there is no
known organic link between the al-
Qaeda type terrorism and other activist
or terrorist organizations. Such links
might be established in Afghanistan,
Iraq, Chechnya or in some other trou-
bled spots in the world, but this is not
the case, yet, in Europe. Among these
terrorist cells, the Moroccan ones seem to have a wide influence. The
Madrid train explosions in March 2004, according to the latest findings,
were sponsored and carried out by these Moroccan cells, although one
of their prominent members was from Tunisia. 
The cases of England and France
Another feature of European Islamist terrorism is its wide use of re-
cruits whose parents or grandparents came from the former European
colonies. Among them two countries have been the major centres for
the development of this type of activity: France and the United King-
dom. Though Italy, Spain, and even countries like Holland, Belgium,
Germany, and Greece have harboured these terrorist groups as well,
but the role of France and England is distinct in so far as many mem-
bers of these terrorist cells seem to have been English or French by
birth or acquisition, their parents originating from the ex-colonies. In
England, the Pakistanis or some “Arabs” (coming from North Africa
mainly through France and having established themselves in the Unit-
ed Kingdom), and in France, people from Algeria, Morocco or Tunisia
have played a significant role in the jihadist activities. This fact seems
to be noteworthy. In Germany, where the majority of the Muslim pop-
ulation is of Turkish (or Kurdish with Turkish citizenship) background,
the Arab perpetrators of the 11 September 2001, who had spent many
months in Germany, did not have any organic link with the Muslim
populations of Germany. The ex-colonial citizens of France and Eng-
land, or those from North Africa (in France), and Pakistan or North
Africa in England (but not Bangladesh or India) play a major role in ter-
rorist activities in these two countries in particular, and in Europe in
general. The fact that Bangladesh does
not play a major role is probably due to
its non-involvement in the Kashmir
problem which pushes Pakistan to radi-
cal islamism. Moreover, Pakistan played
(and still plays) a major role in Taliban
style activities.
Post-colonial heritage
The reasons for the distinct roles of
France and England in the jihadist ac-
tivities in Europe are manifold. First,
the colonial memory has its own say in
this matter: many of these young
males feel despised or rejected in their
new country in France or England.
They feel deeply estranged, on the
other hand, from the secular and “god-
less” Western societies in which they
develop a counter-secular identity be-
fore getting involved in Islam as the
major bearer of their hatred or rejec-
tion of societies which do not recog-
nize them as such. Among these male
youth (in which there is no female con-
stituency up to now), many belong to
the lower middle class while some are
economically excluded. Some have the
European citizenship (French, English,
or even Spanish) but some have the
North African or Pakistani one: they
have been either denied the citizen-
ship, or have simply not asked for it, or
did not stay long enough to be entitled
to it. In Spain, some have only settled
there a few years ago or even more re-
cently. 
On the whole, these groups, which
constitute a very small proportion of
the immigrant population from North
Africa or Pakistan, have developed a counter-Western or counter-Euro-
pean identity. This is mainly due to their ambiguous situation in Eu-
rope, as well as Western policies towards the Mus-
lim world, in particular, Palestine, Afghanistan,
and Chechnya (in Paris, one dismantled cell had
endeavoured to blow up the Russian Embassy),
and more recently, Iraq.
The problem of jihadist cells in Europe is, there-
fore, both internal (estranged people from the
former colonies) and external (the spread of ter-
rorist networks with anti-Western jihadist ideolo-
gies, favoured by hot issues like the Palestinian
and Chechen problems). Any policy “externaliz-
ing” the causes, i.e. denying their internal roots, is
doomed to failure. Accordingly, any policy aiming
at exclusive repression of these youth groups can
only be short term and will create new problems
as well. A mixture of repressive and persuasive
policies is necessary in order to promote an effi-
cient counter-terrorist activity in the long term.
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Anti-terrorism
demonstration
near Madrid,
5 April 2004
The terrorist attack on passenger trains in
Madrid on 11 March caused shock and anger.
Alerted by the assault, political authorities all
over Europe have intensified their efforts to
suppress jihadist activities. The causes of
militant Islamist activism in Europe are often
considered to be external, emanating from
conflicts in Palestine, Iraq, etc. But any policy
based upon this externalization, i.e. denying
the existence of internal roots, in particular
the existence of alienated European Muslim
youth, is doomed to failure. 
Terrorism in Europe
. . .Colonial memory
has its own say in
this matter: many
of these young
males feel despised
or rejected in their
new country in
France or England.
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In fact, as recent events have shown, a
rather different but equally authentic
version of “Iraq-as-Lebanon” has been
emerging. The rise to prominence of
sectarian and ethnic leaders, intra-com-
munal struggles for power and influ-
ence, the emergence of communally-
based militias, sectarian murders and
acts of terror, the abduction of foreign-
ers as bargaining tools, the involve-
ment of outside powers in the country
for their own strategic advantage—all
of this looks horribly familiar to those
who had watched Lebanon’s torment in the 1970s and the 1980s.
The turmoil has presented the US and its coalition allies with their
greatest challenge since the invasion of Iraq in 2003, but these devel-
opments are a direct consequence of policies pursued by the US in
Iraq. They come out of a reading of Iraqi political society which has em-
phasized the communal at the expense of the national, a reading rein-
forced by a range of Iraqis who either think this is indeed the way in
which power should be handled, or who fear the reconstruction of the
powerful central state apparatus which had ruled so brutally for so
long.1
Initially, the coalition forces encouraged local forms of power to help
restore order in the vacuum created by the collapse of central govern-
ment. For many local elites long used to positioning themselves in
order to serve the central authorities, it was natural to gravitate to-
wards the source of patronage—and to present themselves for recog-
nition as representatives of their communities. In the absence of elec-
toral processes, there were few to gainsay them and they rapidly be-
came the interlocutors of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). 
Under Bremer’s direction, however, this also became the principle on
which the emerging national Iraqi politics was based. The occupation
authorities consistently treated sectarian, ethnic, and tribal features of
Iraqi society as if they were the only framework for social and political
order, as demonstrated by the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) and the
Iraqi Council of Ministers. 
Security vacuum
Equally importantly, and ominously for the future, the CPA’s dismissal
of the Iraqi security forces and the dispersal and disintegration of the
Iraqi police, left a security vacuum which the over-stretched allied
forces were unable to fill. In response, local militias, some better organ-
ised than others, emerged to restore some modicum of security in the
lawlessness that followed the invasion. In doing so, of course, they be-
came potential assets in a developing political game. Officially the mili-
tias were condemned by the CPA. In fact, many have been tolerated,
even encouraged by the CPA as it seeks local allies to help keep order. 
Most obviously, this has applied to the largest indigenous armed
force in Iraq, the 40,000 or so Kurdish peshmerga (fighters) of the Kur-
dish Democratic Party and the Popular Union of Kurdistan. It has also
extended to the Badr Brigade of the Supreme Council for the Islamic
Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), and to units affiliated to the Shia al-Da‘wa
(The Call) party, one of the oldest Islamist movements in Iraq. Since all
of these organizations had been recognized by the CPA and brought
into the IGC, they were regarded as “forces for order.” More surprising-
ly perhaps, until March 2004 US forces shied away from taking on the
Jaish al-Mahdi (Army of the Rightly Guided One), the militia of the rad-
ical Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr. They too had been able to organise as
neighbourhood security units in Baghdad and in towns across south-
ern Iraq—and given the license granted to other CPA-approved mili-
tias, saw no reason not to do so. Meanwhile, in many parts of the coun-
try, tribal sheikhs have been allowed to
raise their own armed retinues. These
developments inevitably led to the
emergence of counter-militias in the
so-called “Sunni triangle.”
Inbuild tensions
At the same time, the CPA has been
pursuing a potentially contradictory
strategy, some of the problems of
which became apparent in March and
April 2004. With great speed, it rushed
to reconstruct the national Iraqi police
force; it accelerated the rebuilding of the Iraqi armed forces, essential-
ly as an internal policing force; it established the Iraqi Civil Defence
Corps, as well as the Border Force and the Facilities Protection Force.
Faced by dissent and then insurgency, the CPA deployed the familiar
tactics of forcible detention, collective punishment, and military re-
pression. They found, however, that the Iraqi security forces fell apart
when ordered into action and the US forces took on the task them-
selves. The consequence is that the US is desperately trying to stiffen
the resolve of the Iraqi security forces by bringing back senior officers
of the former army more familiar with this style of internal security
work.2
These developments are not reassuring. It is not simply the inconsis-
tency of the CPA’s direction. It is also the probability that the future
Iraqi government will preside over a state in which there is an inbuilt
tension between the temptation to farm out security and economic re-
sources to provincial, communal elites, and the impulse to assert the
central government’s monopoly of violence and of oil revenues. As
things threaten to fall apart and economic reconstruction is stalled,
there are many Iraqis who may find the reassertion of strong central
state leadership the lesser of two evils.3
However, such a trend will be resisted by those Iraqis who have tast-
ed a degree of autonomy during the past year—and, in the Kurdish
case, during the past thirteen years. It will be a test for those who take
charge in Iraq. Historically, Iraqi governing elites, when confronted by
social unrest or provincial resentment, have all too often lost their
nerve and responded forcefully, hoping that coercion will impose the
order that has failed to emerge from consent. In the coming battle-
ground of Iraqi politics, one can only hope that these very experiences
will steer them away from a form of rule that has exacted such a terri-
ble toll in Iraqi history.
Notes
1. C. Tripp, “Iraq: Political Recognition and Social Action,” SSRC – Items and Issues 4,
no.1 (Winter 2002-3): 9-15.
2. Reuters, “U.S. to reinstate some Baathists in Iraq,” 22 April 2004,
http://www.reuters.com/news.jhtml; BBC News, “Iraqi forces turn on coalition,”
22 April 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 2/hi/middle_east/3648489.stm.
3. See Oxford Research International – National Survey of Iraq, February 2004,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 2/hi/middle_east/3514504.stm.
Politics
The US Vice-President Dick Cheney and some
of those close to him in Washington have been
very taken with the “Lebanese model” for
Iraq. Presumably, this conjures up the vision
of a pluralist republic, open to free enterprise
and foreign capital, presided over by an elite
of zu‘ama (notables and local leaders), with
sufficient common interest in the status quo
to keep the whole thing going. This comes
either from a selective reading of pre-1967
Lebanese political history, or from a heavily
edited version of the post-Ta’if era.
Iraq as Lebanon
Fears for the Future
Charles Tripp is Reader at the Department of Political and International Studies,
School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London. 
E-mail: ct2@soas.ac.uk
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Politics
While 26 years old Nasra is making tea, her
veil keeps slipping down; “I still have to
learn how to wear this absurdity,” she grins.
”In Cuba I used to wear mini-dresses. Here
people find it odd when I wear jeans under
my veil. After my return, my mother asked
why I undress before going to sleep. Here it
is customary to keep on your clothes at
night. There is a world of difference be-
tween Havana and the desert of Tindouf.”
Nasra like thousands of Sahrawi youth
has followed a secondary education in
Cuba. In the camps there are only primary education and two lower-
level boarding schools. For their future education, Sahrawis are depen-
dent on training facilities in friendly, socialist orientated countries like
Cuba, Algeria, Libya, Syria, Russia and the former East Germany. After
more than ten years abroad they return to the camps and face difficul-
ties adapting. 
Where does Nasra feel more at home? She thinks profoundly about
it, “Cuba is my second home. I do speak Arabic, but I can express myself
better in Spanish.” She smiles, but stares as soon as she hears Julio Igle-
sias’ voice on the radio. ”My friend used to put on this song when I
stayed over for the night,” she whispers.
”What do you miss most?” I ask.
”In Cuba we went out for dinner, we visited a café or the cinema and
we used to dance in the open air. Wonderful! Everything that was so
common there, I miss over here. Even if the means are available, the so-
ciety disapproves. Some time ago we had a salsa party—salsa in the Sa-
hara. We have to hold that somewhere
back, in secret.”
Nasra has studied psychology in
Cuba but she can not do much with it
here. She wants to work, but there are
no jobs available. Staying at home dri-
ves her mad. She wants to marry, but
thinks that in these circumstances it
would be ”criminal” to have children.
”What kind of future do they have here?
Waiting for a referendum that keeps
being postponed time after time?”
Overhearing our conversation about
Cuba, a corpulent young man in jeans
and a sweater calls: “Havana, I long for
you and your cigars.“ He introduces
himself as Ali and says that Cuba used
to be his home for seventeen years. He
studied medical biology. He left the
camp in 1985 when he was ten years
old, together with hundreds of Sahrawi
children. An old Russian cruise-boat
carried them for 13 days from the Al-
gerian port town of Oran to Cuba.
”Ten years is rather young. Didn’t
you miss your family terribly?” I ask. 
”I was too young and impressed by events that I forgot about my
family in a couple of weeks. Once per six months I received a letter or a
tape from home. That was all.”
“Did you see your family in these seventeen years?”
“Yes, twice. It is too expensive to fly in all pupils every summer. Usu-
ally only the best students would come home during holidays. They
used to teach at the camp schools in order to participate in the Sahrawi
society and culture.”
”I have heard elders complain that
you youngsters are forgetting
your roots,” I remark. Ali looks at
me with desperation and nervous-
ly cracks his knuckles. ”Imagine,”
he replies softly. ”When you live
for seventeen years with the
Cubans, you adapt to their state of
mind. The cultural evenings of the
Youth Union of Polisario are no
match for this. Have you seen the
museum of Sahrawi history next to
the women’s school? There are pictures of prehistoric men. Do you be-
lieve in that theory?”
Without waiting for an answer he adds, “In Cuba I studied Darwin’s
theory of evolution. I do not believe in the origin of the universe as de-
scribed in the Quran. To whom can I say these kinds of things? You get
back to the camps and are confronted with many things you are not
used to, or things you even disapprove of. If I say something, it is not ac-
cepted. We find ourselves in an intellectual straddle.”
”We live in the desert, there is nothing here, we are dependent on aid.
I cannot work nor earn any money. I am afraid I can’t keep up with my
field of studies.”
What about the growing generation gap? ”My father wants me to
marry a girl from a well-off family. When I marry it will be with the
woman I love. My father doesn’t understand that. We quarrel regularly
about it. I am used to expressing my feelings, to talking about girl friends
and sex. That is not done here.”
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Nasra is one of the thousands of second
generation Sahrawi youngsters who have
studied for more than ten years in Cuba
before returning to the camps of the
liberation movement Polisario, in the South
Western Sahara in Algiers. There they wait in
a state of limbo for a solution to the conflict
that has lasted already three decades. What
follows is an excerpt from the recently
published travelogue Africa’s last colony,
travels in the Western Sahara (in Dutch).1
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Watching a
soap opera,
Sahara desert
Note
1. Amsterdam: Bulaaq, 2004
Nicolien Zuijdgeest works as an independent journalist. She has lived for several months
with Sahrawi families in the occupied Western Sahara and travelled extensively in
Algeria, Morocco, Western Sahara, and Mauritania.
E-mail: nicolien.zuijdgeest@planet.nl
Memories of Havana
in Desert Refugee Camps
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Masheitani ya kibuki are said to be
Christian spirits from the Sakalava
kingdom of Madagascar. Engagement
with them can be understood as an
elaborate way of handling sameness
and difference within a basically multi-
cultural, yet mono-religious, society.
The narratives surrounding the spirits
also recall the interactions of individu-
als and societies in the region of the In-
dian Ocean. 
Recently, the ethnic distinctions be-
tween the inhabitants of Zanzibar have
been highlighted. To belong to one or
the other category has had dfferent
socio-political implications reflecting
the changing power structures. The term kabila is used to denote what
one considers to be one’s place of origin such as waNgazija (from the
Comoro Islands), waShihiri (from Yemen), waManga (from Oman), wa-
Hadimu (from the east coast of Ungula), waShirazi (from Shiraz, Iran),
waSwahili (from the coast or mainland), and waHindi (from India). The
notion of kabila implies an understanding of origin beyond the place
where one currently lives and contains an aesthetic dimension, which
relates to habits and ways of life. Although Zanzibar is described as a
multicultural society, it is important to consider that the great majority
of its population is Sunni Muslim. In this society, Islam coexists with a
belief in spirit possession. Interestingly, practices around spirit posses-
sion do not negate an Islamic mode of life, but reflect the society’s ex-
perience of everyday life. 
The spirits seen in Zanzibar
The terms masheitani and majinni both refer to the spirits. Like
human beings, spirits are perceived as beings created and sent to earth
(dunia ardhini) by God and do not indicate any link to the devil or to the
concept of evil. Spirits are said to be
both good and bad and just like hu-
mans are drawn between Allah and
Ibilis. They have sensory and emotional
experiences, soul (roho), breath or the
vital principle, as well as gender. By in-
habiting the bodies of humans—both
male and female—spirits have a physi-
cal presence in the human world. The
spirits exist in distinction from their
human hosts. Humans are believed not
to be responsible for the actions and
behavior of spirits, but are only respon-
sible for their relationship to spirits. In
this sense, spirits take the role of social
players. The rituals performed on be-
half of masheitani ya kibuki illustrate the modes of interaction between
humans and spirits.
Ritual and the acceptance of “other”
A ritual usually takes place just outside the main entrance door of a
house. Two big wooden chairs are placed in the centre of the ground
straw mats, one for the king and one for the queen. In one end of the
room—the end facing Madagascar, which is the spirits’ place of origin,
there is a table with the spirit’s main remedies: a bucket filled with
water and herbs, incense jars, white plates with Maria Theresa coins,
silver bracelets, lime-stone paste (talmalandi), honey, bottles of im-
ported brandy, cups, tobacco, and betel-nut. The ritual starts when
the members of the ritual group come out of the house carrying
ebony spears or sceptres with silver ornamentation, incense jars, and
white plates with silver coins and bracelets. While proceeding they
are, together with the audience, singing the opening song,—a praise
to the great ones among these spirits. Then, both humans and spirits
present, sit down on the floor. The ritual leader offers a prayer to the
spirits in their ki-buki language since each tribe of spirits has its own
specific language associated with their place of origin. The ritual then
resumes with a prayer to God in the native language of the spirit, an
important act for both Muslim Zanzibaris and Christian spirits, and is
performed in the “universal way of praying” by the Zanzibaris. In Zanz-
ibari society language is seen as an important indicator of identity and
belonging, but not as a constraint to communication (differences–
not even scriptural religious differences—are approached as definite).
The spirit inhabiting the ritual leader (fundi) is the king (mfalme)
called grandfather (Babu). As king, Babu wants his feet atop a stool
(kibao), and the sceptre in his hand. Arriving guests, human and spir-
its alike, greet the ritual leader by kneeling in front of her and Babu
when he inhabits her body. The spirits usually initiate the interaction
with the audience. If the spirits are attracted to someone among the
audience they will give them coins, and also ask for coins from the au-
dience. The spirits offer brandy to those whom they like. If they are in
a good mood they might even give brandy to those who ask for
brandy. Humans who are offered brandy have to drink it. If they reject
it the spirit will empty the cup on the head of that person. Both the
drinking of brandy and the act of emptying a cup on the head of a per-
son are disruptive acts, although anticipated and part of the ritualistic
performance. During the ritual both spirits and humans consume al-
cohol. Since the spirits are Christians, not Muslims, Zanzabri Muslims
Multiculture & Integration
Islam and Muslim societies often appear in
the contemporary period, at least to the
“Western” public, as if uncompromising,
inflexible, and unwilling to adjust to
modernity. Unfortunately this debate leaves
significant aspects of Muslim ways of life and
its inherent pluralistic dimensions in the
shadow. Zanzibar—a Muslim and multicultural
society off the East African coast, like other
Swahili societies, has a diverse population,
aesthetics and life-style. The multicultural
dimension of the island of Zanzibar gets
uniquely articulated through the popular
belief in spirits called masheitani ya kibuki and
the rituals performed on their behalf.
Multiculturalism
through Spirit
Possession
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Zanzibar coast
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Multiculture & Integration
maintain that they have to drink in order to make the spirits
feel welcome and their faith respected. 
Such a communitarian philosophy and tolerant aware-
ness of other religious faiths reveals the essential accep-
tance of difference inherent in Zanzibari society. This open
everyday-life philosophy also illustrates that it is possible to
share space with, and accommodate, humans and spirits of
different modes of being and living styles whether they are
your guests or your hosts. Difference becomes a highly val-
ued expression of social behaviour. Yet, there seems to be a
fragile balance between being with and being against “the
other.” In times of crises an identification of “the other” as
the cause of everything problematic, has so far, also in this
society, shown to be a successful political strategy.
The otherness of spirits and 
the otherness within
The experience of being inhabited by spirits should be
analysed through the concept of “embodiment” which en-
compasses critical reflection. Through being embodied by
spirits women and men can extend their understanding of
themselves. Their self-awareness does not necessarily hap-
pen at the moment of spirit inhabitation, but can occur af-
terwards, in remembering, and discussing their experiences
with the spirits. Moreover, by observing others being embodied by
spirits women and men have the possibility of contextualising them-
selves in opposition to the spirits and recognising themselves in the
spirits. Through observing the spirits acting and interacting with hu-
mans and other spirits in this world, Zanzabaris gain perspectives not
only on their lives but also on their position in society and questions
concerning identity, morality, and life-style. Important in this process
of reflection are the dimensions of comedy and parody—dimensions
evoked by the fact that the ways of spirits are characterised by exces-
siveness. Thus, laughter is associated with situations when the taken
for granted modes of life and living (ngoma ya kibuki), are challenged
and conflicting moral codes meet, such as the standardised forms of
Islam and Christianity. 
The spirits caricature human behaviour to the extent of parody, but
they also present another viable way of life. The spirits represent, at
one and the same time a duplication of and a contradiction to human
beings; they are, simultaneously, the same as and different from them.
In this world (dunia), spirits and humans can be seen to comment
upon each other as well as upon the notion of difference and compat-
ibility as such. In Zanzabari Muslim, multicultural society, notions and
demarcations of difference form an inherent part of life and relation-
ships. Both a distinct separation between self and other and their in-
terconnectedness are expressed through the phenomenon of spirit
possession. Hence, multiculturalism as reflected in relationships be-
tween humans and spirits should be understood in terms of interac-
tions and identification, not as expressions of segregation and com-
munalism. 
Although a multi-cultural society, Zanzibari politics are not charac-
terized by multiculturalism in the sense of flexibility and a motivation
to accommodate difference. This is shown time and again, and espe-
cially in relation to the more recent introduction of multi-party rule
and election procedures where precisely religious faith and places of
origin were again turned into political issues of exclusion and inclu-
sion. Still, within this political atmosphere the phenomenon of spirit
possession allows people to live, reflect upon, and accommodate
their experiences of difference and sameness with regard to the
“other” both in their society as well as within themselves. By being
embodied by spirits and thus, for a period of time becoming the other,
individuals gain knowledge of what is for them, considered foreign.
Observing relatives and friends going through a bodily transforma-
tion, becoming an other, Zanzabaris develop an awareness of identity
which makes possible identification with the other, while at the same
time, distinguishing between self and other, us-them. This sense of
separatedness is maintained because of the distinction between hu-
mans and spirits that is never transgressed. Through the pluralistic
presence of spirits of different origins and religious faiths and their
ability to materialize in this world through the use of different human
bodies, the other, otherness or difference become someone and
something that is known and, at least, in ordinary daily life, livable.
Zanzibar is a place constituted by migrating spirits and mobile peo-
ple. And, the migratory ways of both humans and spirits within the In-
dian Ocean produces various forms of difference and sameness where
inclusion characterizes daily life and exclusion is the main message of
the dominant political ideologies. 
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Kjersti Larsen is Associate Professor at the Department of Ethnography, University
Museum of Cultural History, University of Oslo.
E-mail: kjersti.larsen@ukm.uio.no
Objects used
in spirit ritual,
Zanzibar
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The International Institute for the Study of
Islam in the Modern World (ISIM) invites
applications for ISIM Ph.D. fellowships. ISIM
Ph.D. fellowships are available to candidates
with an M.A. degree or equivalent in
anthropology, sociology, religious studies,
cultural studies or political science.
The medium of instruction is English. Ph.D. -
degrees are granted from one of the four
Dutch universities participating in the ISIM:
the University of Amsterdam, Leiden
University, the University of Nijmegen
and Utrecht University.
The ISIM conducts and promotes inter-
disciplinary research on contemporary social,
political, cultural, and intellectual trends and
movements in Muslim societies and
communities. The ISIM welcomes research
proposals which are informed particularly by
a social science perspective and which fit in
with the research profile of the ISIM in
general, or are related to the specific research
programmes of the ISIM Chairs. The current
ISIM research programmes and projects
include: Islam, Civil Society, and the Public
Sphere; Muslim Cultural Politics; Debating
Family Dynamics and Gender; Islamic Family
Law in Everyday Life; The Cultural politics of
Domestic Labor; The Politics of
Representation in the Muslim Societies;
The Production of Islamic Knowledge in
Western Europe; Islam and the Public Sphere
in Africa; Religion, Culture and Identity in a
Democratic South Africa; and Socio-Religious
Movements and Change in Muslim Societies.
ISIM Ph.D. fellowships are awarded twice
per year. The deadlines for applications are
1 March and 1 September of each year.
ISIM Ph.D. fellowships at a glance:
• tenable for a period of four years
• monthly stipend
• office space, a personal computer,
telephone on the premises of the ISIM
in Leiden
• travel expenses for fieldwork to and
from the country in which fieldwork
will be carried out
• no tuition fee
Ph.D. Fellows are located in the historic city
of Leiden with easy convenient links to the
coast, airport, and major European cities.
Fellows have full access to extensive
libraries, research centres, and the facilities
of the universities participating in the ISIM.
For details on ISIM Ph.D. fellowships and an
online application form, please refer to the
ISIM website http://www.isim.nl under the
link “Fellowships” or contact the ISIM
secretariat:
ISIM
P.O. Box 11089
2301 EB Leiden
The Netherlands
Tel: +31-(0)71-527 7905
Fax: +31-(0)71-527 7906
E-mail: info@isim.nl
Web site: http://www.isim.nl
I S I M  P H . D .  F E L L O W S H I P S
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In each of the three largest American
Muslim communities, the African Amer-
icans, Arabs, and South Asians, race has
been a major and controversial issue.
Each of these groups encountered
racism in America and tried to escape
from it, but in different ways. The earli-
est movements of African Americans
toward Islam in the early twentieth cen-
tury, the Moorish Science Temple and
the Nation of Islam, both asserted “Asi-
atic” racial identities, explicitly rejecting slave, Negro, and/or African
identities in many ways. Noble Drew Ali proclaimed his followers to be
“Moorish Americans” and Asiatics, and Elijah Muhammad proclaimed
his followers to be Asiatic-Blacks. Indicating that the Asiatic claim was
not without its own confusion, not only whites (always), but “Brother
Moslems from the East” (sometimes) were barred from Nation of Islam
temples.
The early Arab immigrants, mostly Christians but some Muslims too,
came from the Ottoman Empire in the late nineteenth century and were
often referred to as “Turks,” while they called themselves Lebanese or
Syrian Lebanese. As Turks, they too were designated as “Asiatics”
(Turkey was then called Asia Minor) and were treated in a contradictory
fashion in terms of eligibility for naturalized citizenship. People from
the Middle East were “white” in successive census racial classifications,
but in 1910 the Census Bureau classified them as “Asiatic.” Since citizen-
ship in the United States was until the mid-twentieth century restricted
by racial designation to whites and blacks, the latter added in 1870 after
the Civil War, this posed a problem. Just as the Chinese and Japanese
had been denied citizenship as “Orientals”, “Asians”, and “Mongolians”,
Arabs were twice denied citizenship, declared not to be “free white per-
sons” in 1909 and 1914 (the latter case involved a “Syrian of Asiatic
birth”), although both decisions were reversed on appeal. South Asian
immigrants, including Muslims from India or Hindustan, were similarly
first called “Hindus”, a geographic rather than religious marker in the
early twentieth century. The South Asians were denied citizenship in
1923 by being termed “non-white” although they were admittedly Cau-
casian. In the census, South Asians have had varying separate designa-
tions. Among South Asians today, including Muslims, there are dis-
agreements about whether to identify and affiliate as whites or non-
whites, and the same is true for Arab Muslims. 
A new kind of radicalisation based not on physical features but on re-
ligion is currently underway. This new identity that is being embraced
by some academics invokes an Arab phenotype. In a U.S. Department of
Transportation memo issued in October 2001 outlining guidelines for
airport security personnel, for example, the guideline stated not to sin-
gle out passengers who were “Arab, Middle Eastern, South Asian, Mus-
lim and Sikh” for questioning. Note that these are linguistic, national-
origin, and religious, not racial categories in the traditional sense. 
The notion that Muslims are being newly constructed as a racial group
seems attractive for some as it provides a possible rallying point, since
movements of resistance and empowerment in the United States have
traditionally been organized along racial lines. But such movements
have also been organized along religious lines, and in the case of Islam,
its religious beliefs and, better yet, its practices often do challenge
racism and counter racial divisiveness in America. While the established
religions in America, like Islam, are multiracial and multicultural, some
immigrant religious groups have been
analyzed as becoming “white” by mov-
ing into the mainstream. But this is per-
haps not the strategy American Mus-
lims will want to adopt—the African
American component of the communi-
ty, some 30-40% of the U.S. Muslim pop-
ulation—is already racialized, but as
black, not as Arab. Islam is strongly
committed to racial equality, and since
American Muslims can make a strong
positive contribution to American society in this area, one needs to think
carefully about the facile construction of Muslims as some new kind of
racial category. Discrimination against religious groups also has a long
history in America—why ignore the more obvious and accurate catego-
ry of religion as the target of current prejudice?
Religion
Moving from race to religion, one needs a quick survey of American
religious history and significant recent changes. Euro-American Protes-
tantism, male-dominated, prevailed from the founding of the country.
Relatively recently, Catholics and Jews have become part of the main-
stream religious culture, the national civil religion. Some have written
about this in terms of race: how the Irish became white, how the Jews
became white; others have written about it in terms of economic and
social strategies, of ways of using opportunities.1 As the argument goes,
the Catholics earned recognition and political power by building a sep-
arate sub-culture, while the Jews empowered themselves and achieved
recognition and respect through their successful participation in main-
stream educational institutions. (Arguably, African American Muslims
and some immigrant Muslims are doing the former, while the most am-
bitious, highly educated new immigrant Muslims are doing the latter).
The ideological and organizational nature of the American religious
landscape has changed significantly in the last few decades. First, de-
nominations, so important in the mainline Anglo-Saxon Protestant
world, have become less significant as people become more highly ed-
ucated, intermarry, and move to new neighbourhoods with different
local churches; Christians now change their denominational or church
affiliations relatively easily. Second, despite male domination of reli-
gious structures and dialogues, it is argued that women in America con-
stitute the majority of participants in Christian religious activities and
institutions.2 Third, as denominations decline, there has been a rise of
special purpose groups organized along conservative and liberal lines,
a polarization between conservative and liberal religious groups lead-
ing to passionate mobilization and new coalitions on public issues such
as homosexuality and abortion. Fourth and finally, the public dimen-
sions of religious culture in America, despite the separation of church
and state, have grown in importance, as specialists in religious studies
and American history testify. 
Reviewing the history of American Muslims in the present national
context of an expanding but increasingly politicised civic religion, we
see that from early on the African American Muslim movements were
separatist ones, in tension with religions well-anchored in America.
African American Muslims tried to locate their religious roots abroad, in
Morocco or the Middle East. But they were often denied recognition as
part of world Islam, and, in some immigrant Muslim circles and for some
African American Muslim groups, this denial continues.3
Multiculture & Integration
Muslims in the United States have attempted
to carve out identities that challenge evolving
national norms, identities that often are at
odds with those imposed on them by other
Americans. Through a review of three key
areas of tension, the constructions of race,
religion, and the nation, it can be argued that
American Muslims may very well be making
their greatest contributions to
American pluralism. 
American Muslims
Race, Religion and
the Nation
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Arab Muslims, in particular, have more recently argued for the inclusion
of Islam as part of Western civilization and the American mainstream re-
ligious scene. They argue this not only on the basis of numbers (Muslim
leaders claim there are about as many Muslims as Jews in the U.S.), but,
and more importantly, because Islam is one of the three religions of
“the book,” the historically connected Abrahamic religions, and is there-
fore an integral part of America’s expanding national religious land-
scape. American Muslim discourse positions Islam as a partner with Ju-
daism and Christianity, emphasizing the religious teachings and values
shared by the three monotheistic religions. One needs to ask not only
what this argument means for the many other religions in America now,
the Buddhists, Hindus, and smaller groups (the Buddhists are arguably
as numerous as Muslims and growing equally fast), but what it means
for secular people who dislike the emphasis on religion in the civic
arena and its intrusion into national political rhetoric. Whatever one’s
position, it is clear that religious diversity is being recognized as never
before and is becoming part of the multicultural agenda at all levels of
public life.
American Muslims share in most of the historical trends with regard
to religions in the U.S. It is not clear whether Muslim denominations
such as various Shias and Sufis are declining in importance, but certain-
ly as the numbers within these smaller groups increase they seem to be
establishing separate institutions in the U.S. rather than reducing the
importance of boundaries. The key role played by women is being in-
creasingly recognized by American Muslims. In the early decades
among Arab Muslims, the energy and activity of women was key to the
establishment of major mosques in Detroit and Toledo. The U.S. is the
centre of the “gender jihad,” one of the most exciting developments in
American and international Islam, to my mind, and the feminists (my
term) writing about Islamic law and jurisprudence include indigenous
and immigrant Muslim women, African American, Arab, South Asian,
and others. In another area, we see the relevance of the special purpose
religious coalitions across denominational lines, as most of the national
American Muslim political and religious coalitions try to link Sunnis,
Shias, and others as they focus on pressing issues of the day. Previously,
these coalitions were more conspicuous on the conservative end of the
political spectrum as Muslim groups at both local and national levels
talked about Muslim family values, American immorality, and issues like
homosexuality, marriage and divorce. But now, after 9/11, the liberal
end of the political spectrum is being embraced as American Muslims,
along with others, emphasize civil rights, justice, and the freedom of
speech and assembly.
The nation
Finally, looking at American Muslim constructions of the nation, a
subject already implicit in much of the above, we turn again to history.
African American Muslims, in the early Moorish Science Temple and Na-
tion of Islam, explicitly opted out of the nation. They gave up their citi-
zenship rights and obligations including voting and service in the mili-
tary; separatist tendencies stemming from those formative years re-
main in some movements. While African American Muslims judged the
US more harshly than other Muslims, they were also the most socially
engaged group, in a mosque-based survey that was part of a major na-
tional survey involving forty denominations, with the Muslim compo-
nent sponsored by four organizations, CAIR (Council on American-Is-
lamic Relations), ISNA (Islamic Society of North America), ICNA (Islamic
Circle of North America), and the Ministry of Imam W.D. Mohammed.4
Even Louis Farrakhan’s Nation of Islam clearly grounds itself in the U.S.
and works to change the nation.
The Arab Muslim immigrants who came in the late nineteenth centu-
ry and whose descendants became citizens engaged successfully in
local and state politics in places where they had settled in large num-
bers. However, many of the post-1965 Muslim immigrants took several
decades to decide whether or not to become American citizens. But
once the decision to take citizenship and participate in American poli-
tics at all levels was made in the late 1980s by some national Muslim
leaders, it was enthusiastically implemented. There is an exciting histo-
ry of religious and political American Muslim groups building profes-
sionally-organized movements, sometimes in competition with each
other and sometimes acting in concert for common goals. Critiques of
American foreign policy and orientations to nations of origin dominat-
ed the early goals of many of these organizations, but a shift was un-
derway well before 9/11, a shift towards the rights and responsibilities
of Muslims in this country, towards the issues they
judged crucial and the contributions they could
make to the nation. 
This shift to full citizenship and participation in
the nation has brought some new tensions
among American Muslims. For example, some
American Muslims have greeted Bush’s faith-
based initiatives with enthusiasm, while others
fear the dominance of Christians. More important-
ly, after 11 September 2002 the American media
and mainstream politicians including the Presi-
dent have helped bring liberal Muslims into the
public arena as new spokespeople for Muslims,
spokespeople not based in the established Ameri-
can Muslim religious and political organizations.5
But the nature of the national civic religion and its
politicization are issues of greater significance
than before. An insistence on the civil rights and
freedoms possible in the United States is now a
matter of urgency, a matter at the top of the agen-
da for many in this country, including and perhaps
even especially Muslims.
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Notes
1. Karen Brodkin, How Jews Became White Folks
and What That Says About Race in America
(New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University
Press,1998); Jose Casanova, Public Religions
in the Modern World (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1994).
2. Women have increasingly exercised moral
authority in both religious and civic
institutions: see Ann Braude, “Women’s
History Is American Religious History,”
in Retelling U.S. Religious History, ed. Thomas
A Tweed, 87-107 (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1997).
3. W.D. Mohammed’s American Society of
Muslims is recognized as part of the Sunni or
mainstream Islam: he has changed the
group’s earlier beliefs and practices.
4. This information was released through CAIR,
the Committee on American Islamic
Relations: Ihsan Bagby, Paul M. Perl, and
Bryan T. Froehle, The Mosque in America:
A National Portrait. A Report from the Mosque
Study Project (Washington, D.C.: Council on
American-Islamic Relations, 2001). 
5. For further discussion of this important
point see: Karen Isaksen Leonard, Muslims in
the United States: the State of the Research
(New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2003).
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The Muslims in South Africa make up
less than 2% of the total population
and consist primarily of Malays and In-
dians. The Indians originated largely
from Gujarat, Bombay, and, to a lesser
extent, Madras and Calcutta. They im-
migrated to the British colony of Natal
in two migrant waves: the first were In-
dian indentured workers who arrived
in South Africa from 1860 to work in
the sugar plantations; and the second
were “passenger” Indians who from
1871 paid their own way, some to expand their business in South
Africa. Nearly eighty percent of these Indians were Muslims. 
The experience of Muslims in India had been marked by their loss of
political power. It became imperative for them to know how Islam
could be organized vis-à-vis non-Muslim authorities. In South Africa,
however, the Indian Muslims confronted a situation even more dis-
criminating. The anti–Indian laws were particularly oppressive and
contributed to the reinforcement of community bonds. Their Islamic
faith gave them purpose and even sanctuary.
The Indian Muslim community experienced dou-
ble minority status, first in India, then in South
Africa, a factor that contributed to this group’s
later modes of mobilization in the early decades
of the twentieth century. In the late nineteenth
century, though, merchants and the ulama took
on leadership of this Indian Muslim community.
Their political position, most of the time, was in-
different and in a few instances they appeared to
adopt a policy of co-operation with the govern-
ment during the apartheid era. In the 1930’s as
the merchants took on a changing role in the
modern organization of the Muslim community
and the education system modernized, the cul-
tural heritage of Indian Islam began to play a role
in the specific context of South Africa character-
ized by modes of integration of the Indian Muslim
minority in South Africa. 
Merchants and modern organization
of the Muslim community
In spite of the low level of education of the first
wave of Muslim migrants, they always endeav-
oured to establish a mosque and a madrasa, two
necessary means “to lay the true foundations of a
Muslim Community, jama‘at”.1 Moreover, the con-
struction of places of worship made it possible for
Muslims to consider their presence in South
Africa as permanent. Muslim Indians in other di-
aspora communities in Eastern Africa followed
this same process of integration.
The first mosque of Durban, located on Grey Street in the Indian busi-
ness district, was established in 1884 by the first pioneers of Indian busi-
ness in Natal, Abubakr Amod and Hadji Mahomed Hadji Dada.2 Juma
Masjid, which became the largest mosque in Southern Africa3, played a
symbolic role for Gujarati Muslim merchants in the absence of the ulama
who were not authorized to enter the
country until 1880. Through their initia-
tives to construct mosques and
madrasas, the commercial elite legiti-
mated their leadership status and later
competed with the ulama. The wealth
and connections of the first generation
of merchants enabled them to become
the principal agents and shapers of
Islam in the provinces of Natal and
Transvaal. The articulation between
commercial and religious networks con-
tributed to the integration of Indians not only in Southern Africa, but
also the area of the Indian Ocean.
The madrasa up until the 1950s, however, did not constitute a truly
educational system. Muslim children entered the madrasa at seven
years and left it at ten, having accumulated a superficial reading of the
Quran which they learned to recite by rote. They generally did not un-
derstand even the meaning of the Quranic verses recited during the
five daily prayers. Anxious to prepare Muslims in South Africa for
changes in the economic market, the merchants in the 1940s emulated
aspects of the reformist movements in India, in particular that of
Sayyid Ahmad Khan (1817-1898), and initiated projects for educational
and cultural development. They supported a secular and religious edu-
cation which would preserve the Islamic minority identity.
Through a negotiation between the Muslim commercial elite and the
government, the education system began to be changed in the 1940s
by way of introducing Islam with secular instruction. The educational
project was built around a policy of accommodation that in particular
contributed to religious conservatism. However, a number of Indian
Muslims and organizations fought against the policy of apartheid.
Giving to the community
The Indians successfully participated in the market economy where
they competed with the whites. Their financing of educational institu-
tions can be seen as an investment which facilitated their integration
in the world of capitalism and preserved their proud Islamic identity.
Economic integration and identity assertion, both of which depended
strongly on Muslim merchants, represent the two pillars of the minori-
ty educational policy which characterized each period of South-African
Islamic resurgence.
The mosque and the Islamic private school thus became the two in-
stitutions guaranteeing the social reproduction of the Islamic identity.
Their administrative and financial control still remain nowadays large-
ly in the hands of the middle-class elite with transnational mobility;
their organization is not limited to the national borders of South Africa.
Moreover, the arrival in the country of preachers and lecturers in the
1950s, contributed to their construction of the Islamic identity. It is
again the merchants who employed Muslim scholars from India to or-
ganise and oversee their religious activities. The da’ wa generally
spread by foreign Muslim lecturers from India, later from the Arab
countries, especially Egypt, the USA (mainly from the 1970s), and Eu-
rope, and reflected the need for the Indians to be amenable to the ex-
ternal environment crossed by various Islamic movements. In the con-
text of decolonization, the independence of India and Pakistan in 1947,
and more recently the conflicts in Palestine, Chechnya and Bosnia con-
tributed to the representation of Muslim life as an integral part of the
Multiculture & Integration
The Indian Muslim community experienced
double minority status, first in India, then in
South Africa, a factor that contributed to this
group’s later modes of mobilization in the
early decades of the twentieth century. From
the 1930’s, as the education system
modernized, the cultural heritage of Indian
Islam began to play a role in the specific
context of South Africa characterized by
modes of integration of the Indian Muslim
minority in South Africa. 
Integration and
Islamic Education 
in South Africa
Whilst some may
regard private
Islamic education as
isolationist, others
see it as solution for
the integration of
Muslims in
the new South
Africa.
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umma, or community of Muslims. Indeed, the contemporary Islamiza-
tion of Muslim territories in South Africa has occurred with the assis-
tance of international Muslim actors through the foundation of
mosques and modern Islamic schools. 
Opposition of the ulama 
Certain forces have resisted modernizing changes within the Muslim
community from the 1930s. There exist two theological bodies of Indi-
an ulama in South Africa: Deoband and Barelwi. Beyond the theologi-
cal polemics, which divided the believers, the conflicts of representa-
tion and leadership deeply took root in the recomposition of the Indi-
an Muslim community. These theological schools have jointly diffused
an apolitical discourse and have reinforced a religious conservatism.
The Deobandis, for example, represented by the Jama’a ulama of Natal,
seek to guarantee an orthodox practice and a literalistic reading of
Islam. They remain much attached to a religious communitarianism
which is built on the principle of political indifference, but which also
rejects change of the religious institution associated with a westerniza-
tion of values. The Deobandis, in other words, thought any form of
westernization would threaten the moral basis of the Muslim commu-
nity. 
Since 1940 the ulama have been opposed to several aspects of the
new education including the methods of teaching Arabic, the aban-
donment of Urdu for English in the teaching of the religious matters,
and the transformation of the madrasa into a Muslim aided-school
which can offer secular and religious teaching. The ulama in South
Africa were especially threatened by the introduction of English as the
principal medium of teaching because their religious education in
India was based solely on Urdu, a symbol of the Muslim identity. Invad-
ed by a feeling of insecurity, the traditionalist ulama could not consid-
er adopting new methods which they associated with a westernization
of the madrasa.
It took many years before the ulama decided to adopt English as the
linguistic medium of religious instruction. The introduction of English
marked the integration of Indian Islam in South Africa. They also suc-
ceeded in imposing their leadership within the Muslim community and
consolidating it by an alliance with rich commercial families who had a
conservative vision of religion. The merchants involved in changing
the education system did not intend to upset the traditions of Indian
Islam but simply to accompany an “Islamization of modernity.” This al-
liance with rich merchants which included the creation of a network of
madrasas and the development of a religious school syllabus repre-
sents until today, for both the Deoband and Barelwi ulama, the way to
institutionalize their theological schools.
The merchants in post-apartheid South Africa maintain a powerful
supervision in the religious field. They supported the creation of pri-
vate Islamic schools which are organized by committees built on the
same model as the madrasa and mosque. The businessmen who exer-
cise control over these institutions sometimes interfere in the work of
the professionals, such as teachers and school administrators, whom
they employ. The creation of the private Islamic schools in the post-
apartheid era is primarily motivated by the desire of Muslims to pre-
serve their faith and identity. Education, through private schools,
seems to remain the major ground of the conflicts for the direction of
the Muslim community. Whilst some may regard private Islamic educa-
tion as isolationist, others see it as solution for the integration of Mus-
lims in the new South Africa. 
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In a recently published dissertation, the
period following the deportation of the
Crimea Tatars in 1944 until the collapse
of the Soviet Union is described as fol-
lows, “…religious education was con-
fined to the family bounds. This had not
only affected the quality of education
but also the level of knowledge, which
remained low throughout the period.
Religious rites were observed only by
the older generations. Functions of reli-
gion were so limited that it could not
significantly influence the world out-
look of the rising generation.”1 This ob-
servation, reflecting the dominant opin-
ion of Ukrainian Muslims, may serve as a
point of departure for taking a closer
look at changes that occurred in the reproduction of Islamic knowledge
over the past decade in Ukraine. The implicit assumption underpinning
it seems to be that the social role of religion depends on the quality of
knowledge and the availability of formal institutions in the community.
Even though this assumption merits some further scrutiny because it is
not fully supported by actual practice it is true that younger genera-
tions of Ukrainian Muslims are not satisfied with the traditional religious
knowledge. Moreover, they do not view this knowledge as a proper tool
of reference for constructing their future. 
In spite of the absence of any institutionalized forms of Islam, such as
formal mosques or a professional clergy, during the post-WWII period,
religious life, as well as informal religious instruction, persisted within
communities of the Volga Tatars who were scattered mainly across the
mining region of Donbass, and within the compact Crimea Tatar
groups of the Zaporizhia and Kherson regions; as well as among the
Crimea Tatars living in exile, from which the majority returned in the
late 1980s and early 1990s. Fieldwork data indicate that not a single
local community was without a small group of pious Muslims and a
mullah. The mullah would, as a rule, have a couple of assistants and dis-
ciples helping him in ritual performances. The pious few often includ-
ed relatives of the last generation of formally educated imams or grad-
uates of mektebs and random seekers of religious inspiration. The se-
nior mullah would either appoint a successor or the local community
would nominate a new one from the assistants. Communal religious
life was organized around the annual cycle of religious holidays and
the critical moments of the cycle of life. The former included major Is-
lamic holidays—qurban bairamy (id al-adha), uraza bairamy (id al-fitr),
and the mawlid, and, in the case of Crimea Tatars, Khidirles and Derviza
festivals celebrated at sacred places in Crimea.2 The main life cycle
events, which included such occasions as burials, obituary prayers,
birth (name-giving), circumcision, and marriage rites, were marked
with communal textual performances. A special social role was played
by pious women, known as abystai in the Kazan Tatar tradition, who
performed prayers on behalf of individuals, of which the most popular
was the recitation of the whole Quran, usually in exchange for some re-
muneration. 
In some localities, Friday prayers were held at private houses. Other
ritual performances included religious chants (of presumably Sufi ori-
gin)—ilahiye in the case of CrimeaTatars and munajat in the case of
Kazan Tatars—recited in native Turkic language mainly for the celebra-
tion of mawlid and Khidirles. The only formally acknowledged Islamic
place in the public domain in that period was the cemetery—usually a
section of common burial grounds, but sometimes having a separate
location—such as the case of the Sverdlovsk Muslim cemetery (Luhansk
region). 
Beyond the cycle of these main ritual
festivals and performances most Mus-
lims gradually absorbed the behav-
ioural codes of their non-Muslim envi-
ronment. The mullahs and the pious
were not able to insist on the full scope
of religious observance; Muslim tradi-
tions were losing ground and were in-
creasingly blended with common Sovi-
et customs resulting in a rather un-
orthodox synthesis. 
Continuous reproduction
How much knowledge did this type
of religiosity require and how was it
being reproduced? Some proficiency
in Arabic was required at least for two
important textual performances—reading the Quran and the writing
of amulets.3 The major performances involving Quranic texts—the
public recitation at various collective prayers—implied learning tajwid
(recitation), which could only be done at the hands of a teacher. Often,
the Arabic script was conveniently substituted by a transliteration in
Cyrillic. Consequently, many of second and third generation mullahs
were no longer capable of actually reading Arabic and could only per-
form their prayers from memorization. The skill to compose prayer was
also part of the expertise of a mullah or a pious woman. Proficiency in
the sacred language, Arabic, was perceived as the ability to recite cor-
rectly and according to the rules of tajwid, while focusing on the cere-
monial and symbolic value of particular fragments of the Quranic text
and not on its literal meaning. The scope of knowledge transferred
from one generation to another within the narrow circle of pious men
and women was contingent on the abilities and dedication of the older
generation of mullahs. In some localities the older generation man-
aged to transfer nearly fully their scope of knowledge and skills like, for
example, in the city of Kharkiv, where an elderly Bukhara-trained imam
managed to prepare three disciples, two of whom act as imams until
today. But some types of knowledge were limited in terms of repro-
duction by their very nature. The knowledge linked to the more magi-
cal aspects of religion—a valuable social asset for an individual who
was believed to have mastered it—was never meant to be open to any
lay Muslim. 
Only male mullahs acted as teachers for those seeking religious
knowledge. Pious women addressed familial and individual aspects of
religiosity, while mullahs the more formal and communal ones.
Women dealt with the spiritual, inner (and also native) religious tradi-
tions—such as the recitation of sacred chants. While the social context
in the Soviet times precluded an open profession of religious duties,
especially for younger age groups, the elderly pious females obtained
an important role in expressing the commitment to Islam by individual
lay members of the community. 
During the Soviet period access to religious expertise had become
more difficult while public space available for religious practices had
been significantly reduced. Even within these constraints religious
knowledge, as reproduced across two to three generations, remained
adequate, in terms of its content, to the spiritual and social purposes it
served; a condition that was not unlike that of many Muslims living
elsewhere. Therefore, the transformation the Islamic knowledge in that
area is best described as a functional reduction. The most important
outcome of it was not so much the demise of religious practices or
skills but the fact that Islam—just as Russian Orthodoxy—ceased to be
a universal belief system explaining the world. Consequently, its role as
a moral code was also curtailed. 
Identity & Culture
It is often believed that under the Soviet
regime in Ukraine—in particular after the
mass deportation of Crimea Tatars—Islam
ceased to be a communal project. New
research, however, reveals that the local
reproduction of religious knowledge has
continued to date. Moreover, it has shaped
to a great extent the religious fabric after
the breakdown of the Soviet Union.
Many younger Muslims consider this
traditional knowledge too inadequate to
address the challenges of today. They turn
increasingly to alternative knowledge
supplied by a variety of organizations and
individuals from the Middle East
and elsewhere.
Islamic Knowledge
in Ukraine
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Post-Soviet experiences
Today the local production of knowl-
edge by and large follows the track
typical of localized traditional Islam.
With the re-establishment of Islamic in-
stitutions and hierarchies in the early
1990, those pious Muslims who had
been trained in informal settings of Is-
lamic learning came to the fore. They
filled the vacancies in the newly
emerging clergy which was now com-
prised of muftis, deputy muftis, and
imams. Some of the older religious
leaders, after being succeeded by
younger clerics, continued to be vocal
public speakers giving voice to the tra-
ditional local Islam. For instance, Nuri-
efendi, a former Crimean mufti now
runs a regular Islam Nuru page in the
Crimea Tatar Qirim newspaper and ap-
pears on the radio show Din ve Urf
Adetler (Religious and Local Customs).
Riza Fazil produced a series of books—
Diniy urf-adetlerimiz (Our Religious
Customs)—in cooperation with the
son of an imam who had been perse-
cuted in late 1920s.4
The local Islamic tradition is held in
esteem by Crimea Tatar politicians.
Being nationalists they consider what-
ever is “our own” has greater value than
any imported good. Thus they champi-
on “our traditional Crimean Islam.”
They hardly understand the limitations
caused by this notion of “traditional
Islam” when addressing the challenges
of modernity. 
With the advent of religious freedom
after the collapse of the Soviet Union,
Muslim organizations and individuals
from Turkey, the Arab Middle East and
South Asia appeared on the Ukrainian
scene. It began with the arrival of
preachers of various schools of
thought. By the late 1990s a network of
NGOs, mosques and education facili-
ties with links to the Muslim heartlands
were established in those places with
sizable Muslim minorities as well as the
capital, Kiev. Much effort was put into opening education facilities
(madrasas and universities), offering both introductory and formal ad-
vanced courses. Religious education and guidance is now being pro-
vided by a variety of international and national organizations, includ-
ing the official Turkish Diyanet, Aziz Mahmud Hüdayi Endowment, ce-
maats of the Süleymaniya, followers of Fethullah Gülen, as well as the
Ikhwan Muslimun, Hizb al-Tahrir, Salafis, the Tabligh, and even
Habashis.5 Many young Crimeans are eagerly studying Islam as impart-
ed by these groups and often shifting from one to the other. In spite of
this seemingly large and varied supply of knowledge the more educat-
ed of them feel that their thirst for knowledge remains unquenched. As
yet, there is very little local production following the arrival of new
ideas. A unique attempt to involve Ukrainian Muslims in this process is
the establishment of an Islamic monthly by an Arab-sponsored NGO
network with ties to the Qatar based Egyptian scholar Yusuf al-
Qaradawi. The group has also created an Internet resource page
(http://www.islamua.net) and produces occasionally short radio pro-
grams. 
It is difficult to judge to what extent new types of religious knowl-
edge and organizations impinge on the Muslim communities of
Ukraine. Is it possible to say that some of the Ukrainian Muslims are ac-
tually Ikhwani or Suleymanci? For instance, are the youth distributing
flyers of Hizb al-Tahrir in April 2003 and rallying against the US invasion
of Iraq, Tahriris in the sense that they have adopted the movement’s
ideology? Individual involvement and prefer-
ences continuously change. There is a high de-
mand for religious knowledge and much is cur-
rently being absorbed, but as yet the productive
incorporation into local Islam of new ideas and
concepts seems to be lacking. However, the very
idea that Islam involves more than ritual only is
spreading and may lay out the foundation for a
more comprehensive religious world outlook.
What that would be remains to be seen: “We are
trying to understand what is going on with our
community in Islamic terms; we are looking for
knowledge from all possible sources, but we do
not want to be taught the one thing as being op-
posed to the other,” as one young Crimean Mus-
lim put it.
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1. R. I. Khayali, Krymskotatarskiy narod v
usloviakh deportacii, 1944-1967 (Simferopol,
2000), 97.
2. Some Crimea Tatars used to come back from
exile annually to their native villages and
towns to celebrate Khidirles in 1970s
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(celebrated on the day of autumnal
equinox), which has apparently
discontinued in exile but has been re-
introduced after repatriation. 
3. The tradition of writing a Quranic verse on
piece of paper, folded in a triangular form
and quilted in a water-proof material to be
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a cross in Christian tradition—is widespread
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authored by Abdulwait Sakhtara
(Simferopol, 2001); 101 Dua (Simferopol,
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Hrair Dekmejian, “A Sufi response to political
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Praying during
a rally devoted
to the 59th
anniversary of
the deportation
of more then
200,000 Tartars
from Crimea
during the
Stalin era,
Simferopol,
18 May 2003
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Albania is the only communist country
where religion was completely banned
(in 1967) and which was proclaimed
“atheistic” by the 1976 constitution.
After the disintegration of the commu-
nist system and the abolishment of the
old restrictions on religious freedom in
1990, the religious communities at-
tempted to reconstruct their institu-
tions and religious life. They have en-
countered serious resource problems,
however, as the state has been too
slow to pass new legislation which guarantees the restitution of prop-
erty of the various religious communities previously confiscated by
communists. Consequently, all the religious communities depend
heavily on foreign aid.
The two Muslim communities
The Sunni community reconstituted itself in February 1991 under the
leadership of Hafiz Sabri Koci (who had been persecuted by the Hoxha
regime for his beliefs and spent 23 years in prison), and Sali Tivari.1
They immediately established contacts with Islamic countries and or-
ganizations in order to receive the badly needed spiritual and material
support. Important steps taken were the contract signed in 1991 for
the country’s membership in the Organization of Islamic Conference
(which was however never ratified by Parliament because of a wave of
strong criticism in the press, and the public debates about the geopo-
litical orientation of the country), as well as the establishment of the Is-
lamic Development Bank in 1995. With foreign aid, Muslims built or re-
built hundreds of mosques and opened ten religious schools. The sup-
port, coming mainly from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Egypt, Libya, Turkey,
and Malaysia, also provided religious literature, funds for the pilgrim-
age to Mecca, and scholarships for the study of Albanian students in
Islamic Institutes abroad. The Sunni
community started several newspa-
pers and established various associa-
tions. In 1996 the Albanian Institute of
Islamic Thought and Civilisation was
created under the directorship of
Ramiz Zekaj. The institute focuses
mainly on academic research and pub-
lications and plays an important role
for the promotion of a “moderate” type
of Islam with strong nationalistic con-
notations. In this respect the organiza-
tion fits into the trend towards an “Albanized” Islam that has been
strong since the late nineteenth century. Zekaj does not see a contra-
diction in the relation between the universal umma and the ethnic
identification “… because the idea of the umma is promoted ideologi-
cally and not in terms of a state. We have a more important task—to
define our national identity … The national cause is above all.”2
Yet the Sunni Muslim community in Albania is far from united. Gen-
erally, it is divided into the followers of more nationalistically oriented
tendencies and partisans of the idea of a pan-Islamic unity. This dis-
pute seems to be, to a certain extent, an intergenerational conflict as
the latter trend is represented mainly by younger Muslims who have
studied in Islamic educational centres abroad. One should, however,
not ignore the strong secular mood in Albania, in particular among in-
tellectuals. Some of them, among whom is the renowned novelist Is-
mail Kadare, highly critical of Islam, even argue that Albania’s Muslims,
should return to their “original faith,” Christianity, as a condition for
their country’s democratic development and reintegration in Europe.3
The much smaller Bektashi community has also struggled to rebuild
its religious life after the collapse of the communist regime, but in their
case foreign support has been limited, coming mainly from Iran. Only a
few of the old tekkes (community houses) have been reopened. More-
over, the issue of communal leadership
and its reproduction seems to be unre-
solved as yet.
One of the main religious issues in Al-
bania concerns the relations between
the Sunni and Bektashi communities.
The debate about the relationship
dates to the time before World War II,
and continues today in one form or an-
other, for example, in the internal dis-
pute between the official Bektashi
leader Baba Reshat Bardhi and the
head of the tekke of Fushë-Krujë, Baba
Selim. Only a few define Bektashiyya as
a dervish order within the Sunni Islam;
the vast majority of Bektashis treasure
their independence from the Sunni
community.4 People from both com-
munities sometimes (but not always)
perceive the distinction as more than
intra-religious. Among representatives
of the Sunni community the statement
“We are Muslims and they are Bek-
tashis” is not uncommon. Bektashiyya
has often featured itself as “a different
Islam” and even as a specifically “Alban-
ian religion” and has played a consider-
able role in the nineteenth century con-
struction of the national ideology. 
Identity & Culture
Religion in Post-
Communist Albania
Ethem Bey
Mosque, Tirana
Albania is the only European country with a majority
Muslim population—about 70 % of a total of 3,2 million
and a Christian minority—approximately 20% belong to
the Orthodox Church and 10% to the Roman Catholic
Church. The Muslim population is further divided into a
Sunni community (comprising about 55% of the whole
population), a Bektashi community (about 15%), in
addition to a number of Sufi brotherhoods such as
Rifa‘iyya, Qadiriyya, Khalwatiyya, among others, most of
which are considered to be within the Sunni realm.
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Islam has lost some of the influence and popularity it gained immedi-
ately after the fall of the communist regime. The numerous mosques
are hardly crowded with worshippers and some surveys have even in-
dicated that the percentage of atheists among Albanians of Muslim
background is higher than that among those of Orthodox or Roman
Catholic tradition.5 The repression of what is defined as Islamic funda-
mentalism has intensified after 1997. A number of Arab Muslim ac-
tivists and some NGOs have been banned from the country. The rea-
sons behind the altering perceptions of Islam are connected to
changes in the international situation after 9/11, on the one hand, and
to the country’s struggle to “move closer to Europe,” “Europe” being
identified as Christian, on the other hand. 
The discourse of the European Union has become an essential part of
the Albanian national discourse today. Despite the fact that Albania
has not yet started negotiations for a future membership of the EU, the
aspired membership is seen by and large as a panacea against the
country’s enormous problems connected to regional insecurity, mass
poverty, widespread criminality, weak civic order, and the lack of de-
mocratic traditions. Moreover, this future union
with the European mainland is often perceived as
a solution to the unsettled “national question” as
well, providing a “natural” and peaceful unifica-
tion of all Albanians (major Albanian communi-
ties being in Albania proper, Kosovo, Macedonia,
and Montenegro) in the framework of the EU.
Also for this reason Muslims in Albania emphasize
that they are actually “European Muslims.”
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1. In January 2003 Sali Tivari was shot dead.
To this day the murder has not been solved.
2. Ramiz Zekaj, interview with the author,
December 2003.
3. See Tonin Gjuraj, “A Stable Ecumenical
Model? How Religion Might Become
a Political Issue in Albania,” East European
Quarterly 34, no.1 2000: 38.
4. About the internal struggles in the Bektashi
community see Nathalie Clayer, Religion et
nation chez les albanais XIXe-XXe siecles
(Istanbul: ISIS, 2003), 416 –17.
5. Ibid., 321.
Ina Merdjanova is Researcher and Director of Publishing
at DEMOS Foundation, Bulgaria.
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A D V E R T I S E M E N T
Islam, society and politics
After the collapse of communism the state opted to have no proclaimed
official religion, following the traditional approach which considers Alba-
nia to be a “country of three religions” rather than a Muslim state. Accord-
ing to the Constitution of 1998, there is no official religion and all religions
are equal, yet the four predominant religious communities—that is, in-
cluding the Bektashis as a separate community—enjoy a de facto recogni-
tion and privileged social status because of their historical presence. 
The relations between the various communities are generally re-
laxed. This tolerance is related to the long history of multi-confession-
alism and the traditional pragmatic attitude of the Albanians to reli-
gion, on the one hand, and to the considerable extent of the seculari-
sation of society as a result of communist repression, on the other.
Most Albanians consider their national identity of greater importance
than their religious identification. Religious differences have never pre-
vented collaboration in the name of “national interests,” and cases of
interfaith unions for the defence of autonomy are abundant through-
out Albanian history. Ethno-national identity in Albania has thus pro-
vided an overarching and almost sacred canopy, which has down-
played, or powerfully refocused, identifications along religious lines.
The role of religion in society, while not negligible, is not to be over-
stated. Sometimes Albanians refer to an alleged “pro-Muslim” orienta-
tion of the opposition Democratic Party (in power until 1997) and tend
to see the politics of the ruling Socialist Party as “pro-Orthodox.” These
claims are obviously connected to the Orthodox affiliation of the pre-
sent prime-minister Fatos Nano and that of the president Alfred Moi-
siu, as well as to the correct observation that the electorate of the De-
mocratic Party comes predominantly from the Sunni Muslim commu-
nity (but also from Albanians belonging to the Roman Catholic tradi-
tion), while that of the Socialist party—from the Orthodox and the Bek-
tashi communities. In addition, the Socialist Party has pursued a na-
tionalist orientation bringing the country closer to Greece and Mace-
donia, rather than to the Muslim states. 
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The Hemshin or Hemshinli people live
in the foothills and mountainous areas
of the eastern Black Sea region of
Turkey. The Hemshinli constitute a
unique group, even within the context
of the Eastern Black Sea region, which
differs by its geography and ethnic and
linguistic diversity from the rest of the
country. One circumstance that sets
the Hemshin apart from other groups
of this region, such as the Lazi and the
Georgians, is that they are divided into
two communities almost oblivious to
one another’s existence, and separated
by language, culture and territory. The
districts of Camlıhems¸in and Hems¸in in
the highlands of the province of Rize
are the heartland of the western
Hemshinli, or Bash-Hemshinli. This
group is isolated by the exclusively Lazi
district of Arhavi from the eastern Hemshinli, or Hopa-Hemshinli, who
are mostly settled in the Hopa and Borc¸ka districts of the Artvin
province. Moreover, these two Hemshin groups are unaware of the ex-
istence of yet a third related community speaking a close if not identi-
cal dialect, the Christian Hamshen Armenians of Abkhazia and
Krasnodar in Russia.
The Hemshinli constitute a truly fascinating phenomenon. They
have preserved, centuries after their conversion to Islam, a sense of
identity distinct from that of their neighbours, as well as, for part of
them, their spoken Armenian dialect Homshetsma. By continuing to
speak Armenian, they have reversed one of the more typical para-
digms in the Ottoman Empire, whereby Armenian converts to Islam
were assimilated completely into the surrounding Muslim environ-
ment, and Christian Armenians often became monolingual Turkish-
speakers. The Armenian language did disappear around the middle of
the nineteenth century among the Bash-Hemshinli, to be replaced by
a local Turkish dialect containing a large number of Armenian loan-
words, but it has survived to this day among the Hopa-Hemshinli. Fur-
thermore, given the ongoing decline in the Diaspora of the use of the
Armenian language, the ironic possibility that these Muslim villagers
may well be the last speakers of Western Armenian cannot be exclud-
ed.
The Bash-Hemshinli approximately number between 15,000 and
23,000 individuals in the Rize province, while the Hopa-Hemshinli are
estimated at around 25,000.1 To these figures must be added the
dozen or so villages in the northwestern provinces of Düzce and
Sakarya, settled by the Hemshinli during the last decades of the nine-
teenth century. Large communities of Hemshinli can also be found in
regional centres such as Trabzon and Erzurum and in the large cities of
western Turkey. A total figure of approximately 100,000 individuals
for all of Turkey appears to be a realistic estimate.
In Nations and Nationalism, Ernest Gellner, using language as a crite-
rion, gives a figure of approximately 8000 minority groups on earth.
Of these 8000 groups, he continues, barely one-tenth have developed
“nationalisms,” i.e. ”the striving to make culture and polity congru-
ent,” 2 or have elaborated any sort of ethnically based cultural and po-
litical agenda. The Hemshin, like their Lazi neighbours, clearly belong
to the 90 percent of groups which have chosen not to mobilize on the
basis of their ethnic identity.3 However, they have maintained a sense
of collective identity, the distinction of which is recognized by their
neighbours.
Perceptions of history
Historical sources agree that the
Hemshinli are the descendants of Ar-
menians who migrated to the Black
Sea region or Pontos in the late eighth
century. The district settled by these
migrants came to be known as Hama-
mashen (i.e., built by Hamam), after
Prince Hamam Amatuni, one of the
leaders of the migration. With time,
Hamamashen became Hamshen, and
following Ottoman conquest in the
late fifteenth century, Hemshin. In the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,
the Armenians of Hemshin converted
to Islam. Various reasons have been
given for conversion, including fiscal
oppression, rise of Muslim intolerance
vis-à-vis Christians following a series of
Ottoman defeats at the hands of Rus-
sia, the breakdown of central authority in the late seventeenth century
and the ensuing climate of anarchy when the region was at the mercy
of warlords known as derebeys (valley lords). Islam is believed to have
progressed from the coast up, with highland villages remaining Christ-
ian for a longer period than lowland ones. The religious context during
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was, however, more compli-
cated than that, as the boundary between Christians and Muslims in
Hemshin was blurred by the existence of yet a third category com-
posed of crypto-Christians known as Keskes (Armenian half-half). The
crypto-Christians of Hemshin were reported until the late nineteenth
century to attend church, secretly baptize their children, and continue
to celebrate various Armenian religious feasts such as Vartevar (the
Transfiguration of Christ) and Verapokhum (the Assumption).4
A majority of Hemshinli, however, reject any suggestion that they
have Armenian ancestry, preferring the thesis presented to them by
Turkish nationalist historians such as Fahrettin Kırzıogˇlu. In its main
lines, this revisionist version of Hemshin history argues that the
Hemshinli are of pure Turkish stock and that they are the descendants
of an authentic Turkish tribe. Historical and cultural links with Armeni-
ans are downplayed or simply denied, and the use of the Armenian lan-
guage by the Hopa-Hemshinli is attributed to their coexistence with Ar-
menians in a distant past. This narrative is basically an extension to the
Hemshinli of historical and linguistic theories, such as the Turkish His-
torical Thesis and the extravagant ”sun language theory” (günes¸-dil
teorisi), which have been created and supported by the Turkish Repub-
lic since the early 1930s as an integral part of the nation- and state-
building process. While Kırzıogˇlu has certainly been the chief and most
famous proponent of the Turkish state version of Hemshin history, it
was his predecessor M. Rıza, who stated in a 1933 book that the
Hemshinli were “Hittite Turks‘” and that after speaking Armenian for a
while, “they now know no other language than Turkish.”5
The popularity of Turkish nationalist theories is obviously linked to
the Armenian-Turkish antagonism and to the fact that it is socially
more acceptable to claim Turkic ancestors from Central Asia than Ar-
menian ones in the modern Turkish Republic. Yet, the preference of
the Hemshinli for this thesis also has deeper roots that go back to Ot-
toman times. In the pre-national context of the Ottoman Empire, peo-
ple identified themselves in terms of their membership in a particular
religious community, or millet. Thus, being ”Armenian” prior to the im-
port of the European idea of nation to the Ottoman Empire meant be-
longing to the Armenian Apostolic Church and the millet it composed.
Leaving the Armenian Church to join another Christian denomination
Identity & Culture
By continuing to speak Armenian, the small
community of Hemshin in northeastern
Turkey has become the only community of
Armenian-speaking Muslims. Furthermore,
by developing after their conversion to Islam
a group identity distinct from that of its
neighbours, they have constituted an
exception to one of the more typical
paradigms in the Ottoman Empire, whereby
Armenian converts to Islam were assimilated
completely into the surrounding Muslim
environment. Yet, while maintaining
Armenian components in their culture,
a majority of Hemshin dissociate themselves
from their Armenian ancestry. The rural
exodus has emptied many of the villages, but
among the younger generation, including
those born in the cities, a growing number
seeks to preserve Hemshinli traditions.
History and Identity
among the Hemshin
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or Islam also meant that one stopped being part of the Armenian ”na-
tion.” “Armenian” was used interchangeably with ”Christian,” and
”Turk” with ”Muslim”—and continues to be done so to this day by most
of Turkey’s rural population. That one could possibly be ”Turk” and
”Christian” or ”Armenian” and ”Muslim” was—and still is to most of
Turkey’s population—a concept that was simply beyond the grasp of
most of the Ottoman Empire’s inhabitants; an anomaly.
Identity issues
The estrangement between Hemshinli and Armenians is best shown
in the fascinating anecdote reported by the famous French linguist
Georges Dumézil, who studied the Armenian dialect of Hemshin and
published a series of articles on the topic in the 1960s. The young
Hemshinli with whom Dumézil worked had no idea whatsoever that he
spoke Armenian. He had only noticed when going at the beach in Is-
tanbul that there were people speaking a language he could under-
stand (i.e., Istanbul Armenians), yet he had no idea why, as they were
not from his village or region.6
Answers on ethnic origins among the Hemshinli may well vary ac-
cording to gender, place of residence, age, or location of discussion.
What often appears is a reverse correlation between wealth and influ-
ence on the one hand and admission to Armenian origins on the other.
Thus, older women living in a village of Çamlıhems¸in or Hopa will be
more likely to admit to their Armenian ancestry than middle-aged
businessmen residing in Ankara, who are more likely to staunchly re-
ject any Armenian connection. Younger people, meanwhile, appear
both confused and curious about their origins. In some cases, the
Hemshinli who admit to some sort of Armenian ancestry will mention
that the family founder was a migrant to the area, usually from Central
Asia, who married within the Hemshinli community, and gradually as-
similated. The same is visible among the Laz. It could be true, but it is a
way of “saving” one’s family past while admitting the painful ”truth” for
the rest of the group. In conversations with Hemshinli individuals who
admitted to Armenian origins, there appeared to be two or three levels
of perception of “Armenians”: one’s ancestors before conversion, the
Hemshinli who remained Christians prior to WWI, and modern-day Ar-
menians, from the Diaspora or the republic of Armenia.
While opinions on origins vary, there is a clear consciousness of
group identity, including the notion of Hems¸inlilik, i.e., to be Hemshin.
This sense of community is expressed in the following statement from
a Hemshinli periodical published in Ankara: “We, Hemshinli, are people
who are spread out in all directions of Anatolia. But the longing for
Hems¸in inside us binds us strongly together.”7 The separation of
Hemshinli into Bash-Hemshinli and Hopa-Hemshinli means there are
actually two distinct group identities. The two groups do not mingle in
the large cities of western Turkey and maintain separate associations.
The traditional head-gear (pu¸si) used among Bash-Hemshinli is un-
known among the Hopa-Hemshinli. The western, or Bash-Hemshinli,
continue to celebrate Vartevar in their summer pastures (yayla)—even
if the religious meaning of the feast appears to have long been lost on
them—and have generally maintained more Armenian traditions than
the Hopa-Hemshinli. However, it is more the continued use of
Homshetsma, the Armenian dialect of Hamshen, by the Hopa-
Hemshinli than the preservation of Armenian festivals by the Bash-
Hemshinli that has attracted the attention of outsiders to the Hemshin-
li population. The continued use of Homshetsma by the Hopa-
Hemshinli is also believed to be one of the reasons for the separation
between the two groups, as the Bash-Hemshinli prefer not be associat-
ed with Armenian-speakers.
It is difficult to assert what the future holds for a small group like the
Hemshinli. Assimilation represents a clear danger for the survival of the
group. It is interesting to note in this context that the verb ”assimilate”
has been adopted into Turkish and that minority
groups like the Lazi and the Hemshin are often
described as having been assimilated (assimiley
olmus¸).8 The rural exodus has emptied most
Hemshinli villages—particularly in Bash-Hem-
shin—leaving only elderly people to live year-
round in their native district. Some Hopa-Hem-
shinli families are not teaching their children
Homshetsma anymore, and the Turkish dialect
used in Bash-Hemshin, which contains numerous
Armenian loan-words, is dying. However, many
young Hemshinli, including those born in the
large cities of western Turkey, show a strong in-
terest in preserving the culture of their ancestors.
The day of doom has not arrived yet for the
Hemshinli. They have not ”awakened” as a na-
tion—and have certainly no desire to—but nei-
ther have they allowed their distinct cultural
identity to disappear.
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Hemshin family,
Tirovit yayla
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The political opposition in Egypt had,
until recently, been characterised by
bitter rivalry and mutually antagonistic
ideological positions. Collaboration
between Leftist and Nasserist ele-
ments took place sporadically in the
second half of the 1990s. The turning
point for joint political activism came
in September 2000 with the outbreak
of the second Palestinian intifada
which gave rise to a very strong spon-
taneous reaction on the Egyptian
street. It created a general sense of
anger among large sections of the gen-
eral public, most of whom had never
participated in organized politics be-
fore. The Egyptian Popular Committee
for Solidarity with the Palestinian Intifada (EPCSPI) established by
some twenty Leftist civil society organizations and activists became a
locus for a variety of political activism. It drew both Islamist activists
and Nasserists who participated either as individuals or union repre-
sentatives. The Committee organized campaigns for fund raising for
medical convoys to the Palestinian areas stimulating unprecedented
grass root participation. A first public demonstration organized on 10
September 2001 in Cairo was followed by a series of demonstrations in
support of the intifada in squares of central Cairo, major mosques, and
almost all Egyptian universities. 
With the threat of war on Iraq, and later the outbreak of the war,
more demonstrations and public rallies were organized by EPSCI all
over Egypt at a level unknown in over two decades culminating in the
massive demonstration of 20 March 2003 in Cairo. Almost all political
groupings and opposition parties took part. It became a common sight
in Cairo’s main squares and universities to see banners from the
banned Communist party next to, for example, Muslim Brotherhood
controlled unions and professional syndicates, side by side with copies
of the Quran and Nasser’s photographs, all condemning the war on
Iraq. Elements of different political groups intensely collaborated and
negotiated to plan demonstrations, campaign to boycott US and
British products, send relief convoys to the Palestinian territories and
issue joint statements to prominent politicians worldwide. 
While the main focus of political activism in the last three years has
been the intifada and Iraq, this new mood of joint activism has led to
the rise of initiatives, networks, and forums for political action around
different, yet related issues. For example, the Anti-Globalization Egypt-
ian Group (AGEG) founded in June 2002 by a group of Leftist activists
brings together people from different, if not conflicting backgrounds
such as, factory workers, leftist intellectuals, medium-size business-
men, underground socialist activists, and unaffiliated individuals. In an
interesting development, the Muslim Brotherhood, for the first time
since the re-emergence of political activism and street politics three
years ago, participated as a group in a joint activity with the Left, the
Nasserists, various trade unions, and some civil society organizations at
the Second Cairo Conference held in December 2003 under three slo-
gans: “No to Capitalist Globalization and US Hegemony,” “No to the Oc-
cupation of Iraq and Zionism in Palestine,” and “No to Authoritarianism
in the Arab Region.” Furthermore, there are recent signs of the rising
potential of an “Islamic Left” such as Islamists who are starting to artic-
ulate their ideas more clearly along lines of class conflict and adopt a
more pluralist emancipatory approach partly in reaction to an aging
and rigid leadership.
Significantly, this new political activism is no longer organized within
formal, bureaucratic, and hierarchical political or civil society organiza-
tions but within loosely-established
horizontal networks with often fluid
and interchangeable memberships and
no hierarchical leadership structures.
Moreover, activities are organized by
individuals belonging to disparate po-
litical camps, though mostly from the
Left, and not by organizations or politi-
cal parties. Finally, the value of individ-
uality and the possibility of retaining
one’s independent programme is one
of the main principles upon which al-
liances between previously rival politi-
cal groups have been taking place.
Principles of cooperation
Building an alliance between the tra-
ditional enemies of the political opposition has not been easy. The dif-
ferences in the political programmes and ideologies of the two groups
are deeply rooted and might often seem unbridgeable. It is interesting,
therefore, to explore the foundations upon which representatives of
both groups have based their negotiations for joint action in the last
three years. Two basic principles have been employed in the process:
consensus and independence. Consensus implies that no slogans or po-
sitions are adopted that are not supported by all participants. For ex-
ample, in all demonstrations, organizers emphasize the need to avoid
sectarian slogans and adopt only those which do not offend the sensi-
bilities and ideas of participants. For example, the famous slogan of the
Islamists: “Khaibar Khaibar Oh Jews, Muhammad’s army will be back,”
which is often enthusiastically endorsed by the nationalist Nasserists,
but deeply abhorred by elements on the Left, has been discarded by the
organizers at every demonstration. Achieving a consensus, besides
being time-consuming, is very limiting as certain contentious issues,
such as Palestinian suicide bombers and how to react to 11 September,
are simply dropped, causing considerable frustration to many partici-
pants who do not always want to compromise on their priorities. The
second principle is to maintain independence. The objective of joint ac-
tivism is not “programmatic co-operation” or achieving a “third way”
but coordinated work for specific short-term goals. Each side retains its
independent political character and its activities reflect its particularity. 
Alliance as a necessary tactic
The rising cooperation between the Left and Islamists has also come
about as the result of the Left’s serious reconsideration of its overall
strategic approach and, in particular, its relationship with opposition
religious forces. 
Based on the work of several Leftist authors,2 many leftist activists, in
Egypt have undertaken a self-critical analysis which has led them to re-
gard political Islam as an ambivalent political force which could play ei-
ther a radical and progressive role, or a conservative and reactionary
one, depending upon the historical moment. The conclusion drawn by
the Left is that it can neither unconditionally support the Islamists nor
ally with the repressive state against them, which were the two di-
chotomous positions adopted by various Leftists in the past. It is acute-
ly aware of the need to analyse Islamists’ (and others’) potential at each
specific historical phase to devise a new formula for working with, or,
opposing them. Furthermore, Leftist activists stress the pragmatic
need to work alongside religious groups when they make up part of
the opposition, particularly as religious activists have become much
closer than the secular Left to the grassroots.
Another debate influencing recent forms of joint activism is the Left’s
reassessment of its role within non-class politics. Class-based move-
Political Participation & Activism
The political opposition in Egypt has recently
been showing growing forms of cooperation,
especially at the grass root level. The
nationalist Nasserists, Leftists and Islamists
are infamous for their internecine conflict and
none are a homogeneous political group
representing a monolithic political front.1
Recent attempts to forge new types of
collaborative political action, particularly
between the latter two groups, should,
therefore, not be understood as a coalition
representing three discrete parties under their
official leaderships, but as loose networks
comprising members or sections of different
political camps as well as unaffiliated
sympathizers.
The Leftists and
Islamists in Egypt
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male/female separation in demonstrations have been some of the
most contentious and time consuming points of disagreement. This
does not augur well for quick and flexible decision-making in a crisis.
There is also no doubt that antagonism between Leftists and Islamists
is very deeply rooted. Many Leftists still feel uncomfortable about the
presence of the Islamists in any activity in which they participate. Areas
of disagreement between the Islamists and the Left are numerous, not
least of them being the fundamental differences on issues of class
analysis, women, and the rights of minority groups. For their part, Is-
lamists still cannot forgive the Left’s siding with the regime against
them in the early 1990s. This deeply-rooted antagonism poses the dan-
ger of deepening internal conflicts within each camp. On the Left, in
particular, the old guard and certain factions are increasingly critical of
those who seek the Islamists’ cooperation and to dilute the working
class struggle. Some observers and activists fear that the already divid-
ed Left might become even further polarized because of the new ap-
proach they are taking towards Islamists. 
The still experimental nature of this new activism makes any projec-
tions about the future difficult. The phenomenon is still very fluid and
how it develops depends on various factors. Hence, over-optimistic ex-
pectations about significant results being delivered in the immediate
future are unjustified. On one hand, the nascent coalition holds the po-
tential to become the precursor of a vibrant, broadly-based, and de-
mocratic grouping. But on the other, efforts at cooperation have been
slow and beset with major obstacles. For the most part, collaboration
has taken place at the initiative of individuals rather than organiza-
tions. The future of collaboration, therefore, remains fragile and vul-
nerable to party leadership withdrawal. Moreover, initiatives for coop-
eration have mostly come from the Left, which is objectively the weak-
er group in the coalition, rather than from the Muslim Brotherhood.
Without the will on the part of the Brotherhood,
the achievements of the last three years will be an
isolated chapter. While there are signs that the
Brotherhood is engaged in self-reassessment, po-
litical observers can only speculate on how the
process will evolve.
Political Participation & Activism
ments have been receding worldwide and replaced by more issue-ori-
ented activism that cuts across class interests due to the changing
structure of the global economy and the ensuing changing class con-
figurations. The Left in Egypt, as elsewhere, has found itself forced to
choose between concentrating on its “historic” class-based mission
and expanding its scope to include non-class activism. Those who
choose the latter are attempting to construct a language that will pro-
vide an element of universality in order to appeal to elements from
contrasting political programmes. 
The Muslim Brotherhood, a banned yet tolerated political organiza-
tion which advocates the establishment of an Islamic state and society,
was established in 1928. Al-Jama‘a al-Islamiyya is Egypt’s largest mili-
tant group since the late 1970s. Its primary goal is to overthrow the
Egyptian government and replace it with an Islamic state. It has carried
out several armed attacks on various targets such as tourists, Copts, se-
curity and state officials, as well as opponents of Islamist extremism. It
is equally important to locate reasons for growing political coopera-
tion within political Islam. Both reformist and radical Islamist groups
have altered some of their tactics in recent years. Al-Jama‘a, for exam-
ple, has renounced violence while the Muslim Brotherhood has been
adopting a more general discourse of democracy and political freedom
rather than its traditional emphasis on implementing its goal of shari‘a.
While both streams of Islamists might have ulterior motives for these
recent redefinitions of objectives and tactics, there is little doubt that
they have been instrumental in creating a potential for alliance with
the Left.
Furthermore, internal crisis within the Muslim Brotherhood could
also play a role in encouraging some of its members to seek new op-
portunities for political action. Growing dissatisfaction with the ageing
leadership’s rigid approaches and inflexible ideas, as well as the lead-
ership’s conciliatory approach to the government, is leading some
younger members to seek new forms of activism which offer space for
freer thinking and progressive ideas. The 76 years old leader elected in
January 2004 Muhammad Mahdi Akif, replaced the late Ma’mun al-Hu-
daybi, who died as acting leader, at the age of 82.
Finally, the Islamists have taken the brunt of the regime’s repression
in the last decade, which has weakened them organizationally. Per-
haps the Brotherhood feels the need to work more in the shadow of
other groups that are not so persecuted. 
A new challenge for the state
These new forms of opposition cooperation with their loosely orga-
nized political activities are presenting a novel challenge to the state
which is somewhat confused by the absence of clearly-defined politi-
cal organizations or leadership. The presence of various forums for po-
litical action, on the other hand, has offered activists the space to move
their projects and activities easily from one network to another, and to
have different events organized under different umbrellas without
being easily identified by the authorities.
In its earlier stages, the ECPSPI had the implicit endorsement of the
regime. Later, as the Committee rapidly gained popular support and its
activities became the locus of mass rallies, the regime grew suspicious.
Only a few arrests of the more active members were made in the
months subsequent to the establishment of the Committee. The more
violent and extensive crackdown did not come until the aftermath of
the 20 March 2003 demonstration when about 1500 people including
organizers and ordinary demonstrators were arrested. Interestingly, in
contrast with usual practice under the infamous Emergency Law in ef-
fect for over twenty years which gives the authorities extensive pow-
ers, including detaining suspects for prolonged periods without trial,
trial of civilians under military courts, and prohibiting demonstrations
and public meetings, the majority of the detainees were released very
shortly after their arrest. This could indicate the state’s weakness and
indecision regarding the best course of action against a widely-sup-
ported and difficult to identify opposition.
The future of a “coalition”
This new joint political activism is clearly not easy to realise. The time
consuming nature of consensus building has already been mentioned.
Even the simplest logistical steps can become battlegrounds. Argu-
ments over the details of a demonstration or a conference can exhaust
the time and energy of the organizers. Issues of who gets to talk first in
a conference or a rally, choosing slogans acceptable to everybody, and
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Notes
1. The Left is a case in point: it consists of
various factions and groups including the
banned Communist Party, the Tagammu‘
Party, and the Revolutionary Socialists. 
2. A widely read author in Egyptian Leftist
circles is C. Harman, “The Prophet and the
Proletariat,” International Socialism 64
(Autumn 1994): 3-64,
http://pubs.socialistreviewindex.org. 
P
H
O
T
O
 B
Y
 P
A
U
L
 S
C
H
E
M
M
, 
C
A
IR
O
 T
IM
E
S
, 
2
0
0
3
Demonstration
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by different
political
opposition
groups, Cairo,
20 March 2003
Maha Abdelrahman is Assistant Professor of Sociology at the
American University in Cairo.
E-mail: mahadebu@aucegypt.edu
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In France, Islamic knowledge was for-
mally transmitted and reproduced to
Muslims through associations aimed at
controlling the religious market. “Reli-
gious market” refers to the growing de-
mand by Muslims for religious educa-
tion and services such as the issuing of
fatwa (religious legal advice), and the
performance of rites such as prayer and
marriage. Individuals from mosques,
Muslim associations, or religious au-
thorities supplied all these religious
services.1 These institutions catered
mainly to male followers who were ex-
pected to transmit religious knowledge
according to the in-house ideology; they did not usually promote the
interests of youth and women who were on their margins. 
Young women, particularly, were not satisfied with their marginal
roles in Islamic organizations. Especially since the events of 11 Sep-
tember 2001, they seem to have grown tired of hearing the Islamist
militant speech of these associations and wanted to learn about their
religion through more spiritual and academic channels. Thus, more
and more young female students left the political and social militant
associations in favour of the religious teaching of the institutes for Is-
lamic Studies. They also took part in the activities associations of
young Muslim students such as Etudiants Musulmans de France and
Jeunes Musulmans de France who tried to move away from the strate-
gies of the central organization Union des Organisations Islamiques de
France (akin to the Muslim Brotherhood movement in France), espe-
cially concerning the headscarf controversy. Consequently, they were
more liable to promote the principles of freedom of individual choice
with regard to issues such as, whether to wear the headscarf in schools
and workplaces, rather than to be a
part of a collective Islamist utopia
movement. Within these new organi-
zations, the role of women was no
longer that of the messenger of a pre-
formulated normative and ideological
message expressed by a religious mili-
tancy, but of a “source” capable of of-
fering others an education in Islamic
sciences. 
In a highly diversified knowledge
market, the obligation to promote a re-
ligious, pragmatic, and methodological
learning rather than a political Islamic
ideology made it thus possible for
women to integrate into programs de-
voted to the propagation of the latter.
Because these women could not be
seen in the past as traditional active
militants, male religious leaders did not
conceive as viable the use of female ac-
tivism in the religious market. For ex-
ample, it is within a collective movement that is not exclusively Islamic
(CEDITIM), which fights against the expulsion from school of young girls
who wear the headscarf, that the very recent, and still discreetly visible
Siham Andaloussi (the secretary of Tariq Ramadan), became a spokes-
person. However, the potential risk of defection of the male audience in
the process of immigration led them to re-consider women as a neces-
sary reinforcement to a risk of weakening of a religious Islamic market
uprooted from its national conditions of production.
As far as women were concerned, they
did not conceive of their participation
as exceptional but rather as a way to
introduce themselves into the power
structures of the power-through-
knowledge milieu. In this respect, the
Muslim organizations and institutes
show a turning point in their internal
management of their marketing poli-
cy around the “Muslim woman.” For
instance, patterns of attitudes that
had been imposed as the one and
unique normative avenue (like, for in-
stance, wearing the headscarf, or hav-
ing to sit at the appointed place for
women) are now presented as subject to a legitimate free and indi-
vidual choice. Moreover, the religious education market is open to
competition in the French context. No obligation of belief can now
be imposed upon the young female students who have experienced
a successful socialization out of the religious milieu. The place of fe-
male religious elites in France makes also sense, thanks to a greater
presence of the feminine clientele, who do not only go to the Insti-
tutes, mosques, and religious lectures, but also buys books and Is-
lamic cassettes. Seen as professional models with which women can
identify, they strongly appeal to a clientele that represents “between
65 and 70% of the audience of the new lectures, that is about 33, 000
girls.”2
The unofficial female market
The changes in the production pattern due to immigration should not
hide the fact that, even if female students in the Institutes are as nu-
merous as male students, their presence in the religious job market re-
mains symbolic (less than 15%). The fe-
male religious elites, which include var-
ious types of profiles such as preachers,
intellectuals, or even translators of Is-
lamic works, appear as a very fragment-
ed group. An open-to-women religious
education training system does not
necessarily imply that women will be
recruited for prestigious professions.
They are rather confined to a more clas-
sical niche, the women associations,
while the dominant positions in the re-
ligious market being still occupied by
men. Even though they do not fit in the
formal religious economy, they cannot
be totally excluded from it. Thus, these
new feminine professional abilities rep-
resent a new contender for the tradi-
tional male roles.
Clearly though, the establishment
finds itself well advised to educate and
in the last instance equip women with
adequate skills, even if it assigns them a lower position. Long excluded
from the institutional structures of religious knowledge, women usual-
ly meet at homes for sharing religious information, making it easier for
some of them to become unofficial religious authorities, and proving
to be a real source for influencing other women. Women can now
alone bring forward the religious standards, and their unofficial infor-
mation can possibly meet head-on the interests of the male religious
monopoly.
Political Participation & Activism
Islam in France has been experiencing a
significant evolution of traditional gender
roles as more Muslim women have access to
schooling and employment. Increasingly, first
and second-generation Maghrebi women, as
well as new immigrants, seek out and benefit
from religious training in institutions that
have traditionally been male domains such as
mosques, religious associations and Institutes
for Islamic Studies. Could it be that new public
female Muslim elite with religious skills and
competencies is emerging? Do Muslim women
occupy a new position within a religious
education market? 
Female Religious
Professionals in France
Within...new organizations,
the role of women was no longer
that of the messenger of a pre-
formulated...message ..., but of a
'source' capable of offering others
an education in Islamic sciences.
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In comparison to the far away traditional Maghrebi societies where re-
ligiously knowledgeable women can be easily discredited as healers or
holy female marabouts, neither institutionalized nor accredited with
real knowledge, the social mobility of Muslim female elites in France
makes them first-rate competitors in the religious market. In fact, they
are no longer playing the cultural community go-betweens relaying re-
ligious opinions to protect “the real image of the Muslim woman” from
the influences of the non-Muslim world. As they move, they bring
along their own clientele. In other words, the more prominent they ap-
pear, as visible actors, educated and upper middle-class citizens, the
higher is the corresponding profile of their audience. They can there-
fore occupy the central position of producing religious meanings in so-
ciety.3
The traditional dominant religious character is now being ques-
tioned, and new Islamic indigenous feminist battlefields are emerging
against, for example, polygamy practices, and cultural and economic
male domination. Even if the new standards are the expression of an
unofficial market, they are nevertheless seriously competing in the re-
ligious market. Since those women hold positions in public circles and
know how to use their religious abilities in a professional capacity, they
are not confined to the former scheme of traditional relays of knowl-
edge. Their roles are no longer restricted to raising children and con-
tributing to the smooth running of an “Islamic society,” but they exe-
cute their roles according to a well-planned scheme. They transform
the old small-scale, family-minded corporate approach into a larger, ra-
tionalized production of their knowledge, making their abilities fit in
with the logics of self-interest and profit, notably with children, young-
sters, or women. 
How feminine religious elites were born
The women-centred production of elites, either through written pro-
duction (for example, the books on Muslim women in France by Dou-
nia Bouzar or Malika Dif, both members of the French Board of Muslim
Worship), fatwa, or ijtihad (interpretation of the Quran),4 all signal
strategies of professional redeployment. The shift of what used to be a
professional stigma5 (i.e. being a woman) into a highly researched
quality on the religious market is a revealing phenomenon. Following
their relative exclusion from the global religious market, the new
women elites have become specialists who can both secure a female
clientele and remain as a legitimate part of the religious market insti-
tution. 
Subsequently, and as a sine qua non condition for their introduction
to the religious market, they, on the one hand, comply with the norms
and traditions that exclude them from the canonical authority like the
sermon of the Friday prayer (which is still considered a male preroga-
tive). On the other hand, they directly compete with the establishment,
lecturing in front of mixed audiences or teaching religious courses. By
doing so, they secure a balance between their “feminine” abilities and
career-oriented strategies, while keeping in touch with the global reli-
gious market, now more competitive than ever. 
Setting aside and belittling the achievements of women professionals
created an unofficial religious market that competes with that of men.
Women also inherit some benefits from the structural legitimacy of the
official market allowing them to put forward their own production.
These ambivalent market strategies and the ex-
treme diversity of the feminine religious proficien-
cies produce great instability, but only because it
is still relatively new. Will this market become an
autonomous and exclusively feminine market (so
limiting their field of activity and clientele) or will
the recent feminine religious economy gain
enough value to be fully integrated to the global
religious market, thus providing religious women
elites with new perspectives and positions, far
from the traditional women “ghetto”? 
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de France,
Bourget,
30 April 2001
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On the one hand you advocate a universal discourse of human rights
that is not restricted by religion or culture. Yet, on the other hand, you
also argue that in Muslim societies it is important to reinterpret Islam
to support democracy and human rights. Is it necessary to ground
human rights within religious discourse and law?
Why am I saying religion, religion, religion all the time? The necessi-
ty arises from the fact that one sixth of the population of the earth are
Muslims. And these people have certain beliefs they do not want to
abandon. Yet they do not want their beliefs to be abused and misused
by others, such as by governments that do not apply the principles of
democracy and justify it on religious grounds. Many people, whether
we like it or not, like to preserve the religion of their parents; of their
ancestors. We should not tell Muslims, as the leaders of many dictato-
rial regimes do, that they have to choose between democracy and
Islam. We should tell Muslims, “you can hold onto your religion. It is
very good. Nobody is going to bother you. But do not forget that the
key to heaven is not within the reach of the government or the ruler. It
is not with them. The relationship of everybody with their God is in
their heart and God has never said that somebody has to oppress us.
God has never said that our property has to be taken by from us by
force.” Therefore, we have to be mindful of the fact that since we are
Muslim, we must not necessarily be cheated. Therefore, we must ap-
proach certain issues through religion. If you are confronted with a
nonreligious population you would not have to talk about religion. But
in Iran and many other places in the world the necessity to reason
through religion is a necessity. It exists.
Some Muslims have responded to the many injustices committed
against the third world, and Muslim societies in particular, with
violence and a discourse of terrorism. How do you see this response?
First, I should say that I believe that terrorism and violence should be
dealt with severely. But having said that, we must ask if arresting and
punishing terrorists has decreased terrorism in the world? Or, is it the
case that, unfortunately, terrorism increases on a daily basis? We must
ask, “From where does terrorism originate?” Terrorism has two bases:
fanaticism and ignorance, and injustice. When a person, a group, a na-
tion is oppressed and has no one to come to its aid and, moreover, is
also ignorant, then it starts a fire in the world. I would like to recite a
poem here from Hafez to illustrate this point: “O wine bearer, please
give wine in a cup of justice to the beggar so that there is no calamity
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Ladies and Gentlemen, Dear Audience,
I am happy to have the opportunity to
be present in your gathering. The
country of the Netherlands brings the
idea of democracy and justice to my
mind. In the Netherlands, as in Europe
as a whole, the role of religion in poli-
tics has decreased from the period of
the Renaissance, while democracy and
freedom have gradually expanded. This
is a blessing of which many other countries are deprived. In much of
the eastern world, and particularly in the Islamic countries, the relation
between religion, democracy, human rights, and women’s rights re-
mains the source of many political disagreements. Religion and
democracy have been the subjects of ongoing disputes among
philosophers and scholars. Some believe that
human beings are the creation of God and as
such certain duties are imposed upon them. Ac-
cordingly, whatever rights humans may have, are
granted by Divine commandments. Likewise, it is
the Creator who dictates their obligations; major-
ity opinion cannot be the legitimate source of any
rights or obligations. This religiously oriented
philosophy holds that when a society is over-
whelmed by perversion and decadence, a prophet
would be sent to earth to show the right path to
the misled majority. Followers of this religious
school of thought observe the world through the
eyes of their ancestors and do not tolerate any
belief except their own. They do not concede a
larger role to the elected representatives of the
people, civil law, and parliament in determining
rights since the majority could be on the wrong
path. Rather, all legislation, they believe, should
be based on Divine rules. 
In most Islamic countries there is a mis-
conception that Islam is incompatible
with democracy and human rights.
Moreover, their governments impose
particular ideological meanings to
Islam and reject alternative meanings.
In such countries, religion becomes a
governmental tool. Anyone opposed to
these governments’ interpretations of
Islam risks being branded an “infidel”
and “enemy of Islam”; a tactic used to
silence political opposition and discourage and intimidate ordinary
people from expressing disagreement and dissent. Critics of those au-
tocratic regimes can find themselves lost in a whirlpool of various
charges, and their fear of being labelled infidel may discourage them
from any form of protest. This is the way that such autocratic govern-
ments hide behind the mask of Islam and continue their oppression and
cruelty in defence of its name. 
Islam and the rights of women and children
The situation of women in many Islamic countries is unacceptable.
Islam values women, evidence of which we find in the words and acts
of Prophet Muhammad himself, and in the Holy Quran. Why is it, then,
that in many Islamic countries the blood money for a woman is half of
that for a man? Why are men allowed to have several wives? Why are
women not in charge of their own destinies, especially after their mar-
riage when, under the excuse of obedience, their human identity
weakens. In some of these societies women are even considered mere-
ly as a means to procreate, and the degree of respect accorded to them
corresponds to the number of sons they produce. However, the status
of women differs from one Islamic country to another; some enjoy
more favourable conditions and some still live under the conditions of
thirteen hundred years ago. The essential question is: which one repre-
sents the real Islam? 
The legal position of children in many Islamic countries is also not ac-
ceptable. Children are mainly considered as objects, though valuable,
Political Participation & Activism
The ISIM invited 2003 Nobel Peace Prize
winner Shirin Ebadi for her first formal visit to
the Netherlands where she met with members
of NGOs, government officials, scholars,
students, and activists from 15-17 April 2004.
On 16 April she gave a lecture at the Nieuwe of
Littéraire Sociëteit de Witte in The Hague
entitled, Human Rights, Women and Islam
which is presented below in abridged form
with some audience questions. 
Human Rights,
Women and Islam
Shirin Ebadi was Iran’s first female
judge and served as president of
the Tehran city court from 1975 until
the revolution of 1979. She was
a founding member of the NGO,
Association for Support of
Children’s Rights in Iran, and was
instrumental in the reform of Iran’s
Child Custody law. As a lawyer,
writer, and advocate, Ebadi has
defended the rights of intellectuals,
women, children, and refugees. The
international recognition bestowed
on Ebadi as the first Muslim woman
and Iranian to receive a Nobel Prize
has re-invigorated the fight for
human rights and democracy in Iran
and far beyond.
Audience questions
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gion and want to preserve it, and also have the merit to live in better
conditions. 
Paradoxically, those who want to wage war [in the name of Islam], do
invoke incorrect interpretations of Islam. Such people try to argue that
Oriental civilization and especially Islamic civilization is inherently un-
related with Western civilization and the conflict between the two is
unavoidable. Islam is not a religion of terror and violence. You can be
sure that if a person is killed in the name of Islam then the name of
Islam has been abused. Islam should not take the blame for the incor-
rect actions perpetrated by individuals or groups, just as the wrongs
committed by individuals in the war in Bosnia cannot be said to be the
fault of all Christians. The Jewish religion should not be blamed for
those Israelis who ignore the various resolutions of the United Nations
[and commit injustices against the Palestinians]. We must separate the
mistakes made by human beings from the faith and civilization to
which they belong. Civilizations are not in conflict with each other, for
they share many common denominators. Let us speak of those com-
mon denominators, not the discords. We should not try to justify war
for no one will come out of such a calamity with pride. 
Political Participation & Activism
belonging to the father and the paternal family. Unjust laws guide the
issue of children’s rights. For example, if a father or grandfather kills his
child, even wilfully, he can be exempted from punishment. The age of
marriage, moreover, is unsuitably low, and in some countries fathers
can marry their daughters off even without their consent. Everyone is
aware of the damaging aspects of underage marriage. 
Such laws need to be reinterpreted and reformed. Many informed
Muslims believe that it is necessary to understand the essence and
general spirit governing Islamic rulings, and on the basis of reason,
which is one of the sources of legislation in (Islamic) Holy Law, provide
for more suitable laws. The word of God should be understood with
the help of the intellect. Religious interpretations from five hundred
years ago cannot be applied to situations of today. Reinterpreting Di-
vine law is not heretical; on the contrary, it is precisely the correct way
of truly implementing God’s religion.
Overcoming cultures of patriarchy and ignorance
Patriarchal culture, not religion, is the root cause of inequality be-
tween the sexes and the reason for the lack of freedom and democracy
in much of the eastern world, particularly the Islamic countries. Both
men and women preserve, defend, and perpetuate patriarchal culture.
Women, who themselves are the victims of such a culture, also play an
active role in reproducing it. The paternal culture is passed by mothers
to their sons, the same way haemophilia is transferred by the mother
to her male child. Islam, in its essence, is based on respect for human
dignity. Yet Islamic governments are not inclined, for different reasons,
to offer an interpretation of Islam that is compatible with human
rights, individual and social freedoms, and the principle of democratic
participation in government. Therefore, the general culture and the
political culture in Islamic countries are in need of evolution and leg-
islative change. Laws should correspond to the spirit of Islam and the
requirements of the times. 
Education is the most important step in cultural change. Muslims
should be educated about the fundamentals of Islam in a correct and
sensible manner. They should be made aware that it is possible to be
Muslim, and to respect and put into action the principals of human
rights and democracy. If such an education were widespread among
Muslims, their governments would be forced to respect the rights of
their people. Muslim intellectuals must, through all means possible,
find access to the Muslim masses and participate in their education. It
is imperative that the intellectuals reinterpret Islam, because if they
criticize the policies of Islamic governments from outside a framework
of Islam, they are not going to attract the masses of people. Therefore,
we have to make Muslims aware that the key for paradise is through an
Islamic movement based on pure motives and understanding of Islam,
not through terrorist activities. The one billion Muslims who make up
one sixth of the world’s population of the planet earth value their reli-
in the world.” Hafez wrote these words centuries ago because he un-
derstood that injustice causes people to start riots. Some politicians
see their interests served in moments of ignorance and fanaticism
without thinking about the future. 
I will repeat again that my heart feels pain every time I remember
11 September. I sincerely sympathize with the victims of that
tragedy. But you must bear in mind that the United States helped the
Taliban come to power. When the Taliban took over Kabul, the first
country to recognize them was America. Working with dictatorial
governments brings about such tragedies. Unfortunately, we saw a
few months ago innocent people killed in Spain. The world has be-
come a global village. Any incident affects the others. We should not
take a back seat. When a country is burning in the flames of war, if
the people of a country need help, then we must not remain indiffer-
ent. It is possible that one day, the flames of injustice may affect you
too. The day when that tragic incident took place in Madrid, it was a
product of an injustice that the Taliban had committed against the
Afghans and at that time no one came to the aid of the Afghans. We
must look at the events in the world as joined together and not as
separate. 
How can we in the West help Muslims to promote the kind of positive
Islam you advocate? 
How can you help the Muslims? The most important assistance that
we expect of you is not to blame religion for the wrongdoings of some
of its people. After 11 September, an extremely tragic incident which
hurt us very much, a [difficult] situation has come about for Muslims
throughout the world. A very small group of people committed a hor-
rible crime, and in their act abused the worldwide name of Islam. My
most important request as a Muslim is that before looking at each
other in anger we pause and think within ourselves; think what has re-
ally happened. Many Muslims are suffering from both their own gov-
ernments as well as from the incorrect judgment the world has about
them. The most important help you can give us is to love each other as
we used to do twenty years `ago before this talk of the “clash of civi-
lizations” which is not a good theory. We should not ignorantly adopt
theories that bring about wars. 
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How do you view the future of Iran? 
With reference to how I see the future of Iran, I have said on
many occasions that I am neither a politician nor a leader of a
political party and do not wish to enter the government or
power structure. I am a human being like you and I only work
in the field of human rights. I can speak to you on the situa-
tion of human rights in today’s Iran. The Government of Iran,
in the year 1975 (AH1354) joined the International Covenant
of Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant of
Economic and Social Rights, and remain, until today, signato-
ries of those Covenants. Therefore, we are committed to
abide by those Covenants. Yet, unfortunately, we have laws
against Iran’s international commitments such as discrimina-
tion based on gender. In a country where 63% of students at
universities are female, that is, the number of educated
women exceeds that of educated men, according to its laws
the legal testimony of two women is equal to the testimony
of one man. This society does not remove these discriminato-
ry laws. 
We have discrimination on the basis of religion. According
to the civil rights regulations, if a person who is non-Muslim,
for example a Zoroastrian or a Christian, dies, and among his
relatives, however distant, there be a Muslim, that Muslim will
inherit everything thereby depriving others of inheritance.
We have laws that harm freedom of speech. In our Press Law
it has been stipulated that criticizing the constitution is pro-
hibited. How can it be possible for a professor teaching con-
stitutional law at the Faculty of Law to be prohibited from
criticizing the law? We have a law that, unfortunately, allows
the Guardian Council to vet the qualification of candidates
before parliamentary and presidential elections. During the
seventh parliamentary elections (in early 2004), many candi-
dates were disqualified. These actions are against the inter-
national commitments of the Iranian Government. A country
should either not accept an international protocol or, if it ac-
cepts it, should abide by it and implement it. We expect the
Government of Iran to fulfill its international obligations.
Do you think there is a chance for democracy in Iran, an
Islamic republic? 
I believe in democracy. Democracy means that the gov-
ernment should represent and respect the will of the peo-
ple. If the people demand a separation between religion
and government, then we must respect their wishes. Re-
specting the will of the people is not against Islam and has
many precedents in Islamic history. The problem is that
some philosophers and some ruling government officials
are not willing to acknowledge the rights of the people for
democracy. The problem is not Islam. If all people want the
same thing, separation of religion from government, then
this should not be a problem.
When did you develop the desire to fight injustice and
where has this tendency led you? 
My dear friend, I think that everybody is born with certain
characteristics. From my very early childhood I was fascinat-
ed by justice without understanding exactly what it was
that I wanted. From as early as seven or eight years old I re-
member many occasions when walking down the street I
would stop to intervene in other peoples’ fights. If two chil-
dren were fighting and one child was being beaten by the
other, I would just get involved and help the one who was
being beaten up without even understanding the story be-
tween them. Many times I was beaten up myself because of
this intervention. This spirit made me choose to go to law
school. It was this same spirit that drove me, after I finished
my studies at law school, immediately to work for the Min-
istry of Justice and then I started working as a judge. 
I believed that through the profession of being a judge I
could realize my dreams for justice. I was a judge for many
years, but after the 1979 revolution they said that women
could not remain judges anymore. They made of me a sec-
retary in the same court where I had been a judge. Well, of
course, it was not tolerable for me and I left. I gradually
began to protest in writing and speech. Due to all my activ-
ities, my license to practice law was suspended for seven
years. When I finally got my license I opened my own law
firm and was pulled in the direction of human rights. I have
worked—and continue to work—for the defence of the po-
litically accused and also those accused of media offences.
How has winning the Noble Prize changed your life?
The Noble Prize has given me a chance to be more vocal.
The people of Iran and the people of the world can hear me
more clearly and for this I am very grateful to this prize.
After having been awarded the Noble Prize, I have been
able to highlight pressing issues in Iran. Iran is a country
which is contaminated with landmines. Three million
hectares in the South-West and West of Iran are contami-
nated with landmines, a situation which has led to villages
being abandoned, land becoming uncultivable, and people
dying and suffering terrible injuries. After being awarded
the Noble Peace prize I started an NGO for the purpose of
training people how to deal with areas that are contaminat-
ed with mines. This NGO has been one of the impacts of the
Noble prize in my personal life. 
How do you deal with those who oppose you?
The way I deal with people who oppose me, such as those
who disagree with my condemnation of the United States’
policies to invade other countries, is through dialogue. I al-
ways have a discussion and dialogue with them. There is no
other way. Freedom of expression is one of the issues that I
care for. I am only one human being, I am independent, and
I do not have a party or organized group. The only weapon
that I have at my disposal is a pen and a tongue which is
very long. It can talk a lot! 
Political Participation & Activism
The original transcript of Shirin Ebadi's talk was translated into English
by Zahra Navidi.
P
H
O
T
O
 B
Y
 W
IM
 V
R
E
E
B
U
R
G
, 
2
0
0
4
Piet de Klerk, Ambassador at
Large for Human Rights, 
Shirin Ebadi and Asef Bayat,
The Hague, 16 April 2004
Continued from page 31
Audience questions
Education is the most
important step in
cultural change.
Muslims should be...
made aware that
it is possible to be
Muslim and to respect
and put into action
the principals of
human rights and
democracy.
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both types of groups in either their po-
litical participation or in their support
for women’s citizenship rights. Instead,
holding strong Islamic beliefs (adher-
ing to the theology; orthodoxy) was
compatible with support for extending
political rights to women even after
controlling for other factors. Thus, my
findings support the thesis that secu-
larization at the individual level is not a
necessary condition for the processes
of modernization and democratization
or for supporting women’s rights, as the growth of religious feminism
around the world attests. 
Even though the leaders of the religious service organizations in
Kuwait interpreted Islam in ways that were not supportive of some as-
pects of women’s empowerment and public participation, most of the
members of the service groups surveyed saw the necessity for
women’s education, wanted more rights for women in divorce, and
recognized that women had problems balancing work and family re-
sponsibilities. Moreover, some members of the service organizations
also agreed with the professional members that the lack of political
rights for women was a problem, and that women needed at least the
right to vote to be full citizens in order to tackle the problems women
face. Given that most of these women are also very religious, this pro-
vides further evidence that secularization, at least at the individual
level, is not necessary for supporting women’s rights and the democra-
tization process.
Activists, then, have an additional resource to help them in obtaining
political rights—Islam. In a country where the
overwhelming majority of the citizens are Mus-
lim, activists working for women’s rights need not
only demonstrate that they identify strongly with
Islamic tenets, but also need to justify to Kuwaiti
society that women having a voice in political life
is also Islamic.
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Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris have
recently revised Huntington’s “clash of
civilizations” thesis1 arguing that the
core clash between the Islamic world
and the West is not over whether or not
democracy is the best political system,
but over issues concerning gender
equality and sexual liberalization. Using
the World Values Survey, they found
that citizens of Muslim societies are sig-
nificantly less supportive of equal rights
and opportunities for women than
those living in Western democratic countries. In another study they found
that “in virtually every authoritarian society, a majority of the public be-
lieves that men make better political leaders than women; in virtually
every stable democracy a clear majority of the public rejects this be-
lief…” 2 The implication is that until citizens, particularly women, of Mus-
lim populations believe that women and men are equal in all aspects of
life, this will be the main cultural barrier to democratization in the Muslim
world. 
Islam and women’s rights
There is also growing evidence that Islamic values can be compatible
with women’s empowerment and participation in society. Women
themselves (secular, religious, and Islamist) in Iran, Egypt, and Kuwait,
for example, are using Islamic principles to justify women’s equality, ac-
cess to resources, and participation in the public sphere in order to in-
crease democratization. My research on Kuwait builds upon this evi-
dence and investigates the effect of women’s organizations and their
interpretations of Islam on the political participation and attitudes to-
ward extending the citizenship rights of their members.
In general, there has been little research on Gulf women because of
the difficulties in gaining access to that population. To address the lack
of representation, my research examined women’s voluntary associa-
tions, which are an important base for women’s social participation and
involvement. The research included a range of women’s associations—
ten in all. The leaders of the ten associations were interviewed exten-
sively and a sample of 125 members was surveyed between January—
March 1998. Leaders were identified through a snowball technique that
began with colleagues and key informants at Kuwait University; these
leaders distributed the surveys to their active members. The leaders
provided information about the background, goals, structure, and ac-
tivities of their organizations, especially on the topic of women’s politi-
cal rights. Both leaders and members were asked about their percep-
tions of women’s problems, descriptions of their activism and routine
political participation, and their attitudes toward including women
more fully into Kuwaiti society and politics.
A divide between the more numerous service organizations and the
professional women’s groups prevails. The leaders of the professional
associations support the notion that achieving women’s formal political
rights is an important goal. The leaders of the service organizations are
more concerned with religious and social service activities than obtain-
ing political rights for women. A few, especially among the Islamist ser-
vice associations, are even opposed to granting such political rights
based on religious interpretations that claim that Islam forbids women
to govern or rule. 
Secularization and women’s rights 
Despite certain points of contention between the service organiza-
tions and women’s groups, the research indicated that Islam was not
inherently incompatible with democratization or gender equality. Reli-
gious beliefs and practices did not serve as barriers for members of
Impediments to the global trend of
democratization, particularly in Islamic nations,
have been widely debated in the past fifteen
years. Scholars disagree as to whether Islam is
compatible with democracy; part of the
controversy stems from questions pertaining to
the extension of citizenship rights, particularly
when it comes to women. Debates over the
compatibility of women’s empowerment and
public participation with Islamic values have
intensified, specifically in the Middle East. 
Women, Politics and
Islam in Kuwait
Kuwaiti women
hold mock
elections for
new parliament,
5 July 2003
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Since the late 1990s, a number of Islam-
ic movement specialists have begun to
bridge the gap between the study of
Islamic activism and social science the-
ories of collective action. The underly-
ing premise is that Islamic activism is
not sui generis. Rather than emphasiz-
ing the specificity of Islam as a system
of meaning, identity, and basis of col-
lective action1, these scholars point to
movement commonalities rooted in
process: how contention is organized,
the way ideas are framed and propa-
gated, how grievances are collec-
tivized, and tactics and strategies in
response to exogenous shifts in op-
portunities and constraints. By focus-
ing on shared mechanisms of con-
tention rather than the uniqueness of Islam, such an understanding
avails itself of a broader array of concepts, theories, and comparative
empirics. In this new approach, scholars primarily emphasize three
sets of processes—resource mobilization, decision making, and fram-
ing—each of which is operative in both Islamic and non-Islamic ac-
tivism.
Resource mobilization
Many studies of Islamic activism emphasize the underlying griev-
ances that engender impetus for collective action, including blocked
social mobility, a lack of political freedom, economic despair, a sense of
cultural vulnerability, and humiliation. The central argument is that, as
Ted Gurr once famously put it, “misery breeds revolt.” 
The problem with such arguments is that while misery is ubiquitous,
mobilization is not. Social movement theorists have attacked griev-
ance-based explanations as incomplete: grievances are not irrelevant,
but there is a missing intermediary set of variables that is necessary to
translate grievances into actualized mobilization. In particular, move-
ments need resources and mobilizing structures to collectivize what
would otherwise remain individualized grievances. Money, communi-
cations technology, meeting places, social networks, and other re-
sources are needed to organize, direct, and mobilize contention. With-
out organizational capacity, individuals remain isolated from one an-
other and unable effectively to launch collective endeavours. Differ-
ences in mobilization patterns are, in part, explained by the degree of
resource availability, and the types of resources and mobilizing struc-
tures utilized by particular groups. For Islamic activism, important re-
sources and mobilizing structures in-
clude mosques, study circles, dense so-
cial networks (friends and family), Is-
lamic non-governmental organizations,
political parties, the dars (religious les-
son), the khutba (sermon), professional
and student associations, and unions.
All of these are utilized to effectively re-
cruit, organize, and launch contention.
To a large extent, the reason Islamic
movements have emerged as a domi-
nant opposition in the Muslim world is
because they command more societal
institutions and resources than other
movements. In addition, the ability of
activists to tap religious resources pro-
vides a modicum of protection from
regime repression. Certainly, regimes in
the Muslim world have severely ham-
strung mobilization, but a full-blown
crackdown on religious institutions and
resources is a delicate and difficult en-
deavour, since it can engender societal
backlashes.
Examples of resource mobilization
abound. In the early 1990s, the Islamic
Salvation Front (FIS) utilized the na-
tional network of mosques and com-
munity organizations in Algeria to or-
ganize for elections. The electoral suc-
cess of the FIS in the face of regime re-
pression and electoral manipulation
was, at least in part, due to the party’s
access to enduring religious institu-
tions. The Islamic Group (al-Jama‘a al-
Islamiyya) in Egypt enjoyed similar resources and institutional access
during the 1980s. In the city of Dairut (Upper Egypt) alone, the move-
ment controlled about 150 mosques. Access to the mosques was used
to provide social welfare services, create community “reconciliation
committees,” hold meetings, and recruit support. The regime’s difficul-
ty in uprooting the Islamic Group in the 1990s reflected the organiza-
tional resilience of the movement. When the regime tried to repress
the movement, it met dramatic resistance since “after a decade of or-
ganizing social and political networks in Upper Egypt, the Islamists had
the capacity to fight back.”2 Moderate Islamic groups in Egypt, Jordan,
and Yemen have successfully utilized grassroots networks of non-gov-
ernmental organizations to provide basic goods and services to com-
munities, develop contact points with the public, recruit support, and
organize. 
Resource mobilization is a process that transcends the specificity of
ideology. Though ideology can limit the range of resource options by
excluding some as contrary to movement beliefs, movement fortunes
frequently ebb and flow according to resource availability and institu-
tional access. A focus on resource mobilization emphasizes how move-
ments mobilize, rather than the ultimate goal of mobilization. 
Decision making
Some earlier research on Islamic activism assumed the pre-eminence
of belief in dictating behaviour. Although this assumption was never a
universal norm, Orientalist influence often privileged the causal import
of ideas and Islam as a belief system.
Largely, the new emphasis on process challenges some earlier onto-
logical assertions about the Islamic ac-
tivist. Rather than viewing activists as
dogmatically guided by rigid adher-
ence to ideology, a number of recent
studies adopt a loose rational actor
model. From this perspective, Islamic
activists are driven by tactical and
strategic assessments of costs and
risks. Choices reflect conscious evalua-
tions of whether decisions help
achieve goals within a context of op-
portunities and constraints. Although
such an approach tends to avoid the
conceptual language of rational choice
theory (preferences, utility maximiza-
tion, etc.), it shares the emphasis on
strategic decision-making.
Political Participation & Activism
For decades, the study of Islamic activism has
languished at the margins of social science
theory. With the exception of a small handful
of scholars (particularly those focused on the
Iranian revolution), research on Islamic
activism has not fully engaged the broader
theoretical and conceptual developments that
have emerged from scholarship on social
movements, revolutions, and contentious
politics. Yet this large body of comparative
research on non-Islamic forms of collective
action provides myriad tools of analysis and
theoretical leverage for many questions that
interest students of Islamic activism, including
issues of recruitment, tactics and strategies,
mobilization patterns, and state-
movement interactions.
Conceptualizing
Islamic Activism
…in the new approach to Islamic
activism ...the emphasis is on
the process of constructing
discourse and the resulting
ideational packages.
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This trend is most apparent in studies
of violent groups in particular. Perhaps
as a reaction against caricatures of the
“irrational zealot,” social scientists
have highlighted the strategic logic of
radicals. Hamas, for example, strategi-
cally responds to changes in the politi-
cal context.3 Prior to the al-Aqsa intifa-
da in 2000, growing popularity for the
Palestinian-Israeli peace process chal-
lenged the viability of Hamas. Strict in-
transigence toward peace was likely to
erode support from a population that
sought an end to the economic and so-
cial hardships of occupation, thereby
threatening the organizational survival
of the movement. In response, Hamas
tactically adjusted its doctrine to ac-
commodate the possibility of peace by
framing it as a temporary pause in the
jihad. After the al-Aqsa intifada in
2000, however, popular support for
Hamas grew and the movement re-
turned to its earlier pro-violence
frames. Mohammed M. Hafez uses an implicit rational actor model to
explain Muslim rebellions in Algeria and Egypt during the 1990s. He
contends that violence erupted as a response to “an ill-fated combina-
tion of institutional exclusion, on the one hand, and on the other, reac-
tive and indiscriminate repression that threaten[ed] the organizational
resources and personal lives of Islamists.”4 To defend themselves
against regime repression the Islamists went underground and formed
exclusive organizations, leading to a process of encapsulation and rad-
icalization. Stathis N. Kavylas views the Islamist-led massacres that
plagued Algeria in the 1990s as strategic assaults intended to deter
civilian defections “in the context of a particular strategic conjuncture
characterized by (a) fragmented and unstable rule over the civilian
population, (b) mass civilian defections toward incumbents and (c) es-
calation of violence.”5 Several scholars have argued that the tactic of
suicide bombing is rational in that it helps Islamic (and other) terrorist
groups achieve their group goals.6 In addition, Michael Doran concep-
tualizes al-Qaeda as a rational actor, arguing that, “When it comes to
matters related to politics and war, al-Qaeda manoeuvres around its
dogmas with alacrity.” In this understanding, “Al-Qaeda’s long-term
goals are set by its fervent devotion to a radical religious ideology, but
in its short-term behaviour, it is a rational political actor operating ac-
cording to the dictates of realpolitik.”7
This is not to completely marginalize the role of Islamist ideology in
decision-making. The universe of potential choices is circumscribed by
the “imaginable options” within particular worldviews. However, the
rationality of Islamist decision-making demonstrates that the process
of choice is shared by a wide range of movement types.
Framing
Although the new approach to Islamic activism de-emphasizes ideol-
ogy and belief as causal variables, it does not reject the role of ideas al-
together. Instead, the primary concern is how ideas are socially creat-
ed, arranged, and disseminated. In other words, the emphasis is on the
process of constructing discourse and the resulting ideational pack-
ages. In the parlance of social movement theory, movements must
“frame” their arguments to persuade audiences and elicit support and
participation.
Al-Qaeda, for example, is embroiled in a bitter “frame dispute” with
the Saudi ulama (religious scholars) in which each asserts a particular
interpretation and the right to sacred authority. Al-Qaeda emphasizes
the knowledge, character, and logic of its scholars while attacking its
detractors based upon the same criteria. Its supporters are framed as
honourable, independent, and scientific in their approach to interpret-
ing Islam. Opponents, in contrast, are framed as corrupt “sheikhs of au-
thority” or “palace lackeys” inextricably linked to corrupt Muslim gov-
ernments. The framing strategy is designed to insert al-Qaeda as the
sole mediator between the sacred texts and religious practice. 
To maximize access to these discontented populations, Islamists
have in many cases generated frames that meld religious and non-reli-
gious themes to garner broad support
among those who are merely seeking a
change from the status quo rather than
an Islamic transformation. Meriem
Vergès, for example, shows how the Is-
lamic Salvation Front (FIS) in Algeria
strategically framed itself as the heir to
the revolutionary mantel of the war of
independence.8 Using the language
and symbols of the revolution, the FIS
attempted to portray itself as a natural
extension of the struggle while de-
nouncing the regime as a usurper of
Algeria’s historic memory. Such exam-
ples demonstrate the strategic dimen-
sions of framing: content is frequently
selected according to its potential per-
suasive effects rather than solely on
the basis of ideology. 
An approach to the study of Islamic
activism that draws from social science
theory erodes essentialist assumptions
about Islamic exceptionalism. It offers
analytic tools for addressing key ques-
tions and draws from comparative research, thus adding broader em-
pirics. Moreover, by emphasizing the dynamics of activism rather than
the uniqueness of Islam as an organizing belief system, such an ap-
proach opens possibilities for dialogue with students of non-Islamic
contention, potentially offering new insights.
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…the reason Islamic
movements have emerged as
a dominant opposition in
the Muslim world is because
they command more societal
institutions and resources
than other movements.
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University art education was first estab-
lished in Iran on the Marvi school
premises in Tehran in 1939 (AH 1319)
and moved to its present location, at
Tehran University campus, in 1949. The
move was part of an evolutionary
process of teaching art, as a specialized
subject, at secondary schools (honar-
estan) founded by the late nineteenth-
century Qajar court painter, Moham-
mad Ghaffari Kamál al-Mulk. These
schools taught art history, and the sci-
ence of painting (elme naqashi) and
carving (hajjari) in the style of the Acad-
emy of Paris. Some classes also taught
design elements within traditional Iran-
ian art. Such new ways of teaching were in sharp contrast to the long-
standing system of master-pupil apprenticeship. 2 Currently there are
roughly ten institutions in Tehran where the arts, and in some cases
crafts, are taught awarding B.A., M.A., and occasionally Ph.D. degrees. 
Continuity and change in Iranian art education
Al-Zahra University is the only national women’s university accom-
modating several faculties including the Faculty of Applied Arts where
both male and female tutors teach the plastic arts. It was founded in
1964 during the Pahlavi regime as the Institute of Higher Education for
Girls, re-named for a very brief period as Mahboobeh Motahedin Insti-
tute after the 1979 Revolution, and finally registered as Al-Zahra Uni-
versity in memory of the Prophet’s daughter. It is built on the site of a
small shrine and orchards in rural Vanak, donated by a nineteenth-cen-
tury courtesan specifically for the education of women. It has made
higher education available to a considerable number of female stu-
dents whose family traditions are not in favour of co-education. A great
number of the students at Al-Zahra wear
the chador, a form of Islamic cover, and
come from the traditionalist and neo-
traditionalist religious classes.3 Political-
ly speaking, while some students and
staff advocate the hard-line policies of
the government, others oppose them.
The students from the Applied Arts Fac-
ulty come from more varied social and
political backgrounds and often show
more daring in their work. Commenting
on her female students, one tutor points
out, “the female students cannot be ig-
nored [for they are] highly autonomous
in their conduct and in their ideas.”
Twenty-one year old Atoosa appears to
break taboos when she expresses, “I like to paint images of my own
body, sometimes without clothes. Well it is only a body and we all have
one, don’t we? My body, your body, it is a common language, that’s
all.” 
Nudity and erotic art are neither practiced nor publicly tolerated in
the Islamic Republic. The hard-liners and most tutors frown upon the
idea of “life class” modelling where models pose in a state of undress for
close study of human anatomy and form. Nevertheless, artists widely
push and negotiate boundaries in their depictions of the human figure.
Figure drawing and painting exist at both Tehran and Al-Zahra Univer-
sities where form is studied through plaster casts and fully clothed
models. Although partially-clothed figure paintings do not get exhibit-
ed at the finals’ shows, tutors critically engage with their students’ work.
They do not invoke notions of “haram” (religiously forbidden) or “halal”
(religiously permitted) in art classes; such words belong more appropri-
ately to discussions amongst the clergy in sermons and mosques. The
discourse in these art classes is primarily a universal art discourse. 
Nevertheless, there is widespread
concern, both from the student
body and most tutors, that the cur-
riculum, with its excessive focus on
Islamic subjects is not sympathetic
to the teaching of art as a discipline.
The curriculum places emphasis on
the 1979 Revolution and religious
ethics formulated according to the
religious scholars of Qom. Yet, the
curriculum also provides an expan-
sive historical context for studying
art. Students learn about art in Mus-
lim civilizations, its interconnection
with Spanish and Byzantine art, Per-
sian antiquity with its systems of be-
lief, architecture and motifs, and Is-
lamic iconology and its impact on
the arts and architecture of the Mus-
lim world from India to Spain. The
history of painting and sculpture, in-
cluding the Western heritage, are
taught according to their relevancy
to these aforementioned subjects
rather than as the arts of the “West.”
As one student pointed out, “When
we studied the Renaissance, our
tutor talked about every single
painter in that period who had ap-
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Art education is thriving in Iran despite facing
obstacles by some conservative Islamic
elements. Women are especially active in
making and exhibiting art in the
contemporary period. Through an
ethnographic enquiry into women’s art
education at the Tehran and Al-Zahra
Universities, the ways in which women assert
themselves as highly active members of a
complex and changing society will be
examined. Ethnographic research allows for
long-held stereotypes to be corrected, truer
versions of reality to come to the fore, and
hopefully, the spaces and texts of “the other”
to be better understood. 1
Art Education in Iran 
Women’s Voices
Drawing atelier,
Visual Arts
Department,
Tehran
University,
2002
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plied a mere brush mark onto a church wall… He made it like a won-
derful story. I love art history, and it is ridiculous to say West and East
too much. I am a citizen of the globe, a member of the global village. If I
am to be an artist, all of art history is my heritage.” 
Adaptation and resistance in art departments
Art, like other disciplines, has experienced some strain with the rise
of the Islamic Republic. A non-academic body, the Ethics Council (her-
aasat), is at large on university campuses. Members of the Ethics Coun-
cil pride themselves on their Islamic zeal and apply their authority
across social institutions as they see appropriate. Their tasks include
keeping a check on the overall appearance, dress code, and general
conduct of the student body, particularly women. Many women, un-
able to withstand the mechanisms of control, have been pushed out of
the academic and art world altogether, but they have demonstrated
resilience and agency, finding new ways of making their contributions
independent of formal state institutions. As one such woman relates, “I
had a gallery and a bookshop. I had to give up both as a consequence
of the change of regime. But you know my skin is tough, it has to be. I
am a woman….The 1979 revolution has been like a wave in the streets,
it has not really touched the interiors, our hearts. I don’t believe the
rest of the world has any idea about secular life in this country. I have
had to re-establish myself. Instead of teaching at universities, I work
from home as a translator and editor of art and academic books…and
I’m the main breadwinner in the family. I have educated two of my chil-
dren at home and they are reasonably good artists now.”
Those who have remained within the university system are often pe-
nalized when it comes to promotion and tenure, for tenure status is
rarely granted to anyone who resists the government’s prescribed line.
Some tutors, to make ends meet, work part-time teaching posts in the
provinces and travel far to reach their classes. Many of the faculty and
staff nevertheless, continue to derive energy and hope from their close
association to the world of art. As one tutor elucidates: 
“I have been teaching art for the last eighteen years at two universi-
ties whilst also practicing and exhibiting painting. I love being around
my students. They give me energy. I get up in the morning and put my
lipstick on and wear my headscarf and go to work. I need the in-
come….I have supported my family financially all my married life and I
am proud to have helped my students to get into universities in Japan
and Germany. Sadly, in the West, there is no consciousness of women
like me in Iran; there are considerable numbers of us contributing, and
defying restrictions as much as we can. I for one refuse to apply self-
censorship and insist on thinking freely, despite the headscarf. You
cannot touch my mind.”
Female students are highly conscious and critical of gender issues,
constantly drawing comparisons between their own position in society
and that of their male peers. This became apparent during the two
seminars in which the author responded to enquiries about gender is-
sues in the West, and in England particularly. These students demon-
strate initiative by printing and distributing invitations for exhibitions
as well as booking rooms, and securing the consent of the head of vi-
sual arts department. They robustly express their aspirations for new
modes of behaviour on a daily basis through their appearance, art, and
social interaction with their male friends. They remain highly critical of
the government stance on laws affecting women, though they are
somewhat uncertain about their future, particularly considering the re-
cent election results. However, these women push the discussion on
gender forward wherever possible. Vibrant in their strife, they are vo-
ciferous, visible, and demanding new and secular laws. 
Despite their efforts, many mainstream representations of women,
particularly in the Western media, tend to be decontextualized, outdat-
ed, and sadly misinformed. Despite some notable exceptions, such as
Shirin Ebadi who, with her recent winning of the 2003 Nobel Prize for
Peace has secured a platform to demonstrate the agency of Iranian and
Muslim women, what is often missing in the deconstruction and under-
standing of gender issues in Iran are women’s own voices. The world
must be willing to hear these voices and be vigi-
lant in recognizing their courage and struggles.
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Mehri Honarbin-Holliday is a Ph.D. candidate at Canterbury
Christ Church University College in art education. She is a
practicing artist and has recently exhibited her installations of
ceramic sculptures and video in Tehran at the Iranian Artists’
Forum Gallery by invitation of the Tehran Museum of
Contemporary Art.
E-mail: mehriholliday@hotmail.com
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Maaruf Rusafi (1873–1945), an Iraqi poet
of the early twentieth century, is well
known to anyone who attended an Ara-
bic public school. He celebrated the
pride of being an Arab at a moment
when the domination of the Ottoman
Turks was receding in the region, just
before the colonial expansion of Europe.
His poetry, in form and content, deals
with Arabism, freedom, equality, and
positive political values and is an exam-
ple of the forceful mobilisation of classi-
cal canons for a “modern” cause. Cultur-
al identity could not be better served, as
Arabism was linked to freedom, equali-
ty, and all sorts of positive values.
Only very recently, another face of the poet emerged. Late in his life,
Rusafi had turned his attention to the early, or “foundational” mo-
ments of Arab history and the figure which had forged Arabs as a force
to be reckoned with in the region and in the world. He dedicated eight
years of his life to the study of the biography of Prophet Muhammad
with the intention of “elucidating a sacred myth,” i.e. extracting the
“true facts” of history from the mythological narratives in which they
had been staged. The book, completed in Falluja in 1933, has hitherto
remained hidden from the general public. Only recently, in 2002, has it
found a publisher.1
Rusafi studied the traditional sources on the biography of the
Prophet with the idea of going beyond the religious allegories and nar-
ratives by which the myth of Muhammad has been constructed. It is re-
markable that although his agenda was modern, his sources, methods,
and style remained strictly traditional. Besides Arabic, he seems to
have had some knowledge of Turkish (he served for short periods in a
few journals published in Istanbul) and, to some degree, of Farsi, but
no knowledge of European languages. His limited knowledge of some
modern theories (such as Newtonian physics or Darwinism) came from
his reading of mainly Egyptian journals published in Arabic in the early
twentieth century.
However, he clearly adopts the attitudes of a free mind, submitting
historical sources to a strictly rational scrutiny, discarding all precon-
ceptions, including the most sacred for his fellow Muslims. As such, he
seems to belong to the line of rationalist rebels who have persevered
in attempting to cross the red line erected around “orthodox” views
quite early on in the history of Muslims, resisting fierce repression and
censorship that were exerted at all levels. The book opens with a
strange declaration (which includes excerpts from his poems) whereby
he proclaims Truth (Haqq) as the only divinity worth worshiping and
asserts his intention of adhering to it whatever the cost may be.
Elucidation of a sacred myth
His reconstruction of the life of the Prophet brings back a wealth of
anecdotes forgotten because later biographers discarded them. The
effect, indeed, is to shed light on a historically real figure. He expunges
the supra-natural from the historical accounts and shows that it is
mainly the outcome of imagination of later narrators, and not fully en-
dorsed by what we know about the understanding of the contempo-
raries of the Prophet. He quotes extensively the most recognised
sources about the life of the Prophet, but uses them in new ways.
Through this secularised narration of the Prophet’s life and deeds, a
novel picture emerges. Its most striking feature is the use of violence
which permeates the customs of the time. The Prophet stands out
amongst his contemporaries not by being totally different in that re-
spect, but by a personality that has the power to dominate others and
a vision which transcends the prevail-
ing conceptions and customs. Rusafi
stresses the Prophet’s main strength as
the capacity to free himself from the
categories of culture in which he was
immersed. He was able to perceive
events beyond the limitations of his
personal self and beyond the domi-
nant views and values of pre-Islamic
society. The revelations he received
were the consequence of an intellectu-
al reasoning through which he broke
with the worldview of his contempo-
raries. Thus, he questions the notion of
prophecy as a message literally deliv-
ered from God. Most individuals, com-
ments Rusafi, think and respond within the world of meanings built by
the language and culture transmitted by their environment. They are
thus neither able to distance themselves from their “world,” nor to
place in perspective the conceptions and values they have inherited.
Only a few have the capacity of distancing themselves from the mould
of their own value system. Consequently, they are able to contemplate
events and things comprehensively and reach a kind of knowledge
which is not accessible to their fellow men. Such are, as Rusafi explains,
the prophets of the Quranic tradition.
Muhammad was such a prophet, probably the one who has gone as
far as any one could go. He had, in addition, the will to apply that
knowledge to transform the moral and political conditions of the time.
Rusafi stresses the numerous sayings of the Prophet in which he
promises his Arab tribesmen, if they were to follow his teaching, a
great destiny and an empire that would crush and dominate the exist-
ing powers of the time, the Sassanid and Byzantine empires. Here
Rusafi shows the limits of his critical reading. While he is critical of later
narrators, his criticism of these early narratives does not lead him to
question these traditions, which could very well have been retro pro-
jections from subsequent history. Instead, Rusafi sees them as the ex-
pression of a “grand design” which he supposes to have overtaken the
imagination and driven the actions of Prophet Muhammad. He draws
the image of the Prophet as the one who envisions and initiates a new
community, which is not built on tribal bonds or on the domination of
powerful monarchies, as were the big empires of the time, but rather
on religious and ethical beliefs. Mohammad’s grand design was thus to
implement an alternative to tribe and empire, which were the only
available socio-political forms his area had known until then. Monothe-
ism and the ethics related to it (solidarity, social justice, and equality)
were to provide the foundations a new community. The Arabs, as the
ones to champion its building and implementation, would enjoy a
privileged role in its subsequent development. 
In Rusafi’s portrayal the Prophet is not a man who passively receives
messages from a transcendent God, as he is depicted in orthodox tra-
ditions. He is rather one who accesses the inner processes of nature
and history, beyond the cultural framework which determines the
thought and action of his time, and brings forth a project which leads
to great transformations in the history of mankind: the creation of a so-
cial order which enacts the ethical principles brought about by
monotheism. 
Rusafi’s admiration for the Prophet is immense, but not for the same
reasons that traditional accounts present. The Arabs are credited, in
passing, of being the initiators of a new order, which is supposed to
have taken humanity from the reign of tribal customs and brute domi-
nation, to the vision of communities built on shared beliefs and ethi-
cally grounded regulations.
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In 2002, nearly 70 years after its
completion, a long essay by the celebrated
Iraqi poet Maaruf Rusafi on the nature of
prophecy in Islam was published in
Germany. His reading of early Islamic
history, in particular of the
accomplishments of the Prophet
Muhammad, roughly coincided with
another new reading; that by the Egyptian
Ali Abd al-Raziq. Rusafi’s admiration for
Muhammad is enormous and he credits him
with inspiring the Arabs to initiate a new
order, taking humanity from the reign of
tribal customs to the vision of communities
built on shared ethics and beliefs.
The Poet and
the Prophet
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An alternate portrait
In his reconstruction of the life of the Prophet, it remains unclear if
Rusafi was aware of another “secular” reading of the same period of Is-
lamic history, which had been proposed a few years earlier. The resem-
blance between the two contemporary endeavours is striking. Ali Abd
al-Raziq (1888–1966) had published his most controversial essay Islam
and the Foundations of Political Power in 1925. He also had ventured be-
yond the traditional narratives of the early phases of the Muslim com-
munity in order to find answers to modern questions. His quest, fol-
lowing immediately the abrogation of the Ottoman caliphate by
Mustafa Kamal Atatürk in 1924, was to question the prevalent thesis
that Islam encompasses both religion and politics. His conclusions,
which seem to contradict Rusafi’s, are also strikingly original. Abd al-
Raziq found that the community created and led by the Prophet in
Medina was by no means a state, in the modern sense. Although it
shared some external features with those of a polity (collecting taxes,
building an “army,” administrating justice, appointing “ambassadors”
to neighbouring states), it was by all means just a religious community,
intended to create a space where individuals could follow their new re-
ligious beliefs and practices at a distance from the hostility of their trib-
al leaders, who had remained hostile to the new religion. The Prophet
did not attempt, nor promote, anything beyond this kind of communi-
ty. The absence of political concerns could be indicated by the fact that
he did not appoint any successor or provide rules for the continuity of
his community, as any political leader with a political agenda would
have done. It was Muslims who, after the death of the Prophet, decid-
ed to transform this religious community into a polity, and who made
of it, in time, an empire. 
In order to defend his thesis, Abd al-Raziq also felt the need to pro-
pose a theory of prophecy. He did not question the idea of a message
literally delivered from God, as did Rusafi, but stressed its exceptional-
ity. He describes prophecy as a phenomenon which gives an elected
man total, comprehensive powers over his fellows. These powers in-
clude and exceed those of kings and temporal leaders. The “inclusion
of politics within the realm of religion” is thus an exceptional turn, a
break into the ordinary course of social and political history, whereby a
man endowed with a message and a mission, transforms the prevailing
order by providing new moral foundations. The exception is, by defin-
ition, not a lasting state and is not intended to outlive its founder.
Although having two different agendas, one rather “liberal” and the
other nationalist, both Abd al-Raziq and Maaruf Rusafi wrote at a time
where Muslim intellectuals were exposed to deep and rapid changes
and enjoyed an unprecedented opening in the intellectual sphere.
New explanations had to be sought and could—to some degree—be
proposed. They understood, and stressed, that the historical emer-
gence of Islam had deep and lasting political consequences, as it pro-
vided new models, aspirations, and values. Both also understood and
stressed that the understanding which prevailed in Muslim histories
did not depict the depth of such a revolution. The latter raised the ac-
counts of Muslim history, i. e. the building of new empires and sul-
tanates, to the status of an Islamic norm, and distorted the meaning of
the “political” message of the Prophet, i.e. that political systems had to
be grounded on shared beliefs and ethical principles, not that religion
had to provide, or did provide, the blue print for designing these polit-
ical systems.
However, Abd al-Raziq acted cautiously, perhaps too cautiously, by
not publishing anything following the controversy around his book.
Rusafi, on the other hand, entrusted his thoughts to an essay that
could not be published during his life-time, or even a few decades
later. The Elucidation of a Secret Enigma is likely to remain the work of a
poet who had not fully mastered scholarly methods and discipline, or
his impatience with the beliefs and attitudes of his fellow Muslims.
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1. Maaruf Rusafi, The Personality of Muhammad, or the Elucidation of a Sacred Enigma,
al-Shakhsiya al-muhammadiya aw hall al-lughz al-muqaddas (Cologne: al-Jamal
Publications, 2002).
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Discourse on martyrdom
While some Palestinian scholars and scholars from other countries
condemned the suicide attacks with the argument, that suicide is pro-
hibited in Islam, others justified them as a legitimate part of the na-
tional struggle for liberation and a proper method of jihad. The Mufti of
Saudi Arabia, Shaykh Abd al-Aziz bin Abdullah al-Shaykh commented
in April 2001 that Islam forbids suicide attacks. His comments raised a
storm of criticism from supporters of the Palestinian resistance. Shaykh
al-Azhar, Muhammad Tantawi, the highest Islamic authority in Egypt
stated in the same year, that resistance in occupied Palestine is a duty
for Muslims and these suicide operations a legal means. In general, fat-
was frequently refer to Israeli violations of human rights and interna-
tional law and stress that Palestinians can neither come to their rights
by diplomatic means, nor by jihad with traditional means. Martyrdom
operations, so they argue, have nothing in common with suicide, be-
cause a person who commits suicide escapes life, whereas a Palestin-
ian martyr sacrifices his or her life carrying out a religious duty –the de-
fence of Muslim land and people—while employing the opportunities
of modern technology.5
A modern theology of martyrdom is as yet under construction. A
Hamas website attempts to supply proof to the argument that Pales-
tinian suicide attacks are no innovation but a continuation of Prophet-
ic traditions. Many fatwas and books have emerged, discussing ques-
tions including as to whether women who are carrying out martyr op-
erations are allowed to travel without a mahram, and whether they
may take off their headscarf if required so by their mission.6 Nationalist
arguments merge in theologies of martyrdom. Often terms “nation,”
“bravery,” and “heroism” are mentioned. The fact that Islamic rulings
forbid the killing of persons, who are not directly involved in war, is
often circumvented by the argument that the entire Israeli society is
militarised—with Israel’s system of universal conscription often given
as “proof”—and that martyrdom operations only return Israeli atroci-
ties.7
Political impotence and lack of prospect play a significant role in the
present cult of martyrs. Through their deeds they become individuals
capable of acting, even if only in the moment of death, which bestows
upon them and their families social prestige and financial rewards. The
weakness underlying these attacks is thus transformed into a personal
moment of strength.
Though there are ways to justify political violence in Islamic terms,
these are as such not part of a structural nature of “Islam.” The ideolog-
ical factors that promote the use of the concept of martyrdom for po-
litical ends cannot be detached from the rejection of basic rights, grave
social inequality, and the repression of non-violent means of opposi-
tion and resistance. Confrontational Western models and aggressive
politics reinforce constructs of foe images and bring about political
and social strategies that are increasingly subject to religious interpre-
tations. The further Islamization of the concept of suicide martyrdom is
essentially dependent on the political developments in these regions.
Abdou Filali-Ansary is Director of the Institute for the Study of Muslim Civilizations,
The Aga Khan University, London.
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Recent months have witnessed a surge
of discussions and analyses of the cur-
rent political situation in Iran and its
uncertain outcomes. When newspa-
pers, magazines, radio, and TV in Eu-
rope and United States take a wider so-
cial view of things, they often note the
relevance of intellectual engagement
among Iranians. They describe the
ways in which they respond to the pre-
sent political and social situation by
avidly reading and discussing social
theorists and analysts of different per-
suasions and positions: Iranian such as Abdul Karim Sorush or Mohsen
Kadivar; as well as foreign: Habermas, Popper and lately, Foucault.
Even these more expanded accounts, however, are confined to imme-
diate political concerns and focused almost solely on the city of
Tehran, the megalopolis that seems to contain all of Iran into itself. If
one, instead, takes an ethnographic and thus slower look at transfor-
mations and travels to other cities, other dynamics emerge.
What receives less attention is the degree to which debates and con-
frontations are caught up in questions about the limits and possibili-
ties of “culture,” a word that began to be used in Iran early in the twen-
tieth century with an anthropological meaning and a prescriptive
bend. Nowadays, the concept is particularly resilient in official discus-
sions as well as in informal settings. Farhang (culture) encompasses a
broad spectrum of practices, intersects with religious and political tra-
jectories, and is crucial in reflections about identi-
ty and the nation. Culture is today the defining ar-
ticulation of social needs and desires. 
I study these dynamics in a specific city, Shiraz,
which has been since its foundation in the eighth
century an important cultural centre, so much so
that it is often called the “City of Knowledge”. In
the twentieth century the city became more and
more identified as the site of “classical Persian
culture” in opposition to the modern and bustling
Tehran. During the Pahlavi monarchy, in conjunc-
tion with orientalist trajectories, the discourse of
Shiraz as repository of Persian culture connected
the main ruins of the Achaemenid Empire (which
are in large part in the region surrounding Shiraz)
with two of the major poets from Shiraz, Sa‘di and
Hafez.The pre-Islamic imperial past and poetry
were mobilized to celebrate a racial and national-
ized vision of culture. The revolution of 1979 re-
versed this discourse by rejecting the monarchy’s
interpretation of the past, substituting it with a
religious paradigm. As several scholars have
noted, however, national trajectories loomed
large in the emergent state and nowadays, twen-
ty-five years after the revolution, several of the el-
ements of “Persian classical culture” are emerging
anew, though in a transformed constellation. The
municipality and other institutions in Shiraz are
promoting a vision of the city as the “cradle of Is-
lamic-Iranian civilization” while reinterpreting the
Achaemenid Empire according to the limits of ac-
ceptability of public state discourse. These initia-
tives are in conjunction with a growing attention
to the amelioration of public space and the pro-
duction of a public through spectacles of enter-
tainment like pop concerts, which are
regularly organized by the local Office
of the Ministry of Culture and Islamic
Guidance. Recent ambitious plans en-
visage the construction of a host of cul-
tural theme parks: the Park of Culture,
the Historical Museum of the Literature
of Iran, the Cultural House of the Tribes
of Fars, the Museum of Philosophy, the
Museum of Contemporary Art, and the
City of Civilizations (a clear homage to
the “dialogue of civilizations” of Presi-
dent Khatami). All of these “administra-
tive” activities, with far reaching political and economic entailments
concur in producing a “culture” for consumption that offers a neutral-
ized ground beyond the political constituencies of the day. This public
culture appears superficial to many inhabitants, but provides a power-
ful trajectory for the articulation of the politically sceptical and cultur-
ally satisfied citizen.
Power and the selective production of culture
For an ethnographer as I am, however, studying the production of
culture does not stop at tracing the genealogy of certain discourses; it
implies foremost spending time with people who are engaged in this
production. During my many stays in Shiraz, I became more and more
interested in the ways in which the discourses mentioned above were
articulated in people’s lives. Over the years, in my conversations, I
came to realize how history and poetry functioned as different modal-
ities in the reproduction of what people called the “culture of Shiraz.”
Fragments of national and local history combine with poetry to pro-
duce a less uniform and more conflicted version of “culture” in which
comments about the dire economic situation and the price of books
mix with a vague nostalgia or a particularly evocative verse.
History, especially the history of the twentieth century, is a matter of
contention. History is a crucial element of the articulation of the “cul-
ture of Shiraz”, which is deemed essential to its understanding and cel-
ebration. The nation is mostly envisaged in historical terms, but histo-
ry itself is also considered relevant at the local level, as an important
tool to understand the present and be aware of the past. People in Iran
mention singular historical events or figures to articulate their sense of
belonging. Both among professional historians and among those who
read them however, there is a widespread uneasiness about available
historical narratives. They consider them incomplete, inapt to account
fully for “things as they were.” Historians point to the lack of sources, to
the impossibility of writing without being caught up in political entan-
glements, or to the difficulties of engaging in kaˆr-e jeddi (serious re-
search), while cultural institutions pursue superficial projects. Readers,
who often engage in conversations at bookstores around the city,
complain about the “emptiness” of narratives, which contain mistakes,
silence regarding certain figures while exaggeration for others, and in
the overall, are unable to celebrate the greatness of Shiraz both for it-
self and for the nation. 
Concerns for history and the projection of its inability to represent the
past focus both on broad themes, as well as on specific fragments. The
events of the 1950s, for example, elicit a great deal of discussion, and the
position of the different religious leaders and their followers is still a mat-
ter of contention, especially since several of their descendants still play
significant political roles today. Heated debates take place around a
charismatic ayatullah who opposed Musaddeq’s National Front and was
said to have “British leanings” but is celebrated today as an “anti-colonial-
ist” leader and a precursor of the Islamic Republic. Historians are afraid to
write about him and have a hard time finding materials because support-
Arts, Media & Society
Culture is a key word in contemporary Iran,
especially in relation to power. Developing a
practice begun in the early nineties, several
national and local institutions are investing in
“cultural activities” as a neutralized ground
for the construction of citizens. This process
intersects with poetry, which has a great
power of recognition and is hegemonic well
beyond the state: while on one hand poetry
seems to offer expressive possibilities
otherwise unavailable, on the other it is in fact
an effective modality of power. 
Culture, Power and
Poetry in Shiraz
It is this poetic
power of
recognition that
makes poetry
the dominant
discourse of culture:
a discourse that
crosscuts
differences of
religion and politics.
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ers of the aforementioned leader refuse to give them newspapers, docu-
ments, and other relevant sources. Readers complain that available bi-
ographies or standard accounts found in local histories, often published
by state cultural institutions, distort the activities of this leader and fail to
reveal his political strategies. Different trajectories intertwine in such
opinions that touch on questions of social constituency as well as reli-
gious interpretation and social imagination. The aforementioned leader,
for example, heralded a populist approach geared at gaining consensus
and power through turning ritual practices such as ashura (day com-
memorating the death of Imam Husayn) into political occasions, while
staunchly opposing mystical brotherhoods. However, discussions around
this episode, and others, also point to the ways in which causality and
agency are interpreted in history and how they are linked to considera-
tions that are more general about the state of the nation. All these ten-
sions underline how history is a crucial site for the production of the “cul-
ture of Shiraz.” Related to the institutional investment in culture and in
part articulated on the same discourse, history plays out many of the con-
flicting views that make up the Shiraz of today while partaking in the re-
production of its “culture.” At the same time as a specific modality, histo-
ry, at least in the present, is considered inapt to fully articulate this “cul-
ture” and is therefore supplemented or often substituted by poetry.
Poetry speaking the unspeakable
Poetry affords the recognition that history cannot deliver. While his-
tory with its embedded quest for truth remains controversial and is
seen as mostly untrustworthy, poetry constitutes a more secure
ground. Poetry is not subject to the same rules of interpretation of his-
tory. Lapses, silences, or ambiguities in poetry are not seen as making
it incomplete, but rather as a characteristic of poetic discourse itself.
Poetry is considered as something that always requires interpretation
and its layering are seen as adding to its aesthetic appreciation, thus
making poetry more effective. For example, when the topic comes up
in conversations, listeners substitute the “absent” historical account of
the practices and political position of the aforementioned religious
leader by referring to and sometimes quoting verses from Al-Tafasil
(The Commentary), a satirical book that the Shirazi poet Fereidun
Tavallali composed in the early fifties using the famed Sa’di as a model.
In the book, without mentioning him by name, Tavallali depicts a cer-
tain ayatullah as a kaˆsib al-khutabaˆ (merchant of sermons) and attacks
him vehemently: “He who called people towards God/when the veil
was lifted, Satan he was // Look! The rahbar-i khalq (guide of the peo-
ple) was the very one who/robbed mind, faith and religion.”1 This por-
trait, while elusive, is for Shirazi readers, who are interested in history,
an explicit reference to the character in question. It is a depiction
whose allusions are not considered as an inaccurate or incomplete ac-
count, but rather as more effective through the aesthetic dimension; a
dimension that the translation cannot convey. Moreover, the verses,
because of their intended vagueness, open up parallels between the
past and present. For those who are not familiar with the specific his-
torical context, the verses are still an indication of the power of poetry. 
Poetry’s relevance is not limited to its satirical efficacy in relation to the
past or the present, nor should it be reduced to a counter discourse
through which is expressed what could not have been otherwise. Cer-
tainly, there are these dynamics at play, as the success of magazines like
Golagha and others attest. However, there is much more at stake. As
mentioned above, Shiraz can claim a special poetic relevance within the
national literary constellation, and even if poetry in itself is not some-
thing specific to the city, people in Iran in general and in Shiraz in partic-
ular grant a special place to Shiraz in poetic practice and imagination.
The extent to which the place of poetry relates to its social practice re-
quires careful ethnographic consideration, since it might lend itself to
certain naturalizations about poetic knowledge and capabilities. These
attributions while celebrating certain skills do not consider how socially
differentiated and selective was, and is, the access to a learned tradition
that might be, or have been, widespread but was not, and is not, gener-
al. This being said, I have rarely met Iranians who dislike or distance
themselves from poetry and those who do, have a specific critical agen-
da, such as that of the nationalist and modernist Ahmad Kasravi. Poetry
is sometimes language, sometimes articulation of common sense, and
sometimes just the names of a few poets, or a visit to their tombs.
The widely different approaches to poetry reinforce its pervasive-
ness. Often it is said that the poet Hafiz embodies and expresses “Iran-
ian-ness” at its fullest. Poetry, even when used as an empty signifier, is
an articulation of the self. In my encounters, women and men, universi-
ty professors, shopkeepers, students and local intellectuals rely on po-
etry as a stable imaginary, as something that could dispense answers
not only to the large and small questions of social and personal life but
also grant a location and an identity in the world. It is this poetic power
of recognition that makes poetry the dominant discourse of culture: a
discourse that crosscuts differences of religion and politics. While it
might offer a venue for the expression of discontent, poetry is a hege-
monic articulation that goes well beyond the administrative initiatives
of the state, and whose aesthetic effects heighten its emotional grip.
Poetry’s inclusiveness makes it appear almost as a natural quality of the
“culture of Shiraz,” and thus a particularly effective modality of power.
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There are many ways for Americans to
learn about Islam, especially with the
volume of books that hit bookstores
after the 9/11 tragedy. One increasing-
ly popular way is only a click away. It is
estimated that for the two days follow-
ing the hijacked airplane crashes into
New York’s Twin Towers almost twelve
million visitors accessed cnn.com, a
sharp rise of 680 percent over previous
usage. At least two-thirds of internet
users searched the web for news about
the bombing. Millions, literally millions,
of web pages now have something to say about Islam. Whether people
are looking for information or out to put a spin on what Islam really is,
there is no question that Islam has reached, in the words of Gary Bunt,
a Digital Age.1
Through Google eyes
One unsophisticated, but no doubt, popular mode for surfing the
web is simply typing in a word or two in a popular search engine. I can
imagine that as you read this essay someone somewhere in cyber-
space is looking at Islam through Google eyes. If you type “Islam” into
Google, as I did in April 2004, you will find well over 8 million results.
Most people find what they want, or at least what they get, on the first
page of ten hits. Unlike some websites, such as about.com for example,
the links are generated by a sophisticated computer program rather
than an expert on the subject. 
A critical look at the first ten sites generated by Google on April 11
shows the sampling problem with such a generic search. Eight of these
are sites run by Islamic organizations, but there are also links to the offi-
cial website of the Nation of Islam (www.noi.org) and to a Christian anti-
Islamic site at www.answering-islam.org. The top ranked site (www.is-
lamworld.net) provides a wide range of links to onsite and offsite pages
describing Islamic beliefs and rituals, but does not provide any informa-
tion on who puts out the site. It is hard to imagine why this derivative
site takes precedence over second-ranked IslamiCity, which has been
operating since 1995 and announces that almost 280 million hits have
been recorded since January 2001. The fact that IslamiCity is linked by
more than 13,500 websites around the world no doubt gives it such
high visibility for the search engine. Neither of the first two sites advo-
cates a distinct sectarian version of Islam. Indeed, a visitor to either site
would think that one Islam fits all.
The third in the listing is a major Shia
site (www.al-islam.org), although its
Shia orientation becomes clear by look-
ing at the content of the site rather
than by specific admission in the FAQ
section. One need not go far into the
site to find its sympathies, since a menu
item across the top heralds “Islam as
Taught by the Ahlul Bayt.” This is fol-
lowed by another general mega site
(www.islamonline.net) founded by a
Qatari consulting firm in 1999. In fifth
place (www.islam-guide.com) is an
electronic version, also available in PDF format, of A Brief Illustrated
Guide To Understanding Islam, first published in Houston, Texas in 1996.
This conversion guide may owe part of its popularity to its multilingual
versions, available onsite in Chinese, French, German, Italian, Japanese
and Spanish (with Arabic and Russian forthcoming). At number six is a
site (www.Islam101.com), billed as educational, but actually a wide-
ranging resource sponsored by a somewhat mysterious organization
called the Sabr Foundation. 
In seventh place is a site (63.175.194.25) dedicated to the work of
Shaykh Muhammad Salih al-Munajid, a Saudi religious authority who is
imam of a mosque in al-Khobar. Shaykh Munajid offers cyber fatwas to
solicited questions in Arabic, English, French, Indonesian, Spanish, and
Urdu. The next two web sites present a problem, since one is the offi-
cial home of Louis Farrakhan’s Nation of Islam and the other is a large
Christian site dedicated to convincing Muslims of the error of their
ways. The latter, Answering Islam, is subtitled a Christian-Muslim dia-
logue, although it is a very one-sided dialogue as one sorts through the
apologetic information loaded onsite. This is prefigured in a neon-like
flashing pair of verses from the Quran and the Bible. The Quranic selec-
tion (2:256) reads “Let there be no compulsion in religion; truth stands
out clear from error.” But this is rhetorically trumped by a verse from
John 8:32: “And you shall know the truth; and the truth shall set you
free.” Scrolling down the “about us” section ultimately finds the inten-
tions of the site creators. “This all said,” they admit, “we are Evangelical
Christians and agree without reservations with the statement of faith
as given, for example, by the World Evangelical Alliance and the Lau-
sanne Committee for World Evangelization.” Both creeds emphasize
that there is one “truth” and it is not to be found in the Quran.
If you knew nothing or next to nothing about Islam, several of the
top ten sites would set you on the right path. The problem is that all of
these first-page links are self-consciously subjective, several with a
goal to convert the reader. Not until place number thirteen would you
find an educational site attempting to treat Islam in an objective way.
This is the excellent and updated scholarly compilation (www.arch-
es.uga.edu/~godlas/) of Alan Godlas at the University of Georgia. Un-
fortunately, the ISIM site is not to be found even in the first hundred on
the list (after which I gave up counting). In addition to the long, long
list of web pages, Google provides a shorter set of commercially spon-
sored links. For my entry of “Islam” I could have taken this shortcut to
“Meet Tens of Thousands of Muslim Singles for Love or Friendship”
(www.MuslimFriendship.com) before I even began to surf. The lesson
is that Google is both hit and miss (including a potential Mrs) for any-
one looking for a balanced analysis of Islam.
The problem with webservation
The main problem with analyzing the use of cyberspace is that it is
virtually impossible to know who is taking advantage of the several
million web pages which in some way mention Islam. As an anthropol-
ogist I am intrigued by the possibility of a new method of webserva-
tion, especially the interactive potential in participating through chat
rooms and discussion forums.2 However, this presents a far different
field than the villages in rural Yemen where I conducted ethnographic
fieldwork in 1978-79. While I did not know everyone there on a first
name basis, there was an opportunity in a small-scale social context to
Arts, Media & Society
Cyberspace gives access to an astounding
amount of information on Islam. How do we
find relevant data and possible answers to the
questions one may have? Search engines are
convenient tools but have not been designed
by specialists in Islam. Many sites, including
top ranking hits, fail to plainly indicate the
objectives of the individuals or organizations
that maintain them, while many others are
ephemeral. As a result, researching digital
Islam constitutes a major methodological
challenge for social scientists. 
Islam Takes a Hit
http://www.islamworld.net, viewed 27 May 2004
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observe behaviour and follow up with interviews and casual conversa-
tion. Traditional field sites are not likely to be replaced by surfable web
sites, but it does seem that the exotic others studied by anthropolo-
gists are increasingly to be encountered in html construct rather than
ethnographic context alone. This will require a rethinking of how virtu-
al reality is to be related to the more mundane reality of everyday be-
haviour. 
Ironically, the very rationale that has concerned anthropologists to
collect information about traditional cultures before it is lost or ab-
sorbed in dominant cultures now faces those of us who treat the Inter-
net as a field of study. As Gary Bunt laments, there is no archive of old
Islamic web sites, some disappear and others are updated leaving no
trace of earlier stages.3 As a pertinent example, shortly after the 9/11
tragedy I accidentally stumbled upon a Yahoo web ring for “Jihad.” By
clicking up and down the ring I could access quite a few sites that
preached terrorism against specific non-Muslims or fellow Muslims.
One Kuwaiti site allowed me to download and watch videos of Bin
Laden or read his available works. By the end of 2001 this web ring had
been defused and the more militant sites were no longer online. Simi-
larly, long before the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan there was a tal-
iban.org web site, although that had disappeared well before the 9/11
attack. At the time it did not occur to me (nor did I have the digital stor-
age space) to archive such sites. Perhaps someone did, but retrieval for
study would no doubt be akin to looking for hand-written manuscripts
rather than consulting a library catalogue. 
The ephemeral nature of web sites is compounded by the seeming
ease with which so many different kinds of sites can be found. If there
are indeed over 8 million web pages that mention Islam, it would the-
oretically take me over four and a half years of non-stop analysis, eight-
hours per day, if I only spent one minute on each webpage. Of course
not all the potential websites would be of value, but how could such a
massive sample be meaningfully analyzed by hand? Consider also that
Google does not access every webpage and many of the pages listed
no longer exist. The data set in itself is seductive, but how could it be
usefully related to the people putting up the sites and surfing through
the pages? A media revolution of enormous proportions is taking place
in cyberspace. With apologies to Marshall McLuhan, I am not sure that
the medium is the message for the Internet, but the medium is defi-
nitely a new kind of methodological challenge.
A final vista
My Google search in April 2004 can be compared with a similar effort
I made in October 2000 using an earlier search engine called Altavista.4
Three and a half years ago there were only about one and a quarter mil-
lion pages for “Islam.” The top ten at that point were decidedly more er-
ratic. Oddly, the most rated site was Islam Tanzania (www.islamtz.org),
which was hardly a primary hit site even at that time. This web page still
exists, but was last updated in December, 2001. Second in the Altavista
ranking was the Islam page (www.about.com), not a surprising top
choice then or now. In October 2000, however, the Nation of Islam web
site registered third, followed by IslamiCity and Islam101. These three
sites, though not in this order, are still in Google’s April 2004 first page.
In sixth place was the main webpage of the Lahore Ahmadiyya Move-
ment (www.muslim.org/cont-islam.htm), not to be confused with the
main Ahmadiyya Muslim Community website (www.alislam.org). The
ninth and tenth slots were taken up by Answering Islam, once again giv-
ing space to Christian apologetic against Islam. 
Whether entering cyberspace in October 2000 or April 2004, the ca-
sual browser would find a set of mixed messages. The Islamic mega
sites, which tend to duplicate much of the same information, would
yield ready access to the Quran, sayings of the Prophet Muhammad
and details on the major aspects of Islam as a religion. Today, more so
than before 9/11, major Islamic portals such as IslamiCity attempt to
educate Americans about the peaceful nature of Islam. I am not certain
how the average American surfer would evaluate either an Ahmadiyya
site or the Nation of Islam. Neither site proclaims that a sizeable major-
ity of other Muslims considers what both stand for as against the main-
stream of both Sunni and Shi’a Islam. Christians might prefer the spin
of Answering Islam, especially given the apparent interest in dialogue
rather than blatant condemnation, which can readily be found else-
where. But Muslims would feel the need to log onto Ahmed Deedat’s
Combat Kit against Bible Thumpers (www.geocities.com/Athens/Del-
phi/7974/deedat/deedat.html) for relief. 
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As curators of the exhibition, we expe-
rienced the challenge to communicate,
in an encapsulated yet comprehensi-
ble form, our academic insights in the
contexts in which Islam is lived and re-
produced by ordinary Muslims. In addi-
tion, the making of the exhibition con-
curred with a heightening of the ten-
sions surrounding Islam and Muslim
cultures in Dutch society, which put
considerable pressure on our project.
We were faced with how to present a new perspective on Muslim reli-
gious life when public opinion and common knowledge of Islam were
quite limitedly and negatively defined. Is it possible to make an exhibi-
tion that is neither pedantic nor apologetic?
Rethinking the familiar
Urban Islam intends to broaden and deepen visitors’ views of Islam,
to make them rethink their opinions about Islam as well as their rela-
tion to the available sources of information. In order to do so, Urban
Islam presents the personal stories of young Muslims living in five
modern cities around the globe; Amsterdam, Dakar, Istanbul, Mar-
rakech, and Paramaribo. The personal views and stories represent a
particular context specific for the society in which the young protago-
nists dwell. In this way, not only individual interpretations and person-
al perspectives on Islam are highlighted but also the different social,
political and cultural contexts with which religious life interacts. For in-
stance, secondary school teacher Ferhat from Istanbul explains what
secularism in Turkey aspires for; and how deeply it has influenced his
lifestyle. While he identifies himself as a real Kemalist, a secular Muslim
and a westernized Turk, fragments of daily newspapers are displayed
to point to the ongoing discussions in Turkey on the meanings of west-
ernization, modernity, and place of Islam in public life. The newspaper
headlines reflect the major divisions in society with respect to the
headscarf—is it against secularism or not?—and the expression of reli-
gious identity in public space—should religion be confined to the pri-
vate sphere?
Re-contextualizing Islam
Next to these four foreign cities where
young individuals present their lives,
Urban Islam also brings Islam to the
Netherlands. Amsterdam is designed in
a manner slightly different from the
other cities. The display is an arena, a
symbol for the often-passionate debate
about Islam in the Netherlands. The
arena serves as a multimedia platform
in which the visitors themselves be-
come the protagonists. On a large screen several Muslim and non-Mus-
lim inhabitants of Amsterdam give their opinions on issues regarding
the place of Islam in Dutch society. Visitors are challenged to share a
glimpse of their own views by selecting one of the opinions expressed
on the screen. In this way visitors encounter diverging ideas about Islam
while forming their own by participating in a virtual discussion.
The Dutch public’s knowledge of Islam is shaped by media images,
discussions on Muslim minorities in the Netherlands, and representa-
tions of Islam in cultural institutes such as museums. In this context,
Urban Islam can be considered as the makers’ statement against dis-
cussions on Islam and Muslims in the West, and the Netherlands in par-
ticular. It argues to approach religion and society from a human per-
spective. By centring on personal stories and experiences in everyday
life Urban Islam distances itself from a-historical and oversimplified
representations of Islam. It sketches an image of Islamic practice in the
context of social and political relations, of personal choices, economic
difficulties, and globalization in modern urban areas.
During the exhibition period, the debate on Islam became more ag-
gressive and one-sided. Several well-known Dutch opinion leaders
who advocate a deliberate approach to Islam are reproached for being
“politically correct” and too lenient on Muslims. While almost any inci-
dent involving Muslims causes a huge outcry in the Dutch media, the
critical message of Urban Islam is largely ignored in public debate.
Given the current political climate, it simply does not seem expedient
to challenge the oversimplified portrayal of Islam in Dutch imagery.
The experiences of Urban Islam reflect some of the difficulties of cul-
tural institutions, like the KIT Tropenmuseum, to engage into the pub-
lic debate on Islam in a political climate in which a more balanced ap-
proach is considered an unwanted deviation from the norm. 
Islam gets discursively defined in a two-camped futile discussion in
the Netherlands. This discussion is a process where non-Muslims and
Muslims define themselves against each other while framing the no-
tion of Islam. The current debate on Islam in the Netherlands is actual-
ly an essentialist discourse about what Islam “is.” It attempts to make
Islam meaningful for the Dutch context by trying to systematize, orga-
nize, and categorize a faith that is diversely practiced and interpreted
in different parts of the world. The difficulty with this “disciplining” dis-
cussion, besides frustrating its participants, is that it can never com-
pletely cover Islam—or any other religion. A discursive definition of
Islam does not always correspond with what is on the ground. This
clash between theory and practice is perhaps an appropriate starting
point for rethinking the idea of a “clash of civilizations.”
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In December 2003 a new exhibition on
Islam opened at the KIT Tropenmuseum in
Amsterdam. This comprehensive exhibition
entitled Urban Islam is the first one of its kind in
the Netherlands to explore the modern aspects
of Islam in different parts of the world. Urban
Islam aims to present a thought-provoking
view on Islam by highlighting the complex and
dynamic contexts that shape religious ideas
and practices in Muslim societies. 
Urban Islam
Rethinking the Familiar
Image from
the exhibition
Urban Islam
Urban Islam is on view through 12 September 2004. For more information please see
http://www.urbanislam.nl
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Islam, Society & the State
The German welfare state is character-
ized by a system of state supervised
compulsory education. Teachers are re-
garded as civil servants, and, according
to the constitution, “Every German is
equally eligible for any public office ac-
cording to his aptitude, qualifications
and professional achievements.” More-
over, “rights acquired in the public ser-
vice are independent of religious de-
nomination. No one may suffer disad-
vantage by reason of his adherence or
non-adherence to a denomination or
ideology.” Do these constitutional pro-
visions apply to a state that is confront-
ed with a growing plurality of its citizen-
ry with differentiated claims or does the
state have to adopt another approach? 
The question of plurality of citizenship came to the fore in the above-
mentioned case. The plaintiff, a Muslim woman born in Afghanistan in
1972, had lived in Germany from 1987 and acquired German nationali-
ty in 1995. In 1998, she had completed her education to become a
teacher in an elementary school, but was refused commission because
she was not willing to remove her headscarf before class. As a justifica-
tion for their refusal, the executive board of the elementary school ar-
gued that the headscarf was an expression of a cultural demarcation
and was not only a religious, but also a political symbol. Furthermore,
they referred to the changing nature of the neutrality of the German
state that required a more strict separation of church and state. The
plaintiff responded that the headscarf, as distinguishable from the cru-
cifix, was not a religious symbol but was actually an expression of her
religious faith. She maintained that her wearing of the headscarf, rep-
resented individual and religiously motivated conduct that was pro-
tected by the constitution.
The Supreme Court ruled that the headscarf is not a religious symbol
pure and simple.1 It ruled that only by taking into consideration the im-
pact of the applied medium of expression, as well as the totality of po-
tential meanings that are eligible for it, could a certain religious gar-
ment or sign be attributed symbolic meaning that directly or indirectly
is tantamount to the endorsement of religion by the state, and hence a
violation of the principle of the separation of church and state. Whether
a headscarf has such symbolic meaning cannot be judged, therefore, in-
dependent of the person wearing it or unaccompanied by concrete
conduct. In other words, if a teacher, by wearing the headscarf, at-
tempts to religiously influence the children under her care, this would
represent a breach of official duties, among which could be guarantee-
ing the neutrality of the state. Accordingly, it ruled that, since the head-
scarf as such does not constitute a religious symbol (pure and simple),
the wearing thereof by a civil servant in front of a class of students is
constitutionally protected by the principle of freedom of religion. 
The obligation of the state to maintain religious neutrality is not to
be understood as a disassociation in the sense of a strict separation of
church and state, but rather as an attitude of transparency and gener-
ality, that obliges equal protection of the freedom of religion of any
creed. The right to freedom of religion, in the positive sense of the
word, obliges the state to guarantee a space for the active endorse-
ment of faith and the realization of the autonomous personality on the
ideological-religious field. This right also applies to the duties of civil
servants of the state.2
The nature of state supervised compulsory education factored signif-
icantly in the Supreme Court decision, since, as stated in the ruling, “ in
its nature, religious and ideological perceptions were relevant from the
beginning. … Subsequently, Christian
elements in the formation of public
schooling are not simply prohibited;
education, however, has to be open
also for other ideological and religious
substances and values.”2 In this open-
ness, the constitutional state maintains
it religious and ideological neutrality.
As to the tensions that are unavoidable
in the common education of children
from diverse backgrounds, a solution
must be found by taking into consider-
ation the duty of tolerance as an ex-
pression of human dignity. The right to
freedom of religion authorizes the in-
dividual to decide for oneself which re-
ligious symbols one recognizes and
honours, and which one abhors. How-
ever, in a community, that harbours numerous articles of faith individ-
uals or groups do not have the right to remain “untouched” by, or pro-
tected from, alien expressions of faith, cultic acts, and/or religious sym-
bols. Finally, the Supreme Court found it, in line with Article 9 of the Eu-
ropean Convention for Human Rights, unconstitutional for the execu-
tive powers and the judiciary, to restrict the exercise of the right to
freedom of religion, absent any proper legislative enactment from the
democratically elected parliament.
The Supreme Court rightly avoided questions and interpretations of
what a religion “exactly” prescribes for its participants, an activity that
is reserved for the individual by the constitutional and human right to
freedom of religion. Furthermore, it refrained from answering the
question of what is the fair balance of (potential) interests to be struck;
that is a task exclusively attributable to the democratically elected leg-
islative power. In effect, the Supreme Court made understandable the
rationale and legitimacy of the principle of neutrality within the wel-
fare state. It requires “respecting, and anticipatory neutrality,” that
obliges the state “to secure for the individual, but also for religious and
ideological groups, a free space of action.”3
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The Western welfare state is usually
presumed to be “neutral” and not involved
in “personal” matters such as religion.
The principle of neutrality which is based
on the separation of church and State is often
put to the test as a society becomes more
religiously plural. Questions regarding
the legal neutrality of the State came to
the fore in a recent German Supreme Court
case dealing with whether a teacher should
be allowed to wear a headscarf in the class-
room (Teacher with Headscarf case of 24
September 2003). This case poses questions
about the nature of the contemporary
German welfare state and whether it can
maintain its neutrality when confronted with
growing socio-religious pluralism. 
The Headscarf and the
“Neutral” Welfare State
Notes
I would like to thank Edith Brugmans, Janske Hermens, Louis Logister, Thomas
Mertens, and Derk Venema (Nijmegen) for comments on the original paper.
1. Cf. 1 BvR 647/70 and 7/74 of 16th October 1979 (Prayer in the Classroom-case
[Schulgebet-Entscheidung]): “The crucifix … is pure and simple its [Christianity’s]
plain religious symbol. … It symbolizes the essential core of Christian creed …. ”
2. See: BverfG, VBvR 1436/02 vom 3.6.2003, Absatz-Nr. 44.
3. See: BverfG, VBvR 1436/02 vom 3.6.2003, Absatz-Nr. 10.
Deniz Coskun is a Ph.D. candidate at Nijmegen University in the Department of
Jurisprudence.
E-mail: D.Coskun@jur.kun.nl
ISIM-Newsletter-14-WEB-DEF  29-06-2004  11:07  Pagina 45
E L E N A  A R I G I T A
4 6 I S I M N E W S L E T T E R  1 4 /  J U N E 2 0 0 4
Al-Azhar promptly responded to 11 Sep-
tember by portraying Islam to the rest of
the world as monolithic, free of internal
dissent and preaching peace and love
between all peoples, while also discred-
iting challenges to its authority. It fol-
lowed a strategy of showing the entire
world al-islam al-sahih (the correct
Islam) through initiatives such as the re-
newal of inter-religious dialogue with
Christian and Jewish representatives. 
While al-Azhar already had an insti-
tutionalized tradition of inter-faith dia-
logues, 9/11 consolidated this trend to
promote agreements and initiatives of dialogue that stressed the idea
of a positive, unique and universal image of Islam as represented by al-
Azhar. The Shaykh al-Azhar, Dr Muhammad Sayyid Tantawi, has been
especially interested in improving Western perceptions of Islam.1 In
2002, for example, al-Azhar initiated a program with the German Em-
bassy in Egypt to train a select group of German citizens residing in
Cairo in religious sciences, in order to “teach non-Muslims about Islam
and to improve its damaged image in the West after September 11th.” 2
Nevertheless, this official discourse shows its contradictions and
weakness in times of crisis, as the legitimacy of al-Azhar to speak in the
name of Islam constantly needs to grapple with its submission to the
political power, while also, satisfy the pleas and vindications of the
Arab and Islamic public opinion. There are many examples throughout
the modern history of al-Azhar: at the time of the
Napoleonic Expedition in 1798, al-Azhar proved
its capacity to move from the negotiation and
rich exchange of knowledge with the French Mis-
sion to its position at the head of the revolts
against the occupation. Also under the British
rule, the institution showed its capacity to accom-
modate to the political needs and reproduce the
myth of leadership during the struggle for inde-
pendence. But probably it has been throughout
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict when it has be-
come more evident the accommodation of al-
Azhar official discourse, which fluctuates from the
dialogue imposed by political strategies to sharp
condemnations against Israel when the Arab and
Muslim public opinions gets strongly mobilized
in support of the Palestinian people. 
Following the same path, the pressure of public
opinion on al-Azhar’s position within the context
of the post 9/11 era has reproduced this pattern
of submission to political needs and legitimating
strategies in front of its Muslim public. Thus, be-
sides the effort to promote an official Islam as de-
scribed above, when in March 2003 mass demon-
strations rose against the possibility of a war in
Iraq, Tantawi issued a fatwa calling upon all Mus-
lims for jihad in the case that the US went
through with launching its attack on Iraq. Al-
Azhar engages in a conflicting balancing act; on
the one hand, it accommodates moderate official
discourse, and on the other, it advocates a more
revolutionary mobilizing one. Al-Azhar can thus
be seen as both responding to the expectations
created by its official position, and to legitimizing
its moral authority among Muslims.
Contested authority inside
the institution
While al-Azhar perpetuates a myth of
autonomy, it in fact submits to a large
degree to the will of state authorities,
as long as the budget of the institution
depends on the Ministry of Awqaf and
the President of the Republic appoints
the Shaykh al-Azhar. Frequent polemics
have risen around diverse questions
dealing with worship, morality, and the
economy; constantly resisting the as-
sumed authority of these men of reli-
gion assigned with official responsibili-
ties, and thereby questioning the validity itself of an official Islam. 
A recent example of internal dissension is the polemic surrounding
the use of the veil in France.3 The international reverberations of the
law resulted in Shaykh al-Azhar taking a stand by making it permissible
for a Muslim woman not to wear the veil if she lives in a non-Islamic
country where the law forbids the use of the hijab. As is to be expect-
ed, the statement—like many of Dr Tantawi’s other fatwas—caused a
huge outcry and also produced a debate within the heart of the insti-
tution itself; which made evident the important differences that exist
between its different authorities. What is more important is that it
questioned the Shaykh al-Azhar’s authority. Furthermore, when
Shaykh Tantawi summoned the Islamic Research Academy—the al-
Azhar organ that brings together important ulama and whose function
is to serve as a consultant for doctrinal or social questions related to
Islam—, it highlighted the fact that Shaykh Tantawi stood alone in his
opinion. In this case, the differences not only divided the ulama, they
also divided the media that reproduced the polemic in a broader pub-
lic debate by reporting the different statements made by those in-
volved. The fact that differences in opinion can be expressed openly in
the press and in other situations not, is evidence that the hierarchical
authority is contested from within, and that it extends the limits of dis-
sension and internal debate; it thus exposes the fragility of its sup-
posed hierarchical authority.
In addition, the statement also points out the place of al-Azhar re-
garding its official position towards the representatives of the State;
because the media stressed that Tantawi had made the announcement
during a press conference following a meeting with the French Minis-
ter of Interior, Nicolas Sarkozy. On the one hand, al-Azhar and its fore-
most representative were taken as the authorized voice to give an
opinion for a European non-Muslim government, even though specific
French and European institutions which had been created specifically
to give an answer to those kind of matters, had already expressed their
opposition to both the French law banning the hijab and the state-
ment made by Tantawi. One could conclude then, considering the pro-
governmental attitude, that Tantawi has shown along his career, that
by asking for the Shaykh al-Azhar official opinion, Sarkozy was trying to
assure a favourable statement in support of the law. On the other
hand, the statement also caused an important lack of credibility to
Tantawi’s legitimacy in front of Muslim public opinion and inside the
institution that he is leading.
The internal fragmentation that this case illustrates is thus reinforced
by the open criticism from sectors outside of al-Azhar, which range
from other Muslim scholars to the Islamist groups who question any Is-
lamic authority submitting to the will of the political authorities. In ad-
dition, the secular and leftist intellectuals criticize the conservatism
and censorship that al-Azhar exerts over its intellectual production. In
this context, al-Azhar demonstrates its capacity to survive by collabo-
rating unreservedly with the regime, and backs it with an Islamic dis-
Islam, Society & the State
Al-Azhar University projects an image of a
thousand year old institution that has
symbolized the authority and reference point
for Sunni Islam and has been involved in
struggles for national independence. A jealous
guardian of the Arabic language and its
culture, al-Azhar has the pretension of exerting
its influence throughout the entire Islamic
world. Nevertheless, the idealized image that it
projects is quite far from the complex reality al-
Azhar actually faces, and the post 11
September 2001 period has made evident the
challenges this institution is confronting.
Al-Azhar in
the Post 9/11 Era
Al-Azhar engages
in a conflicting
balancing act;
on the one hand,
it accommodates
moderate official
discourse, and
on the other,
it advocates
a more
revolutionary
mobilizing one.
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course that legitimises the regime’s political authority when Islamists
contest it. It is on these grounds that the plurality and dissention man-
ifested by al-Azhar in questions of public morality (such as the veil or
censorship), give way to a univocal discourse.
Censorship and the production of a correct Islam 
An official discourse whose objective is to produce a correct Islam
separate from the polemics and differences in interpretation does
exist; and it serves on political grounds to quieten Islamism, which op-
poses the elite in power with Islamic arguments. In these cases, the ef-
fectiveness of al-Azhar is supported not only by the government, but
also by the intellectual classes, even if they are very critical of the con-
servative morality that al-Azhar attempts to impose. The latter are very
much in favour of stricter control of the da‘wa as a means to discredit
not only radical Islamism but also moderate Islamist trends. 
The control of the da‘wa is a recurring theme, since the time of
Muhammad Ali, which has been pursued by the different protectorate
regimes, the monarchy, and the Republic. In addition to the political
will demonstrated by the State, the control of preaching has basically
depended on how motivated al-Azhar reformers were. However, the
control of preaching and proselytizing, which was really only complet-
ed with Nasser’s nationalism project, has always been fragile. The tra-
ditional conception of Islamic authority does not envisage the exis-
tence of one institution that monopolises the production of Islamic
knowledge. One can thus observe the burgeoning of alternative dis-
courses, from the da‘wa of the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1920’s, to
the proliferation of mosques that escape the control of the Ministry of
Awqaf in the 1980’s, and to the success throughout the last decade of
the shuyukh al-casette wal-television (cassette and television preach-
ers). The preoccupation of those responsible in the Ministry and in al-
Azhar has been obvious and has consequently emphasized the need
for control of the mosque, the correct training of officially certified
Imams, and other initiatives that have not been very efficient, such as
the uniformity of the Friday sermon. Even though, in the aftermath of
September 11, al-Azhar renewed its efforts to control the da‘wa, yet it
followed previous initiatives that had proven to be non-effective, such
as the implementation of the budget for the training of imams, and
once more, the control over the Friday sermon. The latter move was
denounced by the Muslim Brothers as an attempt to limit the freedom
of expression and religious freedom. By controlling the da‘wa, al-Azhar
also attempts to diminish any possibility of contestation to its legiti-
macy as the only voice authorized to speak in the name of Islam.
Another kind of censorship, which exists in order to control public
morality and is directed primarily at intellectual productions: novels,
films, and academic works, is also under al-Azhar’s strict control. Al-
though censorship is legally a duty of the Ministry of Culture, in 1994
the State Council recognized the right of al-Azhar to censor the licens-
es for the audiovisual productions related to Islamic topics. Apart from
that, the Islamic Research Academy frequently advises and influences
in matters of censorship. From the early veto in 1925 to Ali Abd al-
Raziq’s Islam and the Principles of Government to the recent polemics
that regularly arise about novels and academic works, al-Azhar is per-
sistently exerting its control over intellectual production and promot-
ing a conservative morality. By doing so, the institution empowers its
presence in the public sphere, as well as with the government that in
turn uses al-Azhar’s authority to control the demands coming from
both the secular and leftist sectors and the Islamist trends. Thus, the
censorship of al-Azhar and its conservative doctrine is openly criticized
from outside by both progressive sectors and leftist intellectuals. How-
ever, the effectiveness of al-Azhar’s status as an official Islamic institu-
tion is relatively seamless when it comes to opposing political Islamist
discourses, which attempt to exert their opposition to political power
with religious argumentation. In this context, al-Azhar survives by
using the authority that the law grants it to impose its influence in the
public sphere and to exploit strategically its symbiotic collaboration
with political powers, which it knows how to use to extend its influence
in questions related to public morality.
The aftermath of 9/11 illustrates what has been felt to be the neces-
sity for an official Islamic discourse that would exert control over radi-
cal trends, but at the same time, the nature of Islamic authority itself
favours its fragmentation. If 11 September affected in some way the
position of al-Azhar as representative of official Islam, it was in effect,
the growing concern about controlling Islamic discourses that gave to
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the institution the task of producing a correct Islam. However, both the
secular trends, as well as the Islamist ones, consider the submission of
al-Azhar to political power as a lack of credibility.
Egyptian
President
Hosni Mubarak
with Shaykh
Al-Azhar
Muhammad
Sayyid Tantawi,
7 July 1998
Notes
1. For an interesting portrait of Dr. Tantawi as Mufti of Dar al-Ifta, before his
appointment as Shaykh al-Azhar, see J. Skovgaard-Petersen, Defining Islam for
the Egyptian State (Leiden: Brill, 1997).
2. Al-Sharq al-Awsat, March 15, 2002.
3. It is not unusual that al-Azhar gives an official opinion on matters related to other
Muslim communities. In fact, the Azhar Law of 1961 addresses explicitly its pan-
Arab and pan-Islamic will.
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During perestroika, after a moment’s
hesitation, President Gorbachev decid-
ed to depart from the antireligious
policies of the Soviet regime and to lib-
eralize religion. With the indepen-
dence of the republics of Central Asia
in 1991 believers and those in power
had to re-determine the relation be-
tween religion and state, individual
and national identity. Since then these
newly independent States have to
manage Islam, as the majority religion,
in the context of an increasing reli-
gious diversity which mainly consists
of Christian denominations. Each pres-
ident in the area has demonstrated to the popula-
tion—and foreign countries—the desire to grant
religion sufficient space in public life. New images
of liberal religious policies are all the more neces-
sary because four of the five presidents that are
heir to the former Soviet republics were actually
apparatchiks of the former Communist Party. All
of them went on pilgrimage to Mecca. The presi-
dents of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, Niazov
and Karimov, even encouraged, just after inde-
pendence, the presence of foreign Muslim mis-
sionaries in their respective republics. Moreover,
Karimov came into office by taking his oath on
the Quran.
However, at the same time, new legislation in
the republics forbids attempts to incite religious
antagonism. No constitutional or legislative
specificity links up with any religion or denomina-
tion. None of the constitutions include references
to “Quran,” “Islam,” “Muslim” or “Christian” and
“Christianity.” Each state champions, in principle,
the separation of state and religion. This secular-
ism appears to be aimed at avoiding favouring
Islam and ostracizing religious minorities, in par-
ticular, Christian.
In spite of the display of religious freedom, po-
litical authorities are, in fact, trying to control reli-
gious movements in order to prevent them from
getting actively involved in politics. After the So-
viet attempt to divorce religion from the society,
the present authorities fear that religious inclina-
tions of the population could evolve, in the
framework of the state-nation building, toward a politicization of cer-
tain religious—and especially Muslim—movements. Consequently, all
governments have very firmly opposed political Muslim movements,
which are accordingly branded “extremist.” Any movement that chal-
lenges secularism is prohibited and generally labelled as being “Wah-
habi.” Moreover, each of the post-Soviet presidents promotes the ideal
of the peaceful coexistence of Muslims and Christians in Central Asia.
In official parlance, possible differentiation within society does not fol-
low from religious variation but rather from divergent regional and na-
tionalistic schemes.
Religion, nevertheless, was offered new
opportunities by perestroika and inde-
pendence. Muslims were able to reorga-
nize the networks of mosques, shrines
and religious schools that had been sup-
pressed from the 1920s onwards. In the
span of a few years, not only did Islam
get a wider visibility, both in urban and
in rural areas, but so did Christianity, the
second largest religion in Central Asia.
Many Christian—Orthodox, but also
Catholic and Protestant (Lutheran, Bap-
tist, Adventist, Pentecostal, Jehovah wit-
nesses etc.)—prayer houses and church-
es were reopened or newly built. 
Religious revival is clearly manifest in the activities of particular Christ-
ian—especially Protestant—movements, which were prohibited dur-
ing the Soviet Regime, such as the Charismatic and Presbyterian
Churches, and Jehovah’s Witness which are now involved in active
proselytization. The local population has become the target of such
Christian missionary movements; and the missionaries believe that
their call appeals to the public because the latter tend to practice a tol-
erant and traditional type of Islam, often without any theological
grounding.
Christian proselytizing
The emergence of new and active proselytizing religious groups has
caused great unease among the two main religious communities of
Central Asia, Muslim and Orthodox. Their responses were essentially
aimed at Protestant movements and, in a lesser measure, the Catholic
Church. The quick expansion of foreign Christian missions and the
conversions of locals to various Protestant denominations aroused
some hostile reactions from the Muslim clergy who deem that the na-
tive population must remain de facto Muslim. They declare their re-
spect for Christianity, but oppose Christian groups whose proselytiz-
ing activities are too potent. In 1994, the mufti of Tajikistan affirmed
his respect for biblical texts; but he added that it is intolerable that a
Muslim apostatizes and converts to another religion.1 The press in
Central Asia frequently features Muslim representatives who are hos-
tile towards “these too smiling guests whose essential goal is to divide
the Muslim people.”2 Resentment against Protestant missionary
movements is present not only in countries like Tajikistan and Uzbek-
istan where Islamic movements are energetic, but also in Kyrgyzstan
where the Christian missionaries are more active. Petitions were
signed in Kyrgyz mosques, expressing opposition to, not only new, re-
ligious movements like the Moon movement, but to all Protestant de-
nominations. Such protests are reported at the official level: in Uzbek-
istan, the president of the Council for Religious Affairs declared in
1994: “All these things are alien to our people and of course annoy the
Moslems. If we do not take some decisive measures, a lot of blood
might flow.” 3 Many Muslim representatives, therefore, propose a strict
distinction between autochthonous groups who are considered as
Muslim and Europeans who can be Christian. Several violent alterca-
tions have already occurred in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and especially
in Tajikistan, where protestant Churches and even the Orthodox
Church were bombed in Dushanbe.
Islam, Society & the State
Perestroika, followed by independence,
offered Central Asian republics of the Soviet
Union religious freedom. Several Christian—
especially Protestant—organizations
developed missionary projects and
established new churches. Representatives of
“local” religions, Islam as well as, Russian
Orthodoxy, have allied to put pressure on
governments in order to curb proselytizing
and restrict religious conversion. While it is
difficult to ignore the claims put forward by
the main religious communities, most
governments tolerate the growth of religious
diversity, albeit at varying degrees. 
Religious Diversity 
in Post-Soviet
Central Asia
…the missionaries
believe that their call
appeals to the public
because the latter
tend to practice a
tolerant and
traditional type of
Islam, often without
any theological
grounding.
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The Muslim and Russian Orthodox alliance
The Russian Orthodox Church has lost many of its believers to new
Protestant denominations. Consequently, the Orthodox Church strong-
ly questions the legitimacy of what it considers as “foreign” and “non-
traditional” Churches. The link between nationality/locality and Russ-
ian Orthodoxy is accentuated by the notion of canonical territory, a no-
tion which concerns, according to Orthodoxy, the entire Post-Soviet
space: because of the historical precedence over all other Churches
today present in former Soviet Union, Orthodoxy has the right of pre-
eminence on the entire region. Claiming that national stability is
threatened by the proselytization of so-called foreign denominations,
Orthodox authorities try to polarize the religious spectrum around an
Orthodoxy-Islam axis. “In Central Asia and in Russia, there is a natural
distribution of influence between the two main religions, Orthodoxy
and Islam, and no one will destroy this harmony.”4 The Orthodox hier-
archy in Central Asia continues to stress its mutual understanding with
Islam and asserts that “Islam is closer to Orthodoxy than all other Chris-
tian denominations.” 5
Even though the Orthodox Church does not regret the downfall of
the Soviet regime, it regularly complains that the former Soviet re-
publics “…today blindly copy the West and the freedom of expression
and authorize everything and everybody.” Newspapers and especially
the local Orthodox journals,6 regularly criticize the missionary move-
ments, “whose discourses are alien both to Orthodox and Muslims.”7
The Orthodox Church is thus endeavouring to counter the current evo-
lution of Central Asia—which is more criticized for its “Occidentalism”
than for its indigenization—in the name of the protection of the na-
tional and indigenous specificity. In each republic, the Orthodox and
Muslim hierarchies have allied to put pressure on the government in
order to counter the Western missionary activities.
Official responses
The Muslim and Orthodox responses to proselytizing Protestant
groups have a significant influence on the political authorities and
have led several republics to question the principle of religious liberty.
In Turkmenistan, a new law was passed in 1995 that requires the reli-
gious communities to gather 500 signatures in order to obtain the
compulsory registration. Considering the small number of representa-
tives of national minorities, except Russians (the majority of Poles and
Germans have left the country), most Christian movements fail to meet
these conditions, even in the capital Achkhabad, and have been, thus,
forced underground. President Niazov has divided the religious spec-
trum into two distinct units: a Turkmen is supposed to be a Muslim
while a European an Orthodox. An Orthodox is not allowed to convert
a Turkmen to Christianity and a Muslim should not convert a Russian
(European) to Islam. A virulent religious activism may cause the gov-
ernment to take radical measures: some preachers have been sent to
jail, several churches have been closed, and the Adventists’ church in
Achkhabad was demolished in 1999. Protestant movements undergo
permanent administrative and police pressures, in contrast to the
Russian Orthodox Church and the Catholic Church. The latter has in
Achkhabad a Vatican diplomatic representation that is mainly fre-
quented by expatriates.
In Uzbekistan, new legislation passed in 1998 requires religious com-
munities to apply for a new registration and to collect 100 signatures.
This new policy implies a policy of suppression of Christian communi-
ties located outside Tashkent and large cities, except for the Orthodox,
the main Protestant and Catholic communities. However, important
minority communities are still present on the Uzbek territory: although
proselytization is forbidden, Protestant denominations remain present
and active. Some believers who engaged in missionary work have been
jailed for several years. In Kazakhstan, legislation on religion has been
drafted, but none has been confirmed. In 1998 a concordat was signed
between the Kazakh State and the Vatican that grants the Catholic
Church official status. Meanwhile, it then ignores pressures that sever-
al Protestant movements undergo, despite the formal equality of all
confessions before the law.
Religious disagreement is much more apparent within the Christian
realm than between Islam and Christianity. Among the five States in
the area, Kazakhstan—and to a lesser degree Kyrgyzstan—has given
several Churches equal status and does not recognize any special
rights of Orthodoxy, as is the case in some Slavic and Caucasian re-
publics.
The political authorities do not fear Christianity as such, but rather the
religious pluralism it implies, as well as some of its numerous active
missionary movements. Besides, Islamic movements face similar diffi-
culties: in 1997, the president of Uzbekistan, Islam Karimov, declared
that Muslim fundamentalists “destroy the stability, the civil and ethnic
harmony, discredit the democracy, the secular state, and the multina-
tional and multi-confessional society.”8 Several campaigns have led to
multiple extra-judicial measures that range from the disappearance of
suspected militants to the exclusion from universities of students. Such
measures have occured in all five republics, but with a particular vigour
in Uzbekistan, which is considered as a meeting place of Islamic mili-
tancy. Although Islam is always presented as the “national” and “natur-
al” religion of autochthonous populations, Muslims do not enjoy more
rights than adherents of any Christian denomination.
The appearance of new religious movements along with the renewal
of religious activities contributes to the notion of religious revival in
Central Asia, as elsewhere in the former Soviet Union. However, this
phenomenon should be viewed cautiously because the fall of commu-
nism has not given rise to a proliferation of mass religious movements.
On the one hand, despite all the measures taken against religion dur-
ing the Soviet regime, the state never managed to entirely eliminate
religion. Islam and Christianity have widely persisted in more or less of-
ficial or clandestine ways. On the other hand, the present political es-
tablishment has discouraged the proliferation of religious movements,
in particular those judged to be too activist and “foreign,” fearing that
an increased religious diversity may destabilize the new states of Cen-
tral Asia.
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The postcolonial African state is a weak
institutional structure, deficient in many
respects—in structural capacity, in the
legitimacy of authority, (and of course,
in economic performance). There is a
wide margin of difference between
states, from the relatively successful
Ghana or Uganda to disaster cases
such as Sierra Leone, but there is also a
point in common. The African state has
not inspired an intense loyalty; it has not been loved by its citizens. It
was in origin an alien imposition, the creation of European colonial rule
at the end of the nineteenth century, and a conquest state. That state
is still there now, the same territorial frontiers, the same capital cities,
even if the performance of state institutions has been weakened by
corruption and predation, as some see it by patron-client politics. And
the idea of a secular state, standing aside from religious identification,
is itself a colonial legacy, again a legacy that is still there. The state may
for the most part not be loved, there is no intense national commit-
ment, but there is also more of emotional involvement in the African
state than at first appears.
State and religion: symbiotic relations
How do the citizens imagine the state? How do the people imagine
power? The state has no surer foundations than are to be found in the
people’s imagination of authority, the symbolic language of power. The
colonial governments of Africa indirectly recognised as much when
they chose to rule through chiefly intermediaries, through chiefs who
had their own symbolic capital. Thus the European rulers could have le-
gitimacy at second hand. Postcolonial African rulers can do some of the
same with the chiefs, but in looking for a symbolic language for state
authority they have turned to the markers of religious devotion. The
holy symbols are the respected symbols, indices of devotion, of love.
Thus the postcolonial state can hope to borrow a little of its own sec-
ond-hand legitimacy, pilfered from the pious. Power in Africa is often
imagined to be of other-worldly origin, rulers can usefully suggest a re-
ligious mystique to themselves; they know where to look for the sym-
bols. Given the religious diversity of Africa, between Islam, Christianity,
and religions of African origin, they
have plenty of symbols from which to
choose. Islam and Christianity each
have their hierarchical structures of de-
votional authority, their shrines to give
a geographical focus to devotion; West
African voodoo too has its shrines, and
each of the three religious forms has its
powerfully loaded symbolic language,
a language loaded with the symbols of
power. So the state has every interest in doing political business with
the religious, however secular it may proclaim itself to be. The religious
return that interest, the state remaining the fount of resources of many
kinds, including those of symbolic endorsement.
The secular self-identification of the state in Africa is however no
mere convenient fiction. The state may borrow or pilfer from the reli-
gious in its search for symbolic authority, but it also really does have a
fundamental interest in staying secular, and in being perceived so to
do. The diversity of African religiosity means that the state stands aside
from religion in the interest of its own unity. And this basic logic still
applies where the majority of the population is Muslim, as in Senegal
where 90% of the population is Muslim but the Muslims are divided
into a number of rival Sufi orders. Sufis cherish their differences, their
devotional particularities, and in a secular state they find an authority
which respects those particularities. An “Islamic state,” the project of
an activist minority, is likely to be a great deal less tolerant of devo-
tional particularity and much more intrusive in spelling out the detail
of correct Islamic practice. And who is to be in charge of an Islamic
state? Muslims are divided in many ways: in Sufi orders, in sects, in rival
ethnicities or racial categories, and in rival schools of thought. Only a
charismatic leadership could hold such diversity together, an Islamic
Leninism, and charisma as we know does not last.
Love transactions
So back to the secular state, a state that knows how to mind its own
business, to respect devotional diversity. In giving that respect, in its
symbolic recognition of the differently devout, the state may begin in
return to win that warmth of popular respect which it so badly needs.
The state has an interest in the differ-
ences, the interest of its own indis-
pensability; and the differences have
an interest in the state, the interest of
their own preservation. But more than
interest may be involved here; as the
state does its pilgrimages to the differ-
ent holy places, be present for the holy
occasions, it begins to be recognised
not only as a valuable witness but as
“our” state, a possible object of love.
Love too is a transaction, and the
African state need not be so wholly
bereft.
Islam, Society & the State
Postcolonial Africa has witnessed problematic
processes of nation and state building, but in
general the state structures as designed in
late-colonial and early independence endure,
including their secular orientation. 
A major challenge for the state in Africa is to
advance its respect for devotional diversity,
because the secular state has an interest in
religious diversity. 
African Muslims and
the Secular State
Donal B. Cruise O’Brien is Professor of Political
Studies, School of Oriental and African Studies,
University of London. His most recent book is,
Symbolic Confrontations: Muslims Imagining
the State in Africa. London: Hurst and Co.;
New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003.
E-mail: bp@soas.ac.uk
The State
as Devil,
painting by
Alexis Ngom,
Dakar, 1970
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Islam, Society & the State
The Islamic Hospital in Amman is the
jewel in the Islamic Centre Charity So-
ciety’s crown. It is an important symbol
of the viability of the Islamist model for
the Muslim Brotherhood that estab-
lished it. In keeping with its stated phil-
anthropic aims, the prices listed at the
hospital are significantly lower than at
other hospitals. The cost of a natural
childbirth delivery is only 15 Jordanian
Dinars (JD) compared to 18 JD at the al-
Bashir Hospital, a public hospital for
the poor, and over 200 JD at the Farah
Hospital, considered the finest private
hospital in Jordan. Furthermore, the
hospital’s Fund for the Sick and Poor provides subsidies for medical
treatments; in 2002 alone it distributed a remarkable 4.5 million JD.1
These statistics appear to support the widely held image of Islamic
charitable and social welfare associations as targeting the poor with
the aim of recruiting them. The authenticity of this image of philan-
thropy combined with recruitment of the poor has largely gone un-
questioned. 
Due to their operational and instrumental dictates, Islamic associa-
tions are largely run by and for the middle class and not the poor. Is-
lamic associations’ services are driven by the associations' needs for
donations and professionals, the demands of the professional middle
class for employment, good schools and hospitals, and the response of
the Brotherhood to its predominantly middle-class constituency. As a
result, they forge strong middle-class networks. Rather than the re-
cruitment of the poor, the activities of such associations directly and
indirectly contribute to the expansion and strengthening of middle-
class ties of solidarity that reinforce an Islamist worldview and bind Is-
lamists, non-Islamists, and the institutions of the Islamist movement.
Islamic associations and the middle-classes
The ICCS, and particularly the Islamic Hospital, is a case in point. The
Brotherhood in Jordan is largely a professional middle-class phenome-
non.2 This is reflected in the ICCS’ services. Of the ICCS’ forty kinder-
gartens and schools, one college, two hospitals, thirty-two medical
clinics, six training centres, and thirty-three centres for orphans and
poor families, its largest facilities –the kindergartens, schools, college,
and hospitals—are all not-for-profit enterprises that are commercial-
like in that they target a paying middle-class clientele and not the poor. 
A second look at the Islamic Hospital’s prices reveals its middle-class
bias. While the base cost of a delivery is 15 JD, the hospital charges sep-
arately for each additional service and tacks on the costs to the original
base fee. The result is that the delivery of one child with no complica-
tions, and with one overnight stay in a third-class room actually costs
190 JD. Patients without medical insurance are charged an extra 20%
of the costs. The hospital’s Fund for the Sick and Poor subsidizes up to
20% of the costs for poor patients thereby reducing the cost of a deliv-
ery to 152 JD. Jordan’s poor, however, spend 15.88 JD or less per year
on medical expenses.3 The hospital is simply beyond their means. And
the same can be said for the ICCS’ private kindergartens, schools and
college.
The ICCS not only targets a middle-class constituency as its clientele,
but for employment purposes as well. The Islamic Hospital alone has
approximately 12,000 employees, seventy-seven resident doctors,
twenty-one interns, and 445 nurses.4 The ICCS employs thousands of
people—mainly professionals who are attracted by handsome pay, full
benefits, and excellent equipment. Furthermore, hiring for the ICCS’
private enterprises is prioritized over hiring for those facilities meant
for the poor. While approximately 200
doctors (including residents and in-
terns, but not part-time doctors) cater
to the needs of the hospital’s middle-
class clientele, only thirty-two doctors
in total tend to the poor in the ICCS’
medical clinics. Three of these clinics,
moreover, are located in the ICCS’ pri-
vate schools.
It is not surprising that ICCS centres
are predominantly situated in the mid-
dle-class neighbourhoods of Amman
and Zarqa. Here the ICCS finds middle-
class clients, employees, and also
donors. The very fabric of the ICCS is
made up of the ongoing development and maintenance of middle-
class social networks—interpersonal ties that are constantly being cre-
ated and/or solidified in order to secure the donations and staff the as-
sociation requires. ICCS directors make individual appeals for dona-
tions of money, services or items to neighbours, friends, colleagues,
and merchants. In this manner, overlapping networks between the
home, mosque, workplace, and other associations make the ICCS pos-
sible. These networks include individuals who may only donate once
per year, those looking for an extra income, those wanting to fulfil a
personal Muslim obligation, and more committed Islamists.
My research found that donating to, volunteering, and working in Is-
lamic associations gradually creates middle-class networks of team-
work, trust, and solidarity. These are reinforced by the benefits the
middle-class receives—jobs, educational and health services, a sense
of purpose, and friendships. Furthermore, by bringing different social
networks together in the provision of charity, Islamic associations cre-
ate new social networks and introduce Islamist networks and world-
views to non-Islamists. 
Do Islamic associations recruit the middle-class? The provision of
health care does not directly lead to recruitment. Rather the creation
and strengthening of intricate social networks indirectly binds their
middle-class members ever closer to Islamist movements. The ques-
tion to be asked is whether this focus on the middle class has alienated
others. 
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To what extent are Islamic associations
vehicles for recruitment for Islamist
movements? Whom do they recruit? How does
recruitment occur? Does the mere provision of
health care suffice as a basis for recruitment?
Can we assume that all those who work and
volunteer in Islamic associations are Islamists
with a political agenda? These represent some
of the questions that motivated research in
Jordan in 1998 to examine the political
significance of the Islamic Centre Charity
Society (ICCS) as part of a larger comparative
study of Islamic associations in Jordan,
Yemen, and Egypt. 
Islamic Associations
and the Middle Class
Janine A. Clark is Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, University of
Guelph in Ontario, Canada. She is the author of Islam, Charity and Activism: Middle-
Class Networks and Social Welfare in Egypt, Jordan and Yemen (Bloomington, USA:
Indiana University Press, 2004).
E-mail: janine.clark@sympatico.ca
Notes
1. Interview with Ra’if Nijim, former Director of the Fund for the Sick and Poor,
Amman, Jordan, August 10 2002.
2. For example, of the 353 founders of the Islamic Action Front, the Muslim
Brotherhood’s political party, 37.7% were professionals: 24 university professors;
26 physicians; 22 engineers; 16 pharmacists; 25 lawyers; 17 managers; 3 journalists.
This excludes business people and salaried employees. See Ahmad Jamil Azm,
“The Islamic Action Front Party,” in Islamic Movements in Jordan, ed. Hani Hourani
(Amman: Al-Urdun Al-Jadid Research Centre, 1997), 101-103.
3. World Bank, Population and Human Resources Operations Division, Country
Department II, Middle East and North Africa Region, Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan:
Poverty Assessment, vol. 1, Main Report, Report no. 12675-JO (Washington, D.C.:
World Bank, 1994), 12, 167.
4. E-mail communication from the medical director, Islamic Hospital, July 18, 2001.
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Workshop:
“Rights at Home” Advanced Training
The training will be a hands-on, interactive
experience that will bring the best in
international human rights perspectives,
interactive skills transfer, and Muslim legal
theory in context. The training aims to focus
on actual experiences of women and
children in Muslim societies. 
Date: 23 June – 8 July 2004
Venue: Zahlé, Lebanon
Organizers: “Rights at Home” Project/ ISIM,
Sahiba Sisters Foundation, Tanzania, SIS
Forum Malaysia.
Sponsor: Dutch Foreign Ministry
Round table:
The Islamic Resurgence in Southeast
Asia
Round table discussion at the European
Association for South-East Asian Studies
(EUROSEAS) Conference 2004
Date: 2 September 2004
Venue: University of Paris: Sorbonne Centre,
Paris, France
Organizers: Rémy Madinier, Mathias Diederich
and Martin van Bruinessen
Inaugural Lecture:
Prof. Abdulkader Tayob
Reading Religion and the Religious
in Modern Islam
Date: 10 September 2004, 15:45 hrs
Venue: University of Nijmegen: Aula,
Comeniuslaan 2, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
Conference:
Islam and Public Life in Africa
Religious discourses are an inescapable facet
of public life in Africa. Islamic discourses,
being no exception, reflect varying local and
global, social and political contexts.
The conference aims to build on previous
meetings supported by ISIM on mapping
the experiences of Muslim societies in
different contexts.
Date: 10–13 September 2004
Venue: Conference Centre Holthurnsche Hof,
Berg en Dal, The Netherlands
Workshop:
Islam and Modernity
Workshop in preparation of a book of
readings.
Date: 29–30 September 2004
Venue: University of Leiden: Not open to
the Public
Convenors: Muhammad Khalid Masud,
Armando Salvatore, Martin van Bruinessen
and David Waines
ISIM at MESA 2004
The ISIM supports three panels at the 2004
Annual Conference of the Middle East
Studies Association of North America (MESA)
See elsewhere on this page for a detailed
description of the respective panels. 
Date: 20–23 November 2004
Venue: San Francisco, United States of America
ISIM Annual Lecture 2004:
Lecture by Prof. Lila Abu-Lughod
Date: 17 December 2004, 16:00 hrs
Venue: Utrecht University: Utrecht,
The Netherlands
For more information on these and other ISIM Events please
consult the ISIM website or contact the ISIM Secretariat:
Tel: +31 71 527 7905
Fax: +31 71 527 7906
E-mail: info@isim.nl
www.isim.nl
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The ISIM supports three panels at the 2004 Annual
Conference of the Middle East Studies Association
of North America (MESA),
(http://fp.arizona.edu/mesassoc/index.html), 
San Francisco, 20 – 23 November 2004. 
Cultural Politics of Muslim Youths in the Middle
East (P007)
Organized by: Asef Bayat
Chair/Discussant: Shahnaz Rouse, Sarah Lawrence
College
– Asef Bayat, ISIM/Leiden University
Subversive Accommodation: The Cultural Politics of
Youths in Iran
– Ayse Saktanber, Middle East Technical University
Negotiating Muslim Identity and Youthfulness:
The Cultural Dilemma of Muslim Youth in Turkey
– Linda Herrera, ISIM/Leiden University
Cultural Agency of Youth: Negotiating Morality
in Egyptian Education
– Mounia Bennani-Chraibi, IEPI University of Lausanne
Moroccan Youth and Religion
– Nikola Tietze, Hamburger Institut Fur Sozialforschung
Young Muslims in France and Germany:
Youthfulness, Religiosity and Recognition
The Cultural Politics of Dress and Fashion
(P092)
Organized by: Annelies Moors
Chair: Annelies Moors, ISIM/University of Amsterdam
– Jeni Allenby, Palestine Costume Archive
Re-inventing Cultural Heritage: Palestinian Traditional
Costume and Embroidery since 1948
– Annelies Moors, ISIM/University of Amsterdam
Islam and Fashion on the Streets of San’a, Yemen
– Alex Balasescu, UCI/EHESS
Time, Space, Dress, Fashion and Aesthetic Authority in
Tehran
Educating Imams (P037)
Organized by: Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad and Thijl Sunier
Chair: Thijl Sunier, University of Amsterdam
Discussant: Martin Van Bruinessen, ISIM/Utrecht
University
– Jonathan Birt, Islamic Foundation
The ‘Ulama, the Literate Masses and the Search
for Authentic Islam in an Age of Disembodied
Knowledge
– Frank Peter, ISIM
Training Imams in French Islam
– Nico Landman, Utrecht University
Islamic Higher Education in the Netherlands on
the Crossroads of Academic Traditions
– Jane Smith, Hartford Seminary
Training Muslims for Chaplaincy at Hartford Seminary
– Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad, Georgetown University
Imam Training: Is American Paranoia Justified?
The ISIM invites applications and research proposals for its various programmes.
Applications from candidates in anthropology, sociology, religious studies, cultural studies
and political studies will be considered. Applicants should be competent in academic English. 
The ISIM fellowships and their respective application deadlines are as follows:
– Ph.D. fellowships (1 September 2004 and 1 March 2005)
– Post-doctoral fellowships (1 September 2004 and 1 March 2005)
– Visiting fellowships (1 September 2004 and 1 March 2005)
– Sabbatical fellowships (1 September 2004 and 1 March 2005)
For more information on the various fellowships and for application forms, please consult www.isim.nl.
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ISIM/Workshop
In 1975 the Turkish politician Necmettin
Erbakan published a manifesto that he
gave the title Millî Görüs¸, “The National
Vision.” It dealt only in the most general
terms with moral and religious educa-
tion but devoted much attention to in-
dustrialization, development, and eco-
nomic independence. It warned against
further rapprochement towards Europe,
considering the Common Market to be
a Zionist and Catholic project for the assimilation and de-Islamization of
Turkey, and called instead for closer economic co-operation with Muslim
countries. The name of Millî Görüs¸ would remain associated with a reli-
gio-political movement and a series of Islamist parties inspired by Mr. Er-
bakan, one succeeding the other as they were banned for violating
Turkey’s laik legislation. Following the ban of the Virtue (Fazilet) Party, a
rift that had been developing in the movement resulted in two parties
taking its place, the Felicity (Saadet) Party representing Erbakan’s old
guard, and the Justice and Development (AK) Party led by younger and
more pragmatic politicians around Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who claimed
to have renounced on a specifically Islamist agenda. The AK Party con-
vincingly won the 2002 elections and formed a government with a
strong popular mandate that brought Turkey closer to acceptance for
membership in the European Union than any previous government had
done. 
Among the Turkish immigrants in Western Europe, Millî Görüs¸ became
one of the major, if not the major, religious movement, controlling nu-
merous mosques. Like the movement in Turkey, it went through some
remarkable changes, not least because the first generation, which was
strongly oriented towards what happened in Turkey, is gradually surren-
dering leadership to a younger generation that grew up in Europe and is
concerned with entirely different matters. Millî Görüs¸’ public profile
shows considerable differences from one country to the next, suggest-
ing that the nature of the interaction with “host” societies may have as
much of an impact on its character as a religious movement as the rela-
tionship with the “mother” movement in Turkey. This is a strong argu-
ment for studying this and similar movements in comparative perspec-
tive and taking the context of the “host” societies explicitly into account. 
The participants presented, in roughly
equal measure, work in progress, com-
pleted research, and new projects in the
initial stages. Nico Landman (Utrecht
University) had studied the evolution of
mosque and mosque communities in
the Netherlands; Thijl Sunier (University
of Amsterdam) Turkish youth and Mus-
lim organizations in Rotterdam; Kadir
Canatan (Islamic University of Rotter-
dam) shifts in religious leadership among Turkish Muslims in the
Netherlands; Nikola Tietze (Institute of Social Sciences, Hamburg) pat-
terns of religiosity and group identity among young Turkish men in
Germany and France; and Levent Tezcan (University of Bielefeld) polit-
ical symbolism and collective presentations in the Millî Görüs¸ commu-
nity. Four participants are carrying out relevant Ph.D. research projects.
Meryem Kanmaz (University of Gent) and Welmoet Boender (ISIM) are
studying Turkish and Moroccan imams and mosque congregations in
Belgium and the Netherlands respectively, and both found Millî Görüs¸
mosques to be involved in a wider range of social activities than others.
Ahmet Yükleyen (Boston University and ISIM) studies communication
within Turkish Islamic associations in the Netherlands and Germany
and between these associations and state organs. Sarah Bracke com-
pares Millî Görüs¸ women’s groups with “fundamentalist” women in
Protestant and Orthodox Christian contexts, in a study of resistance to
secularization. 
Gerdien Jonker (Marburg) and Werner Schiffauer (University of
Frankfurt/Oder) presented two new research projects in which Alev
Masarwa (University of Münster) and Levent Tezcan will also be in-
volved. Schiffauer and Tezcan will focus on the young generation and
the dilemmas they face in their attempts to change Millî Görüs¸ without
alienating their elders. Rising young leaders are aware that much in the
discourse of the first generation, understandable in the Turkish con-
text, offends the sensitivities of German society and is irrelevant to
many young Turks, but they have none of the charisma of the older
guard of leaders. Jonker and Masarwa will take part in a larger project
on adaptations between German law and Islam. Masarwa will compare
Millî Görüs¸ muftis in a German and a Turkish town; Jonker will be study-
ing how Millî Görüs¸ defines its religious
identity through court cases. Two board
members of the Northern Netherlands
federation of Millî Görüs¸, Haci Karacaer
and Üzeyir Kabaktepe, took part in the
discussions and commented on the re-
searchers conclusions and hypotheses.
Discussion among the participants sug-
gested that different European societies
impose different ways of asserting Mus-
lim identity: in Germany, the court of
law is a major arena of communication;
in the Netherlands, there is a perma-
nent process of negotiation and grad-
ual adaptation; and in France, Muslims
position themselves more assertively in
debates in the public sphere. 
M A R T I N  V A N  B R U I N E S S E N
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ISIM, in co-operation with Gerdien Jonker
(Marburg University), held a workshop on
9 January 2004 to take stock of previous
research on the Turkish religious movement
Millî Görüs (“The National Vision”) in Western
Europe. The workshop brought together
scholars from Germany, the Netherlands,
Belgium, and France, whose research was at
least in part concerned with this movement. 
Millî Görüs¸
in Western Europe
Martin van Bruinessen holds the ISIM Chair
at Utrecht University.M
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It is likely that for at least the next twen-
ty years Saudi Arabia will retain (and in-
deed increase) its central importance as
a supplier of energy to the world econ-
omy. Hence the US and the industrial-
ized world will maintain a strong inter-
est in the country. But it will probably
be Asia that will see the biggest growth
in imports of hydrocarbons, and in-
creasingly also petrochemicals, from
the Kingdom. Even so, the balance be-
tween resources and demands within
Saudi Arabia will remain under heavy
pressure, as population growth will
outstrip the growth in revenues. In this
context, the cost of the large royal fam-
ily (some 7000 princes) is also attracting some criticism within the coun-
try; it is unclear whether Crown Prince Abdallah’s awareness of this
issue will lead it to be addressed effectively.
The most serious problem for the economy and for the longstanding
“social contract” between the regime and society, is the question of
employment. The economy is simply not generat-
ing sufficient jobs for the growing number of
young people. If this could be bridged, the coun-
try would theoretically be in a good economic po-
sition. Hence is the crucial importance of eco-
nomic reform and diversification, and of the role
of the private sector. Saudi Arabia remains in
many respects a rentier economy, and largely
also a rentier polity, with the peculiar social con-
tract that comes with this. Nevertheless, the pri-
vate sector does appear to have acquired a de-
gree of autonomy, and increasingly produces
“added value” rather than merely resting on sub-
sidised activity. This is also true for a state-owned
concern such as SABIC (Saudi Arabian Basic In-
dustries Corporation), which in fact functions
very much with a market-oriented business
ethos. The business community (of perhaps
200,000 people) has, in this context of greater au-
tonomy, also developed a greater desire for polit-
ical participation. But this does not mean a com-
mitment to whole-scale democratic reform; they
have little enthusiasm for the kind of political re-
form that would hand the levers of power to the
more radical, anti-Western Islamist strands in so-
ciety.
A different problem relates to the traditionally
large amount of military spending. Judging by
the evidence of the past two years, however,
giant weapons acquisition programmes seem to
be a thing of the past (the only such project still
running its course is the al-Yamamah project with
Britain).
Notwithstanding the reported tensions in US-
Saudi relations since 9/11, the two governments
remain mutually interested in safeguarding a
healthy world economy, a predictable supply of
energy at stable prices, and the survival of the
Saudi regime. This does not mean there may not be serious friction, or
that some in the US will not question certain aspects of the relation-
ship. While there have been several earlier periods of friction that were
overcome, this time the Cold War context within which Saudi-US rela-
tions developed ever since 1945, and from which much of the current
Kingdom’s strategic and ideological importance derived, is absent. A
real rupture, however, seems unlikely, although actors on both sides
will need to tread carefully if further complications are to be avoided. 
Political stability and
religious reform
On another note, the alliance be-
tween the Al Saud and the Wahhabi
ulama which has long been part and
parcel of the Saudi system has been
showing some evidence of strain. Yet
“Wahhabism” is itself not monolithic,
either in theory or in practice. On prin-
ciple, however, the ulama have gener-
ally upheld the need to support an ef-
fective ruler rather than risk chaos.
Hence, even where there is disagree-
ment with the Al Saud, this has not
been pushed so far as to turn main-
stream ulama into a stance of real op-
position. Yet other, newer strands have emerged, consisting of
younger, more radical ulama, and especially also non-ulama who now
claim religious expertise and who are accepted as such by parts of the
population. And this strand has indeed, with various degrees of radi-
calism, expressed some form of opposition. Yet two trends need to be
set against this. The first is that the Al Saud have been exceptionally
good at co-opting opposition voices—most recently by bringing on-
side prominent figures among the critical ulama, once the latter had
condemned the bombings in the country after 9/11. Secondly, there is
the fledgling development of a new more liberal type of Islamism, with
Saudi intellectuals beginning to think outside the “Wahhabi” context
altogether. A significant move has also been effected with the Nation-
al Dialogue, under the auspices of the Crown Prince: it is not just that
questions once deemed too sensitive to touch (such as the role of
women) are now being discussed; the very composition of the Dialogue
is telling. Indeed, the presence of a variety of groups, strikingly includ-
ing Shia religious scholars, legitimates both their role and the principle
of pluralist dialogue—thus in effect breaking the long-held Wahhabi
endorsed principle that only their school had a legitimate voice. 
Whether and how this mix of older and more fledgling trends might
lead to the sorts of reforms that would assure long-term political and
economic success remains an open question. The pressures from pop-
ulation growth, globalization, and bottom-up demands for reform are
palpable—but they are neither translated into common views by dif-
ferent parts of the Saudi public, nor, as yet, responded to effectively by
the Al Saud and its own internal constituencies.
ISIM/Workshop
From 19-21 February 2003 ISIM hosted
a workshop, Saudi Futures. Paul Aarts
(University of Amsterdam) and Gerd
Nonneman (Lancaster University, UK) brought
a group of experts from around the world,
together with a number of Saudi
commentators and observers representing
a wide spectrum of opinion. The workshop
was also sponsored by the Dutch Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, Lancaster University and the
Mediterranean Programme of the European
University Institute. Topics for discussion
included trends in Saudi politics, society,
economy and international relations in
the post-9/11 and post-Iraq War era. 
Saudi Futures
Gerd Nonneman, Reader in International Relations and Middle East Politics at Lancaster
University. 
E-mail: g.nonneman@lancaster.ac.uk
The convenors plan to publish the findings of the conference in an edited book.
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sensitive to touch
…are now being
discussed… thus in
effect breaking the
long-held Wahhabi
endorsed principle
that only their
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ISIM/Conference
The main objective of the conference
was to explore the relationship be-
tween social and cultural institutions
and religious practices in contempo-
rary West African Societies. Twenty pa-
pers were presented covering a wide
spectrum of topics and countries. The
conference participants debated pub-
lic policies, dress codes, sharia, and
gender issues. 
The first keynote address was deliv-
ered by Prof. J.K. Olupona who empha-
sized the need for a clear-cut methodology for the academic study of
various religious traditions. He pointed out that thematic studies of re-
ligious traditions, rather than studies on particular faiths, would bring
the field further. He also advocated that religious leaders play a role in
not only bringing about a democratic renaissance in West Africa, but
that they work towards sustaining these democracies. Desmond Tutu’s
role during the Apartheid and post-Apartheid political developments
in South Africa served as a case in point. He emphasized the urgent
need for religious leaders to be active in social issues such as corrup-
tion, indiscipline, abuse of power, and ensuring good governance and
rule of law.
Abdulkader Tayob brought to the fore the need to distinguish be-
tween a scholar of religion and a religious leader in another keynote
address. He was of the conviction that the two perform different roles
in society. He made it explicitly clear that, as a scholar of religion,
Desmond Tutu is not his role model. However, he was quick to add that
most participants will disagree with him. He dwelt on the problem of
Muslim representation in government. In Ghana for instance, there is
always the problem of which body represents Muslims at the national
political level. Currently, there is a struggle between the office of the
national Chief Imam (spiritual leader) and the Federation of Muslim
Councils, the legitimate mouthpiece for Sunni Muslims in dealings
with the government. He further dealt with the emergence of Islamic
reformist movements and the Islamic ideological debate about the
state. He is of the conviction that the Is-
lamic state has failed. 
Another theme that generated much
discussion was the dress code in some
Nigerian universities. Muslim female
students began wearing face veils,
leaving some university authorities
with the problem of identification of
female students during examinations
and official university activities. To
overcome the problem some universi-
ties came up with a dress code, part of
an attempt by university officials to curb the global renaissance of Is-
lamic movements; especially after the introduction of sharia in North-
ern Nigeria since the reintroduction of democracy. This development
was surprising to the Ghanaian participants because Ghanaian tertiary
female students prefer western fashion, which is seen to be incompat-
ible with the African culture. Yet, at the same time, there is also an up-
surge of the use of the veil by Muslim female students in the tertiary in-
stitutions in Ghana. 
The implementation, structures, and problems of sharia in Northern
Nigeria generated a great deal of discussion (presentations by Muu-
tasim Dawood and Lateef Mobolaji Adetona). Lateef argued that the
sharia was becoming an issue in the Southwest especially among the
Yoruba in Nigeria where independent sharia committees are emerging
under the supervision of the Supreme Council for sharia. Eventually
sharia law will be implemented at the federal level.
The conference was supported by the International Association for
the History of Religions (IAHR), the International Institute for the Study
of Islam in the Modern World (ISIM) Leiden, the University of California,
Davis and ICCO-Zest, the Netherlands. More than thirty scholars from
the Netherlands, the United States, Britain, Nigeria, the Gambia, and
Ghana, participated in the conference.
H A J J  M U M U N I  S U L E M A N A
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Religion and Transformation
in West Africa
Hajj Mumuni Sulemana, Department for the Study of Religions, University of Ghana.
The conference organizers plan to publish selected papers in an edited volume.
The African Association for the Study of
Religions (AASR) held a three-day regional
conference under the title, The Role of
Religion in the Socio-Cultural Transformation
of West African Sub-continent from the 5th–8th
February 2004 in Ghana at the Ghana Institute
for Management and Public Administration
(GIMPA). Among the topics covered were:
religion and the state; conflict and violence;
religion in contestation; religion as a source
of values; and the study of religion.
I S I M  P O S T - D O C T O R A L  F E L L O W S H I P S
The International Institute for the Study
of Islam in the Modern World (ISIM) invites
applications for ISIM post-doctoral
fellowships. The fellowships are available
to scholars who have recently (within five
years) obtained a Ph.D. degree in anthro-
pology, sociology, religious studies, cultural
studies or political science. 
The ISIM conducts and promotes inter-
disciplinary research on contemporary
social, political, cultural, and intellectual
trends and movements in Muslim societies
and communities. The ISIM welcomes
research proposals which are informed
particularly by a social science perspective
and fit in with the research profile of the
ISIM in general, or related to the specific
research programmes of the ISIM Chairs.
The current ISIM research programmes
and projects include: Islam, Civil Society,
and the Public Sphere; Muslim Cultural
Politics; Debating Family Dynamics and
Gender; Islamic Family Law in Everyday Life;
The Cultural Politics of Domestic Labor;
The Politics of Representation in Muslim
Societies; The Production of Islamic
Knowledge in Western Europe; Islam and
the Public Sphere in Africa; Religion, Culture
and Identity in a Democratic South Africa;
and Socio-Religious Movements and
Change in Muslim Societies.
ISIM post-doctoral fellowships are awarded
twice per year. The deadlines for
applications are 1 March and 1 September
of each year. 
ISIM post-doctoral fellowships at a glance:
– granted for a period two years
– monthly stipend 
– office space, a personal computer,
telephone on the premises of the ISIM
in Leiden
– travel expenses to and from the country
in which fieldwork will be carried out
Post-doctoral fellows are located in the
historic city of Leiden with convenient links
to the coast, the airport, and major
European cities. Fellows have full access
to extensive libraries, research centres, and
the facilities of the universities participating
in the ISIM: the University of Amsterdam,
Leiden University, the University of
Nijmegen and Utrecht University. 
For details on ISIM post-doctoral fellowships
and an online application form, please refer
to the ISIM website http://www.isim.nl
under the link “Fellowships” or contact
the ISIM secretariat:
ISIM, P.O. Box 11089
2301 EB Leiden, The Netherlands
Tel: +31-(0)71-527 7905
Fax: +31-(0)71-527 7906
E-mail: info@isim.nl
Website: http://www.isim.nl
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Five papers presented at the workshop
dealt with madrasas in South Asia,
home to the largest concentration of
Muslims in the world. Adil Mahdi, a
doctoral student at the Open Universi-
ty, Milton Keynes, UK, spoke about the
Indian madrasa and the spectre of “ter-
rorism.” He argued that unlike the case
of certain madrasas in Pakistan, not a
single madrasa in India has been in-
volved in “terrorist” activities. Numerous madrasas played a leading
role in India’s freedom struggle. Yet, the Indian state and the media
have mounted a relentless campaign to demonize the madrasas as
“anti-national.” Mahdi also spoke about the Deoband’s links with the
Taliban, arguing that although the two shared a common vision, they
differed in matters of strategy. The rise of the Taliban to power, he
stressed, owed less to their Deobandi ideology, than to political fac-
tors, including the support given to the Taliban by Pakistan, Saudi Ara-
bia, and the US.
Dietrich Reetz of the ZMO spoke about the changes in the Deobandi
madrasa following its split in 1982. Countering the stereotype of De-
obandi madrasas as hostile to change, he noted the reforms recently
introduced at the Dar ul-Ulum, including the setting up of depart-
ments of English and computer applications. Regarding the Deoban-
dis’ links with other groups, Reetz argued that the Deobandi ulama
were more concerned with countering other Muslim groups than with
non-Muslim communities. He also spoke of the efforts of some De-
obandis in promoting dialogue with Hindus.
Girls’ madrasas in contemporary India are a fairly recent develop-
ment. Mareike Winkelmann of ISIM dealt with the case of a Deobandi
girls’ madrasa in Delhi, showing how, by providing free education that
was also culturally relevant, such madrasas are playing an important
role in promoting literacy among girls from poor families. Although its
curriculum is conservative in terms of its vision of gender relations, the
madrasa affords new spaces for Muslim girls, including involvement in
the reformist Tablighi Jama’at, arguably the largest Muslim movement
in the world today.
Farish Noor’s paper dealt with the case of over a dozen Indonesian
and Malaysian students at two madrasas in Karachi, Pakistan, who were
recently deported to their countries and arrested on charges of being
involved with “terrorist” groups. These students have been denied a
fair trial by their governments, who, Noor claimed, appear to have
joined hands with the US to clamp down on dissenting Islamic move-
ments, branding them all as “terrorist.” This must be seen in the con-
text of the complex links between the US and governments in Muslim
countries allied to it, for both of whom the talk of madrasas as “dens of
terror” has come in handy to clamp down on internal opposition. The
agenda for reforming the madrasas has, unfortunately, today come to
be linked with the question of countering “terrorism.” Yoginder
Sikand’s paper focused on efforts being
made today by ulama and Muslim ac-
tivists in India to introduce modern
subjects in the curriculum, excise sub-
jects and books that are considered
irrelevant, and introduce reforms in
teaching methods.
Noorhaidi Hasan of the Institute for
Asian Studies, Leiden, dealt with the
Salafi or “Wahhabi” madrasas in con-
temporary Indonesia. He traced the evolution of the Salafis in Indonesia
and their adversarial relations with the Shafi’i ulama, Sufis, and abangan
or “lax” Muslims. He noted that some Salafi madrasas have been receiv-
ing generous support from Saudi Arabia, linking this to the Saudis
broader goal, which they shared with the US, of promoting a conserva-
tive, status quo, literalist Islam to counter anti-monarchical tendencies in
Muslim countries following the Iranian Revolution. He spoke of the in-
volvement of some Salafi madrasas in Indonesia in the militant Lashkar-i
Jihad movement and in the 2002 bombings in Bali, after which, he
noted, some of them have been banned by the government. Following
the events of 11 September 2001, he added, Saudi financial support to
Indonesian Salafi madrasas has significantly declined, leading to a crisis
in the Salafi camp.
Martin van Bruinessen’s paper focused on the pesantren system of Is-
lamic boarding schools in Indonesia. He noted that although a few pe-
santren in the country could indeed be said to be militant, this was
hardly true of the vast majority. The radicalization of some Indonesian
pesantren must be seen in the wider political context, and as a conse-
quence of the suppression of opposition movements by the Indone-
sian state. 
In her paper on Islamic education in China, Jackie Armijo of Zayed
University, Abu Dhabi, examined the growth of madrasas across the
country in a climate of greater religious freedom. Some of these are
part-time schools that allow their students to simultaneously study at
regular schools and colleges. Madrasas in China, except in the province
of Sinkiang, she said, are not a platform for anti-government propa-
ganda. She also referred to a number of Chinese Muslims who have
studied in Iran or in Arab countries and their role in setting up Islamic
schools in China after completing their studies abroad.
Christine Hunner of the University of Bochum, Germany, dealt with
Islamic education in contemporary Azerbaijan. Because of decades of
Soviet rule, she said, few Azeris have a sound knowledge of Islam, al-
though Islam remains an integral part of Azeri identity. She looked at
new ways of imparting Islamic education in Azerbaijan, including the
newly established Islamic Theological Faculty at the University of Baku
and Islam University in Baku, in which both Shias and Sunnis study to-
gether. She also reflected on the possible political implications of the
Turkish government’s promotion of a specifically Turkish form of Islam
in programs in this Shia majority country.
Overall, there seemed to be a near unanimity among the participants
about the fallacy of labelling all or even most madrasas as “dens of ter-
ror,” although they pointed out that some madrasas in certain coun-
tries can be said to be militant or even terrorist. Further, it was also
generally agreed that intellectual and financial links have long existed
between madrasas in different countries, and that most madrasas with
transnational connections have had nothing to do with terrorism, al-
though some certainly have. Some participants stressed the need to
look at the phenomenon of militancy in certain madrasas as, at least
partly, a reaction to state terror and to Western, particularly American,
hegemony. Stressing the need to counter misleading stereotypes, the
participants underlined the need for more empirically grounded stud-
ies of madrasas and their transnational linkages.
ISIM/Workshop
During the last week of May this year ISIM,
in collaboration with Zentrum Moderner
Orient (ZMO), Berlin, organized a two-day
workshop on the theme The Asian Madrasa:
Transnational Linkages and Real or Alleged
Political Role. The nine papers that were
presented at the workshop looked at
madrasas in different Asian countries in the
context of the ongoing debate on “terrorism.”
Madrasa in Asia
Yoginder Sikand was until recently a post-doctoral fellow at the ISIM. He now works as a
reader at the Department of Islamic Studies, Jamia Hamdard, New Delhi.
E-mail: ysikand@jamiahamdard.ac.in
The following ISIM publications are
available in hard copy. Please use the
order form on the ISIM website.
Publications in the ISIM Papers Series
include:
– Islam, Islamists, and the Electoral Prin-
ciple in the Middle East (ISIM Papers 1)
by James Piscatori
– Thinking about Secularism and Law
in Egypt (ISIM Papers 2)
by Talal Asad
– Shari'a, State, and Social Norms in France
and Indonesia (ISIM Papers 3)
by John R. Bowen
– “Traditionalist” Islamic Activism:
Deoband, Tablighis, and Talibs
(ISIM Papers 4) 
by Barbara D. Metcalf
Special ISIM Publications include:
– Muslim Jurists’ Quest for the Normative
Basis of Shari'a
(ISIM Inaugural Lecture) 
by Muhammad Khalid Masud
– New Voices of Islam
by Farish A. Noor (Interviews with
Muslim Intellectuals)
I S I M  P U B L I C A T I O N S
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ISIM/Lecture
Ramadan’s major contribution to the
debate on Islam in Europe is perhaps
his re-conceptualization of the tradi-
tional fiqh categories related to space
(from dar al-islam and dar al-harb to
dar al-shahada). While Ramadan has no
formal linkages to the class of ulama,
his contribution to the debate is testi-
mony to the worldwide emergence of
a Muslim intellectual elite, with a secu-
lar background (in his case, a doctorate
in philosophy), entering the restricted
world of religious representation and
interpretation. 
For many years now, Ramadan has
been touring Europe persuading Mus-
lims, and in particular the youth, that
they do not have to feel any guilt or
reservation about living in the non-
Muslim West. He argues that the Mus-
lim communities in Europe should not
wait for an Arab scholar to come and
solve their problems, but should start
actively participating in their new soci-
eties in order to find answers to their
predicament; Muslims, as upholders of
a universal religion, are not in need of a
justification for living as minorities,
“spreading out on the earth,” and “en-
joining the good.” 
Many contemporary Islamic scholars
would undoubtedly agree with Ra-
madan that the dichotomy between
dar al-islam and dar al-harb has be-
come obsolete in our globalized world.
This consensual assertion, however,
often hides the differences that still underlie, in the minds of the
ulama, Islamic thought and practice in the Muslim world, on one hand,
and in the “diaspora,” on the other. 
For Ramadan, on the contrary, a European Islamic identity is not—
or, should not be—a minimalist one. Exceptions based on rules of ne-
cessity (which, thus, do not question the norm) are no longer deemed
suitable. Rather, Muslims in Europe (and now, in America too) must
provide answers to the dilemmas they are facing, drawing mainly on
the Islamic principle which states, “all that is not strictly forbidden is
allowed,” allowing them to incorporate whatever good they en-
counter. 
This and other juristic principles governing the presence of Muslims
in the West were first enunciated in his book, To Be a European Muslim,
published in 1999. More recently, in his Western Muslims and the Future
of Islam (2003), Ramadan has attempted to provide concrete applica-
tions for these principles. 
In his lecture Ramadan adamantly stressed the importance of bind-
ing one’s loyalty to Islamic faith to one’s loyalty to the nation-state,
whose secular values allow Muslims to live their religion peacefully. Re-
ferring to the contemporary reflection on issues of fiqh al-aqalliyat (Is-
lamic law for Muslim minorities), which takes a similar stance on loyal-
ty, Ramadan criticised what he perceived as the negative conse-
quences of the minority syndrome, which encourages “ghettoization,”
preferring to emphasize the key concept of citizenship instead. 
Arguably, at the grassroots level, this is already happening: “Western
Muslims”—and this is a central theme of Ramadan’s work—are shap-
ing a new and civic form of Islamic reli-
giosity in tune with their time and
place. They are sowing, and perhaps al-
ready harvesting, the seeds for a “silent
revolution,” inexorably taking place
outside the media limelight. In Ra-
madan’s view, Western Muslims are
thus starting to re-read the Islamic
texts in the light of their cultural base
and social context, attempting to rec-
oncile between their Islamic values
and those of the democratic forms of
participation, and prevalent human
rights discourses. 
This, as Ramadan knows only too
well, is only one part of the multifac-
eted dynamics of Islam in the West:
along with progressive interpretations
and positive engagement co-exist fun-
damentalist movements and strong in-
ward tendencies, each claiming to
speak for the true Islam. As a commit-
ted Muslim intellectual he is faced with
a difficult choice: either to argue that
only the ulama may interpret the reli-
gious texts, and thus exclude other
voices (including, perhaps, his own)
from the debate on the meaning of
Islam; or to call for the democratization
of religious interpretation, despite the
very real fears that this may also lead to
extremism. 
Specifically questioned by the audi-
ence in relation to the above, Ramadan
was rather prudent in his articulation
of what constitutes Islamic authority in
the West: Muslims must start training their own future scholars, spe-
cialised in both Islamic sciences and knowledge of the local contexts
and histories; but until then it is up to the ulama, including those living
in the “East,” to draw the contours of the Western Islam for which he
has been advocating.
At the confluence of disciplines, Tariq Ramadan was perhaps not in-
terested in (sociologically) dwelling on the impact of national dynam-
ics on Muslims in the various European countries, nor did he elaborate
on the links between Europe and America. More importantly, given his
(implicit) theory that Muslims in the West represent the future of Islam,
he did not address the specificities of “Western Muslims” regarding
Muslims in the “East.” A frequent visitor to Muslim majority countries,
both in the centre and in the periphery, Ramadan is aware that the new
perceptions emerging among Muslims in the Western world are not
without precedents in the Muslim heartlands. As the life-stories of
Alioune (Dakar), Farina (Panamaribo), Ferhat (Istanbul) and Hanane
(Marrakech) from the Urban Islam exhibition (see p. 44) suggest, the
Muslim world as well, is undergoing profound structural changes, forc-
ing each individual believer to take position amid conflicting interpre-
tations and engage in the hermeneutics of sorting out the cultural
from the religious. 
A L E X A N D R E  C A E I R O
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In the context of the exhibition Urban Islam in
Amsterdam (see p. 44), the Royal Tropical
Institute and the ISIM co-organised a series of
lectures and debates. The theme of the
meeting held on 27 April 2004 was “From
Cyber Imam to European Islam: Youth and
Islam in Europe.” In his introduction to the
event, Alexandre Caeiro (ISIM) focussed on
how the Internet is giving rise to new types of
socialization among Muslims in Europe,
including original matrimonial strategies and
enhanced modes of political mobilization. The
main speaker for the evening was Tariq
Ramadan who delivered a lively lecture on the
role of Western Muslims and the future of
Islam to a mixed audience of Muslim youth
and non-Muslims.
European Islam and
Tariq Ramadan
Alexandre Caeiro is a Ph.D. fellow at the ISIM.
E-mail: caeiroa@yahoo.com
Tariq Ramadan at the European Social Forum, 2003
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Editors’ Pick
Contemporary Arab Thought
Studies in Post-1967 Arab Intellectual
History
By Ibrahim M. Abu-Rabi’
London: Pluto Press, 2004
This book retraces the Arab world’s
aborted modernity of the decades
after 1967 and explores the
development of contemporary Arab
thought against the background of
the rise of modern islamism and the
impact of the West on the modern
Arab World.
Memoires of an Iranian Rebel 
by Masoud Banisadr
London: Saqi Books, 2004
Masoud is a story unlike any other to
come out of Iran; at once a passionate
and terrifying account of one man’s
revolutionary journey, it is also a
poignant warning against the dangers
of extremism, such as that of the
Mojahedin.
Good Muslim, Bad Muslim
America, the Cold War, and
the Roots of Terror
By Mahmood Mamdani
New York: Pantheon Books, 2004
In this provocative book,
distinguished political scientist and
anthropologist Mahmood Mamdani
dispels the idea of “good” (secular,
westernized) and “bad” (premodern,
fanatical) Muslims, pointing out that
these judgments refer to political
rather than cultural or religious
identities. This book argues that the
terrorist movement at the center of
Islamist politics followed America’s
embrace of proxy war after its defeat
in Vietnam. With the invasion of Iraq,
as in Vietnam, America will need to
recognize that it is not fighting
terrorism but nationalism, a battle
that cannot be won by occupation.
Holy Terrors
Thinking about Religion
after September 11
By Bruce Lincoln
Chicago: The University of
Chicago Press, 2003
It is tempting to view the perpetrators
of the September 11 terrorist attacks
as evil incarnate. But their motives,
as Bruce Lincoln reveals, were
profoundly religious. Lincoln argues
for greater clarity about what we take
religion to be. Holy Terrors sorts
through the details and the religious
rhetoric of September 11 and
examines their implications for our
understanding of religion and its
interrelationships with politics and
culture.   
Humanism and Democratic
Criticism
By Edward W. Said
New York: Columbia University Press,
2004
Ever since the ascendancy of critical
theory and multicultural studies in
the 1960s and 1970s, traditional
humanistic education has been under
assaul. The late scholar and humanist
Edward W. Said, in a series of lectures
given at Columbia University in 2000,
forcefully argues for revitalizing the
humanities and for intellectuals to
reclaim an active role in public life.
Rethinking the Qur’ân
Towards a Humanistic Hermeneutics
By Nasr Abû Zayd
Utrecht: Humanistics University Press,
2004
Since the ninth century, discussion
about the nature of the Qur’ân has
been blocked in favour of the
Orthodox view that it is the exclusive
verbatim Word of God. This book aims
to reopen the debate by rereading
the classical material and addressing
the present situation of Muslims in
the context of the challenges of
modernity.
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Arts
Qajar
Reinterpreted
Qajar Series by
Shadi Ghadirian,
1999
The old sepia finish of the photographs shown here evokes
the impression of something outmoded. In them, Ghadirian
plays with a juxtaposition of modernity and tradition. But
there is further ground to these images. Modern identity is a
lens through which life in Iran is depicted. The tension evolv-
ing from the distance between the photographer’s perspec-
tive (modern identity) and the photographed subject (tradi-
tional identity) is strained with an irony that leaves the viewer
with a feeling of joy, rather than resignation.
H E I K E  G A T Z M A G A  FOR THE HOUSE OF WORLD CULTURES
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Shadi Ghadirian is representative of the young intellectuals
and avant-garde artists of Iran at the beginning of the 21st
century. She studied photography and was influenced by
the most liberal and creative of minds while even so she also
worked in an environment in which she was required to par-
ticipate actively in the acquisition of religious knowledge.
From this situation emerges a body of work imbued with
paradoxes. 
Shadi Ghadirian has been one of the contributors to the exhibition 
Far near Distance: Contemporary Positions of Iranian Artists,
House of World Cultures, Berlin, 19 March – 9 May 2004.
For more information please consult http:www.hkw.de.
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Photo Commentary
A Malaysian boy
holds balloons with
the logo of the
country’s ruling Barisan
Nasional as he awaits
the arrival of Prime
Minister Abdullah
Ahmad Badawi at
a campaign rally in Sik,
1 March 2004.
P H O T O  B Y
B A Z U K I  M U H A M M A D ,
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Millions of voters were
mobilized through
popular methods for
elections in Malaysia and
Indonesia in past months.
Voters participated in
spectacular rallies
reminiscent of football
rallies, and festive
promotion materials
were distributed in
the streets. 

Supporters of
Indonesia’s ruling party
Democratic Party of
Struggle (PDIP) led by
President Megawati
Sukarnoputri ride
a mock bull as they
wave party flags during
a campaign rally
in Surabaya, 
1 April 2004.
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